

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIESGROUP HEIGHTLIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.3.1 All full length (shutdown and control) rods shall be OPERABLE and positioned within ± 12 steps (indicated position) of their group step counter demand position.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1* and 2*.

ACTION:

- a. With one or more full length rods inoperable due to being immovable as a result of excessive friction or mechanical interference or known to be untrippable, determine that the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 is satisfied within 1 hour and be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.
- b. With more than one full length rod inoperable or misaligned from the group step counter demand position by more than ± 12 steps (indicated position), be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.
- c. With one full length rod inoperable due to causes other than addressed by ACTION a, above, or misaligned from its group step counter demand height by more than ± 12 steps (indicated position), POWER OPERATION may continue provided that within one hour either:
 1. The rod is restored to OPERABLE status within the above alignment requirements, or
 2. The remainder of the rods in the group with the inoperable rod are aligned to within ± 12 steps of the inoperable rod within one hour while maintaining the rod sequence and insertion limits of Figures 3.1-1 and 3.1-2; the THERMAL POWER level shall be restricted pursuant to Specification 3.1.3.6 during subsequent operation, or
 3. The rod is declared inoperable and the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 is satisfied. POWER OPERATION may then continue provided that:
 - a) A reevaluation of each accident analysis of Table 3.1-1 is performed within 5 days; this reevaluation shall confirm that the previously analyzed results of these accidents remain valid for the duration of operation under these conditions.

*See Special Test Exceptions 3.10.2 and 3.10.3

#One time only exception allowing time for being in HOT STANDBY to be extended from 6 to 9 hours for completion for surveillance testing on April 28, 1982.

ATTACHMENT 2

SAFETY EVALUATION FOR CHANGE TO

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (FNP-2)

I. Background

During performance of a scheduled surveillance test at 11:35 P.M. on April 27, 1982, Shutdown Bank A Group 1 could not be inserted in accordance with surveillance requirement 4.1.3.1.2. Action statement (b) of LCO 3.1.3.1 was invoked at 11:35 P.M. Subsequently, it was determined that Group 1 of Control Banks A and C could not be inserted per the surveillance requirement. At no time was it determined that these rods could not be fully inserted if required by a reactor trip condition. Troubleshooting determined that power cabinet 1 AC was not receiving the signals required for the rod control system to insert the above rods upon operator demand. It was determined that the slave cyclor step counter encoder card was defective. The card was replaced and the applicable surveillance test was successfully performed resulting in all rods being declared operable at 5:53 A.M. on April 28, 1982.

II. Reference

Technical Specification 3.1.3.1

III. Bases

The Farley Rod Control System consists of two Shutdown Banks (A & B) and four Control Banks (A, B, C and D) each with two groups of four rods. During normal power operation, all banks except control bank D are fully withdrawn. Control Bank D is slightly inserted for power shape control purposes. The Control Rod System is described in FSAR Section 7.7.

During performance of the technical specification surveillance test described in Section I, only Group 1 of Shutdown Bank A and Group 1 of Control Banks A and C were affected. It was determined that these three rod groups, controlled by power cabinet 1 AC, failed to move upon operator demand. The "group cycling" light did not illuminate indicating that the groups were not receiving a demand signal to move. It was apparent that the electronic portion of the control system was inoperable; however, no evidence existed to indicate these rods were incapable of insertion under trip conditions. This conclusion was verified upon correction of the electrical malfunction which allowed the surveillance test to be successfully completed.

IV. Conclusion

The original LCO action statement allows six (6) hours to return the rod control system to operable status. Since the affected rod bank

groups could have performed their trip function during the requested extension it is the judgement of Alabama Power Company that this extension did not involve an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10CFR50.59. This one time exception to the Technical Specification did not affect the safe operation of Farley Unit 2.