

Washington Public Power Supply System

Box 1223 Elma, Washington 98541 (206) 482-4428

Docket Numbers 50-508 and 50-509

April 29, 1982

603-82-432

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region V
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
1450 Maria Lane, Suite 260
Walnut Creek, California 94596-5368


Attention: Mr. T. W. Bishop
Chief, Reactor Construction Projects Branch

Subject: PROJECT NOS. 3 AND 5
10CFR50.55(e) POTENTIALLY REPORTABLE CONDITION
ARTIFICIAL ENHANCEMENT OF RADIOGRAPHIC FILM (D/N #41)

In accordance with the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e), Region V was notified that the subject condition was potentially reportable. Subsequent investigation has determined that the deficiency is not significant and were it to have remained uncorrected it would not have adversely affected the safety of operations of the facility.

Attached is the Supply System approved final report for the subject condition detailing a description of the deficiency, corrective/preventive actions taken and safety analysis.

Should you have any questions or desire further information, please contact me directly.



R. S. Leddick, 760
Program Director, WNP-3

DRC/tt

Attachment

cc: J. Adams - NESCO
D. Smithpeter - BPA
Ebasco - New York
WNP-3/5 Files - Richland

WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM

WNP-3/5

ENGINEERING FINAL REPORT

10CFR50.55(e) POTENTIALLY REPORTABLE CONDITION

ARTIFICIAL ENHANCEMENT OF RADIOGRAPHIC FILM (D/N #41)

1.0 DESCRIPTION OF THE DEFICIENCY AND ITEMS OF CONCERN

On October 12, 1981, the NDE Group, Quality Assurance Engineering Department, Ebasco Services, Inc., Lyndhurst, New Jersey identified malpractice in the form of mechanically enhanced penetrameter images on radiographs of piping subassemblies submitted by Associated Piping and Engineering Corporation (AP&E), Compton, California. The radiographs were submitted by AP&E to obtain Ebasco's acceptance and release of piping subassemblies for shipment to the WNP-3/5 Site.

The enhancement was detected when the film reviewer noticed a difference in the appearance of two penetrameter images on the same radiograph. The radiograph was then viewed under reflected light to observe the surface. At that time, it was found that one penetrameter had the 4T hole darkened with a pencil mark. The enhancement was found by the Lyndhurst Office on radiographs of ten (10) spools.

On October 16, 1981, a Nonconformance Report (NCR) identifying the ten (10) pipe spools, was forwarded to AP&E for disposition. Upon receipt of the NCR, AP&E reviewed all radiographs of the pipe spools fabricated from August 1, 1981 to the time of receipt of the NCR and discovered 19 additional pipe spools with enhanced radiographs. Thus, a total of 29 spools at the AP&E Compton facility were discovered with enhanced radiographs.

This time frame was based on the AP&E interpreter's assurance that the enhancement had taken place over a 4 to 6 weeks period prior to the finding of the enhancement by the Lyndhurst Office. Also the radiographs of all spools waiting for Ebasco's acceptance and release for shipment to the WNP-3/5 Site were taken during this time frame.

After the NCR was issued, Ebasco NDE personnel at WNP-3/5 reviewed the radiographs of all spools fabricated by AP&E Compton and delivered to the Site. This review resulted in the finding of radiographic enhancement on eight (8) spools taking place between May 1, 1980 and August 1, 1981. On November 3, 1982, Ebasco Site personnel initiated a second NCR for these radiographs.

On December 1, 1981, the NRC was notified of the deficiency in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e) and on January 11, 1982 an Interim Report was submitted to the NRC.

Findings of radiograph enhancement are summarized below. Records of re-radiographed films are available at the site.

Spools at WNP-3/5 Site

<u>No. of Spools</u>	<u>No. of Welds</u>	<u>No. of Films</u>	<u>Found By</u>
8	11	20	Ebasco - Site

1.0 DESCRIPTION OF THE DEFICIENCY AND ITEMS OF CONCERN (Continued)

Spools at AP&E Compton Facility

<u>No. of Spools</u>	<u>No. of Welds</u>	<u>No. of Films</u>	<u>Found By</u>
10	25	46	Ebasco - Lyndhurst
<u>19</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>37</u>	AP&E - Compton
29	48	83	

2.0 CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN

Upon receipt of the NCR, AP&E confirmed radiograph enhancement on a total of 29 spools at the AP&E facility and obtained acknowledgement of the AP&E Level II inspector that he had artificially enhanced some film where the 4T holes were not clearly visible. AP&E dismissed the Level II inspector. On October 20, 1981, a stop shipment order was imposed on AP&E.

On October 26-27, 1981, Ebasco NDE personnel visited the AP&E Compton facility and reviewed all original radiographs taken from August 1, 1981 as well as re-radiographs of spools involved with radiograph enhancement. They confirmed that radiograph enhancement was involved on only 29 spools among the spools at the Compton facility.

On November 2, 1981, AP&E completed re-radiographing the 29 spools and mailed the films to the Lyndhurst Office for acceptance.

The Lyndhurst Office reviewed the films and did not observe any defective welds. They then notified AP&E that the films were acceptable and the spools were released for shipment.

AP&E reviewed film for the eight (8) spools at the Site and determined that the film for only two (2) of the spools was acceptable and six (6) spools required re-radiographs. Ebasco Site NDE personnel concurred with this determination and six (6) spools were re-radiographed at the Site. After the six (6) spools were re-radiographed, Ebasco NDE reviewed these films and released all eight (8) spools for installation.

The AP&E Level III radiographer has committed to over-viewing all radiographs generated by AP&E Compton for the WNP-3/5 Site to prevent further occurrence of the identified deficiency.

3.0 ANALYSIS OF SAFETY IMPLICATIONS

The Ebasco NDE Group reviewed re-radiographed or duplicate films of all 37 spools involved with radiograph enhancement and confirmed that the welds were of acceptable quality and did not contain rejectable defects.

3.0 ANALYSIS OF SAFETY IMPLICATIONS (Continued)

The deficiency was a result of malpractice by a Level II inspector at AP&E, Compton facility. However, even if the marking of radiographs was not detected and had remained uncorrected, the deficiency would not have adversely affected the safety of the plant since no rejectable defects were found. Thus, the deficiency has been determined to be not significant nor reportable.