



Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Salem Generating Station

May 5, 1982

Mr. R. C. Haynes
Regional Administrator
USNRC
Region 1
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

LICENSE NO. DPR-70
DOCKET NO. 50-272
REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 82-023/03L

Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 1, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 82-023/03L. This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours,

H. J. Midura
General Manager
Salem Operations

RF:ks

CC: Distribution

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The Energy People

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05-2189 (M) 11-81
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Report Number: 82-023/03L

Report Date:

Occurrence Date: 04-06-82

Facility: Salem Generating Station, Unit 1
Public Service Electric & Gas Company
Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Containment-Plant Vent Radioactivity Monitors - Inoperable.

This report was initiated by Incident Report 82-075.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 3 - Rx Power 0% - Unit Load 0 MWe

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

On April 6, 1982, while preparing for a gaseous release, the Control Room Operator noticed that the sample pump for the containment-plant vent radioactivity monitors was de-energized. An investigation of the problem revealed that the air supply to Sample Valves 1VC8 and 1VC10 had been tagged out for maintenance. The valves had failed in the closed position, causing the pump to trip on thermal overload. The monitors were declared inoperable, and Limiting Condition for Operation 3.3.3.1 Action 20 was entered, retroactive to 1035 hours when the air supply valve had been closed. The gaseous release was not initiated.

This occurrence constituted operation in a degraded mode in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9.b.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

The Shift Supervisor had approved the tagout of the air supply valve without regard to the loss of air to Valves 1VC8 and 1VC10.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

Technical Specification 3.3.3.1 Action 20 requires:

With only two of the three required leakage detection systems operable, operation may continue for up to 30 days provided grab samples of the containment atmosphere are obtained and analyzed at least once per 24 hours when the gaseous and/or particulate radioactivity monitoring system is inoperable; otherwise, be in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:


The backup sample valves were opened, the pump was satisfactorily tested, and air flow was restored. The containment-plant vent monitors were declared operable, and at 2053 hours, April 6, 1982, Limiting Condition for Operation 3.3.3.1 Action 20 was terminated.

The Shift Supervisor involved was counseled by the Senior Shift Supervisor concerning Administrative Procedure AP-15, Safety Tagging Program.

FAILURE DATA:

Not Applicable

Prepared By R. Frahm



General Manager
Salem Operations

SORC Meeting No. 82-47