

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

In the Matter of)
General Electric Company)
Standard Plant)

Docket No. STN 50-447

AMENDMENT NO. 2 TO APPLICATION

FDA REVIEW OF 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC

STANDARD SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT (GESSAR II)

General Electric Company, applicant in the above captioned proceeding, hereby files Amendment No. 2 to the 238 Nuclear Island General Electric Standard Safety Analysis Report (GESSAR II).

Amendment No. 2 consists of two parts, a non-proprietary portion and a portion considered by the General Electric Company to be proprietary. The pages considered to be proprietary are so marked and are transmitted under separate cover.


Amendment No. 2 amends GESSAR II by adding Appendix 15D to Chapter 15. Appendix 15D provides a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) which quantifies the risk associated with operating a BWR/6 standard plant with a reference Mark III containment for the purpose of electrical power generation.

The PRA demonstrates that the risk of operating the BWR/6 standard plant is minimal relative to other societal risks and addresses issues that have been raised with regard to severe accidents. This PRA is provided for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's review of the 238 Nuclear Island GESSAR II Severe Accident Design.

Respectfully submitted,


General Electric Company

by:



G. G. Sherwood, Manager
Nuclear Safety and Licensing Operation

8205140413 820319
PDR ADDCK 05000447
K PDR

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 19 day of March 1982.



by:



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Respectfully submitted,

General Electric Company

by: s/G. G. Sherwood
G. G. Sherwood, Manager
Nuclear Safety and Licensing Operation

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 19 day of March 1982.

by: s/Karen S. Vogelhuber
Karen S. Vogelhuber
Notary Public - California
Santa Clara County
My Commission Expires
December 21, 1984
175 Curtner Avenue
San Jose, CA 95125

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SEVERE ACCIDENTS

APPENDIX 15D
SEVERE ACCIDENTS

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 (To be submitted 5/82)

APPENDIX 15D
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 GE PROPRIETARY - Provided under separate cover

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APPENDIX 15D
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(To be submitted 5/82)