

Certified By M.A. Perkins 5/6/92

TO:

Ronald C. Haynes  
Administrator of Regulatory Operations  
Region I  
631 Park Avenue  
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FROM:

Jersey Central Power & Light Company  
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station  
Docket No. 50-219  
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

SUBJECT:


Reportable Occurrence Report No. 50-219/82-12 <sup>LER#</sup> 101P

The following is a preliminary report being  
submitted in compliance with the Technical  
Specifications, paragraph 6.9.2.a.(3).

REPORT DATE:

March 1, 1982

Preliminary Approval:



Peter B. Fiedler  
Vice-President - Director Oyster Creek

Director (2)  
Office of Management Information and  
Program Control  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555

NRC Resident Inspector (1)  
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station  
Forked River, NJ 08731

OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION  
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Licensee Event Report  
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-12/01P

Report Date

March 1, 1982

Occurrence Date

February 26, 1982

Identification of Occurrence

Reactor Building to Suppression Chamber vacuum breaker valve V-26-18 was found to be installed improperly. This is suspected to have occurred following maintenance in May 1980. The valve shaft was misaligned with the valve operator causing the valve to neither fully open nor fully close when stroked for operation.

This event is considered a violation of Technical Specification 3.5.A.4 and reportable in accordance with paragraph 6.9.2.a.(3).

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

The plant has been operating in various modes.

Description of Occurrence

On February 7, 1982, while conducting local leak rate testing on the reactor building to suppression chamber vacuum breakers, it was found that air operated vacuum breaker valve V-26-18 exceeded the allowable leak rate. Subsequent investigation revealed that the valve shaft was improperly aligned with the operator such that when the operator indicated closed, the disc was actually between the open and closed positions. Maintenance records indicate that the valve was last disassembled and inspected on May 18, 1980.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence

The cause of this occurrence is due to an inadequate procedure. The maintenance procedure does not provide adequate instructions on disassembly of the valve to ensure correct orientation of the valve shaft and operator on reinstallation. Although the procedure requires that a leak rate test of the valve be performed after maintenance, the results of that test did not indicate that a problem existed. This aspect of the occurrence is still under investigation.

### Analysis of Occurrence

The vacuum relief system from the reactor building to the pressure suppression chamber consists of two 100% vacuum relief breaker subsystems (2 parallel sets of 2 valves in series). The purpose of the vacuum relief valves is to equalize pressure so that containment external design pressure limits are not exceeded. Operation of either subsystem will maintain the suppression chamber external pressure less than its design pressure of 1 psi. Further investigation into the operability of this valve and its redundant valve (V-26-16), along with the operability of the other valves contained in the subsystems, will be performed to determine the effect of this occurrence on plant safety.

### Corrective Action

Immediate corrective actions taken included properly realigning the valve shaft with the operator and performing a leak test on the valve. This test was completed satisfactorily on February 22, 1982.

### Failure Data

Not applicable.