

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK / / / / / / (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

/0/1/ /V/A/N/A/S/2/ (2) /0/0/-/0/0/0/0/0/-/0/0/ (3) /4/1/1/1/1/ (4) / / / (5)
 LICENSEE CODE LICENSE NUMBER LICENSE TYPE CAT
 /0/1/ REPORT /L/ (6) /0/5/0/0/0/3/3/9/ (7) /0/4/1/3/8/2/ (8) /0/5/1/0/8/2/ (9)
 SOURCE DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

/0/2/ / During Unit No. 2 Refueling Outage, Type C tests revealed that a number of con- /
 /0/3/ / tainment isolation valves had an unacceptable leak rate. The as found leakage of /
 /0/4/ / all these valves exceeded the total allowable Type C leakage of 0.60 La. Integ- /
 /0/5/ / rity was maintained in all cases by the redundant valve, the steam generator, re- /
 /0/6/ / circ. spray or other heat exchanger shells; therefore the health and safety of /
 /0/7/ / the general public were not affected. This is contrary to T.S. 3.6.1.2 and re- /
 /0/8/ / portable pursuant to T.S. 6.9.1.9.d. /

SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE COMP. VALVE
 CODE CODE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBCODE

/0/9/ /3/A/ (11) /E/ (12) /D/ (13) /V/A/L/V/E/X (14) /X/ (15) /D/ (16)
 LER/RO EVENT YEAR SEQUENTIAL OCCURRENCE REPORT REVISION
 (17) REPORT NO. NO.
 NUMBER /8/2/ /- / /0/1/7/ / / /0/3/ /L/ /- / /0/

ACTION FUTURE EFFECT SHUTDOWN ATTACHMENT NPRD-4 PRIME COMP. COMPONENT
 TAKEN ACTION ON PLANT METHOD HOURS SUBMITTED FORM SUB. SUPPLIER MANUFACTURER
 /E/ (18) /Z/ (19) /Z/ (20) /Z/ (21) /0/0/0/0/ (22) /Y/ (23) /N/ (24) /A/ (25) /X/9/9/9/ (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

/1/0/ / All of the valves (except the service water butterfly valves) failed due to /
 /1/1/ / degradation of the seating surfaces. The limit switches on the service water /
 /1/2/ / valves were misaligned. The valve seats were lapped and the limit switches ad- /
 /1/3/ / justed to restore the leak rate to an acceptable level. /
 /1/4/ /

FACILITY METHOD OF
 STATUS %POWER OTHER STATUS (30) DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
 /1/5/ /H/ (28) /0/0/0/ (29) / NA / /B/ (31) / TYPE C TESTING /

ACTIVITY CONTENT
 RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
 /1/6/ /Z/ (33) /Z/ (34) / NA / / NA /

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES
 NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION (39)
 /1/7/ /0/0/0/ (37) /Z/ (38) / NA /

PERSONNEL INJURIES
 NUMBER DESCRIPTION (41)
 /1/8/ /0/0/0/ (40) / NA /

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)
 TYPE DESCRIPTION
 /1/9/ /Z/ (42) / NA /

PUBLICITY
 ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45)
 /2/0/ /N/ (44) / NA /

NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER W. R. CARTWRIGHT

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8205180339

Virginia Electric and Power Company
North Anna Power Station, Unit No. 2
Docket No. 50-339
Report No. LER 82-017/03L-0

Attachment: Page 1 of 1

Description of Event

During the Unit No. 2 Refueling Outage it was determined that 16 containment isolation valves had leak rates in excess of 35 SCFH each, and one valve had a leak rate of 6 SCFH. The valves were being tested as part of the refueling type C leakage determination. The maximum type B and type C leakage allowed by T.S. 3.6.1.2 is 0.60 La which corresponds to a leak rate of 154 SCFH.

Probable Consequences of Occurrence

Redundant isolation valves or heat exchangers provided containment integrity for all of the leaky valves. The blowdown isolation valves rely on the integrity of the steam generator shell. The component cooling valves have redundant isolation provided by the containment air coolers, the RHR heat exchangers and the excess letdown heat exchanger. The service water valves have redundant isolation provided by the recirculation spray heat exchanger shell. All valves had redundant isolation; therefore, the health and safety of the general public were not affected.

Cause of Event

The cause of valve leakage was due to seating surface degradation for all valves except the service water valves. The service water valves had excessive leakage due to misaligned limit switches.

Immediate Corrective Action

The valve seats were lapped and the limit switches were adjusted to restore the leak rate to an acceptable level.

Scheduled Corrective Action

No further corrective action is scheduled.

Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence

No further action is required.

Generic Implications

There are no generic implications associated with this event.