

TABLE 3.3.1-1 (Continued)

REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

ACTION 9 - In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 or 2, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 6 hours.

In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 3 or 4, lock the reactor mode switch in the Shutdown position within one hour.

In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 5, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes and fully insert all insertable control rods within one hour.

TABLE NOTATIONS

- a. A channel may be placed in an inoperable status for up to 2 hours for required surveillance without placing the trip system in the tripped condition provided at least one OPERABLE channel in the same trip system is monitoring that parameter.
- b. The "shorting links" shall be removed from the RPS circuitry during CORE ALTERATIONS and shutdown margin demonstrations performed in accordance with Specification 3.10.3.
- c. The IRM scrams are automatically bypassed when the reactor vessel mode switch is in the Run position and all APRM channels are OPERABLE and on scale.
- d. An APRM channel is inoperable if there are less than 2 LPRM inputs per level or less than eleven LPRM inputs to an APRM channel.
- e. These functions are not required to be OPERABLE when the reactor pressure vessel head is unbolted or removed.
- f. This function is automatically bypassed when the reactor mode switch is in other than the Run position.
- g. This function is not required to be OPERABLE when PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is not required; this function may be bypassed when necessary for containment inerting or de-inerting (purging).
- h. With any control rod withdrawn. No applicable to control rods removed per Specification 3.9.11.1 or 3.9.11.2.
- i. These functions are bypassed when turbine first stage pressure is 250* psig, equivalent to THERMAL POWER less than 30% of RATED THERMAL POWER.
- j. Also trips reactor coolant system recirculation pump MG sets.
- k. Also trips reactor coolant system recirculation pump motors.

*Initial setpoint. Final setpoint to be determined during startup testing.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTERNAL PRESSURE

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.1.6 Primary containment internal pressure shall not exceed 0.75 psig.*

APPLICABILITY: CONDITIONS 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

With the primary containment internal pressure in excess of the specified limit, restore the internal pressure to within the limit within 1 hour or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.1.6 The primary containment internal pressure shall be determined to be less than or equal to 0.75 psig at least once per 12 hours.

*Except when performing the test required by Specification 4.6.4.1.b or the Special Startup Test authorized by Amendment No. 2, or when either inerting or de-inerting (purging) primary containment as required by 3.6.6.4.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT OXYGEN CONCENTRATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.6.4 The primary containment atmosphere oxygen concentration shall be less than 4% by volume.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, during the time period:

- a. Within 72 hours after THERMAL POWER is greater than 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER, following startup, to
- b. Within 72 hours prior to reducing THERMAL POWER to less than 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER preliminary to a scheduled reactor shutdown.

ACTION:

With the oxygen concentration in the primary containment exceeding the limit, be in at least STARTUP within 8 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.6.4 The oxygen concentration in the primary containment shall be verified to be within the limit within 72 hours after THERMAL POWER is greater than 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER and at least once per 7 days thereafter.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

BASES

CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE CONTROL (Continued)

The OPERABILITY of the systems required for the detection and control of hydrogen gas ensures that these systems will be available to maintain the hydrogen concentration within containment below its flammable limit during post-LOCA conditions. Either recombiner is capable of controlling the expected hydrogen generation associated with: (1) zirconium-water reactions, (2) radiolytic decomposition of water, and (3) corrosion of metals within containment. The hydrogen mixing system is provided to ensure adequate mixing of the containment atmosphere following a LOCA. This mixing action will prevent localized accumulations of hydrogen from exceeding the flammable limit.

The requirement for the primary containment atmosphere oxygen concentration to be less than 5% by volume is being added for fire protection considerations. This is being done in lieu of the installation of sprinkler for the recirculation pumps inside the drywell.