

CONTROL BLOCK:

						(1)
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0	1	G	A	E	I	H	1	2	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	3	4	1	1	1	1	4			5		
7	8	LICENSEE CODE						14	15	LICENSE NUMBER										25	26	LICENSE TYPE					30	57	CAT		58

CON'T

0 1 7 8 REPORT SOURCE L 6 0 5 0 0 0 3 2 1 7 0 2 1 1 8 2 8 0 3 0 4 8 2 9 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

On 2-11-82, with Unit 1 at steady state power, the HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump (AOP) failed to perform as expected while performing HNP-1-3318, HPCI "Hydraulic Oil Piping Moisture Protection". HPCI was declared inoperable per T.S. 3.5.D.2. RCIC, ADS, CS, & LPCI were operable. There were no effects upon public health & safety due to this repetitive occurrence. (Ref. LER 50-321/81-138). Unit 2 HPCI utilizes the same design but no problems with the AOP could be identified.

09		SYSTEM CODE		CAUSE CODE		CAUSE SUBCODE		COMPONENT CODE				COMP. SUBCODE		VALVE SUBCODE					
0	9	S	F	E		D		C	K	T	B	R	K	B	Z				
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21					
LER/RO REPORT NUMBER		EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE		REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.									
17		8	2		0	1	2		0	3	L		0						
21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32								
ACTION TAKEN		FUTURE ACTION		EFFECT ON PLANT		SHUTDOWN METHOD		HOURS		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED		NPRD-4 FORM SUB.		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER			
A	Z	Z		Z		0	0	0	0	Y		N		A		C	7	7	0
33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47					

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 The cause of the AOP cycling was not positively identified since the con
1 1 dition could not be reproduced. Components associated with the logic were
1 2 inspected & no problems were found. The components suspected to be at
1 3 fault were replaced. The HPCI AOP was operated successfully & the system
1 4 was proven operable.

8 9 FACILITY STATUS (28) 0 8 6 (29) NA OTHER STATUS (30) METHOD OF DISCOVERY (31) B "HPCI Hyd. Piping Moist. Prot." Proc. DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)

ACTIVITY CONTENT
RELEASED OF RELEASE

1 6 2 33 34 35

7 8 9 10 11

AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY

NA

45 80

LOCATION OF RELEASE

36

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

NUMBER		TYPE	DESCRIPTION
1	7	000	(37) Z (38) NA (39)

PERSONNEL INJURIES										
NUMBER			DESCRIPTION							
1	8		0	0	0	40	NA			

		LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY		
		TYPE	DESCRIPTION	
1	9	Z	(42) NA	(43)

PUBLICATION		ISSUED		DESCRIPTION		NRC USE ONLY	
2	0	N	44	NA	820428	2509	

NAME OF PREPARER C. L. Coggin - Supt. Plt. Eng. Serv.

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LER #: 50-321/1982-12
Licensee: Georgia Power Company
Facility Name: Edwin I. Hatch
Docket #: 50-321

Narrative Report
for LER 50-321/1982-12

On 2-11-82, with Unit 1 at steady state 86% thermal power, the bi-weekly running of the HPCI auxiliary oil pump (1E41-C002-3) per HNP-1-3318 "HPCI Hydraulic Oil Piping Moisture Protection" was to be performed. It was noticed that the Auxiliary Oil Pump (A.O.P.) rapidly cycled on and off approximately 5 times before "sealing-in" and running normally.

The HPCI system was declared inop and per Tech Spec 3.5.D.2, RCIC, CS, LPCI, and ADS were operable. There were no effects upon public health and safety due to this repetitive occurrence. (Ref. LER 50-366/1981-138).

The cause of the Auxiliary Oil Pump (A.O.P.) cycling was not positively identified. Upon investigation into the A.O.P. cycling, the condition could not be reproduced and therefore the identification of the exact component causing the problem was impossible. An inspection of the electrical components associated with the "seal-in" logic was performed. The inspection yielded two components most probable to be the cause of the A.O.P. failure. The first component was the MCC starter relay (Cutler-Hammer Model #6002H342B). The relay is mounted in such a position that dust accumulates on the coil and relay lever which are above the open contacts. After relay activation, dust could fall onto the contacts and prevent "seal-in". The second component was the HPCI A.O.P. start pressure switch (Square D Model #9012 ACW). Although both components functioned properly upon inspection, they both were replaced to prevent recurrence. The A.O.P. was operated several times successfully and the HPCI system was proven operable per Tech Specs. Conversations with the Cutler-Hammer product service department indicated that they were not aware of any problems with the relay contacts collecting dust and no modified design from them is available to solve this problem. The failed relay assembly is to be examined by Cutler-Hammer for possible changes to the design to prevent recurrence of this event. Unit 2 A.O.P. Motor Control Center is a different type (GE Model # IC2820A100) and is not subject to similar dust collection problems.

The A.O.P. surveillance is 3 times a month (HNP-1-3303 and HNP-1-3318).