

## (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)[illegible]

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

7	8	9	FACILITY STATUS		% POWER		OTHER STATUS		METHOD OF DISCOVERY		DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION		80	
1	5		H	28	0	0	0	29	Mode 6	A	31	Operator Observation	32	
7	8	9	ACTIVITY CONTENT		RELEASED OF RELEASE		AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY				LOCATION OF RELEASE		80	
1	6		Z	33	Z	34	NA			NA			36	

8 9 10  
PUBLICATION  
ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45) 8205040776 820423  
PDR ADOCK 05000346  
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NRC USE ONLY  
2 0 N (44) NA  
68 69 70

NRC USE ONLY

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TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY  
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE  
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-82-22

DATE OF EVENT: March 26, 1982

FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Loss of one source range indication due to a cut cable

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 6 with Power (MWT) = 0 and Load (Gross MWE) = 0.

Description of Occurrence: At 0820 hours on March 26, 1982, the source range detector NI-2 high voltage cable was cut by a construction electrician working in containment penetration box PL1LI per Facility Change Request 79-401. This resulted in the loss of one of the two source range indicators as was noticed by the Control Room operator. The loss of one source range neutron flux monitor placed the unit in the Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.9.2 which requires an immediate suspension of all operations involving core alterations or positive reactivity changes. There were no core alterations or positive reactivity changes in progress at the time of the loss of the source range detector. No core alterations or positive reactivity changes were performed while the detector was inoperable.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The cause of the occurrence was a problem in coordination of work being performed per several different Facility Change Requests. The cables were to have been spared by several previous Facility Change Requests prior to being cut per Facility Change Request 79-401.

The Facility Change Request should have contained a warning of the required inter-relationships between the Facility Change Requests which had to be completed prior to cutting the cable.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or station personnel. The cut cable resulted in a loss of only one of two source range neutron flux indications. The signal is used for indication only and does not perform any control function when the reactor is tripped. No core alterations or positive reactivity changes were being performed at the time of the loss of the detector.

Corrective Action: The power supply for source range detector NI-2 was de-energized and the cut cable was reconnected to the bulkhead connector and remounted to the penetration phenolic plate. To prove operability, the "NI Detector Post Functional Test" IC 2002.03 and the "Source Range Functional Test" ST 5091.01 were performed and source range detector NI-2 was declared operable at 1400 hours on March 27, 1982.

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All remaining cables to be cut per Facility Change Request 79-401 were reverified to be spare prior to restarting work per Facility Change Request 79-401.

Failure Data: Although there have been previous failures of source range neutron flux indication, the causes of the loss were not similar to this occurrence.

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