

DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING

422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28242

WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
STEAM PRODUCTION

May 7, 1982

USNRC REGION II
ATLANTA, GEORGIA

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TELEPHONE: AREA 704
373-4083

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re: Oconee Nuclear Station
Docket No. 50-269

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report RO-269/82-10. This report is submitted pursuant to Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specification 6.6.2.1.b(2) which concerns operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation, and describes an incident which is considered to be of no significance with respect to its effect on the health and safety of the public.

Very truly yours,

William O. Parker, Jr.
William O. Parker, Jr. *By [Signature]*

JFK/php
Attachment

cc: Document Control Desk
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Records Center
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
1820 Water Place
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

Mr. W. T. Orders
NRC Resident Inspector
Oconee Nuclear Station

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Duke Power Company
Oconee Nuclear Station Unit 1

Report Number: RO-269/82-10

Report Date: May 7, 1982

Occurrence Date: April 7, 1982

Facility: Oconee Unit 1, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Occurrence: Reactor Building isolation valve 1 LWD-1 was inoperable.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: 100% FP

Description of Occurrence: On April 7, 1982, valve 1LWD-1 did not close after pumping the Reactor Building normal sump. Valve 1LWD-1 is the Reactor Building isolation valve for the Reactor Building normal sump; thus, this event is a degraded mode per Technical Specification 3.6.3.b.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The apparent cause of this event was a dirty contact in the valve operating motor starting compartment. The contact opens when the "MOTOR OPEN" coil is energized in order to prevent the "MOTOR CLOSE" coil from being energized simultaneously. The dirty interlock contact did not close which prevented the "MOTOR CLOSE" coil from being energized when an attempt was made to close the valve.

Analysis of Occurrence: The redundant isolation valve, 1LWD-2, was operable at the time of this event. Additionally, valve 1LWD-2 was locked shut within one hour after valve 1LWD-1 was declared inoperable. The problem with valve 1LWD-1 was corrected and the valve declared operable within four hours; thus, the health and safety of the public were not affected by this incident.

Corrective Action: The valve was repaired by cleaning the dirty interlock contact and cycling the valve. The Limitorque Preventive Maintenance procedure has been revised to require specific visual inspection of the contacts, and cleaning of the contacts as necessary.