NRC FORM 366
(7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 LICENSEE CODE: G A E I H 1 (2) LICENSE NUMBER: 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 (3) LICENSE TYPE: 4 1 1 1 1 (4) CAT (5)

CON'T 01 REPORT SOURCE: L (6) DOCKET NUMBER: 0 5 0 0 0 3 2 1 (7) EVENT DATE: 0 2 1 3 8 2 (8) REPORT DATE: 0 3 0 2 8 2 (9)

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 On 2-13-82 at 9:25 CST during startup, the APRMs had not been adjusted
03 per T.S. 3.1.B within the 2 hr. time limit. Corrective action to reduce
04 the CMFLPD/FRTP ratio had been started within 15 minutes but the actions
05 had been ineffective. A power reduction to 25% was not required as sub-
06 suquent actions did have the problem corrected by 11:45 CST. This is not
07 a repetitive event. There were no effects upon public health or safety
08 due to this event.

09 SYSTEM CODE: Z Z (11) CAUSE CODE: A (12) CAUSE SUBCODE: X (13) COMPONENT CODE: Z Z Z Z Z Z (14) COMP. SUBCODE: Z (15) VALVE SUBCODE: Z (16)

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER: EVENT YEAR 8 2 — SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 0 1 3 / OCCURRENCE CODE 0 3 REPORT TYPE L — REVISION NO. 0

ACTION TAKEN: X (18) FUTURE ACTION: H (19) EFFECT ON PLANT: Z (20) SHUTDOWN METHOD: Z (21) HOURS (22): 0 0 0 0 ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED: Y (23) NPRD-4 FORM SUB.: N (24) PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER: Z (25) COMPONENT MANUFACTURER: Z 9 9 9 (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 The initial corrective actions proved to be ineffective due to the
11 spatial redistribution of xenon from burnout coupled with an ineffective
12 rod pattern adjustment. A report is being prepared to familiarize the
13 site engs. with the event. To preclude scenarios of this sort in the fut-
14 ure a T.S. revision giving a more reasonable time limit is being prepared.

15 FACILITY STATUS: C (28) % POWER: 0 7 2 (29) OTHER STATUS (30): NA METHOD OF DISCOVERY: A (31) DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32): Personnel Observation

16 ACTIVITY RELEASED: Z (33) CONTENT OF RELEASE: Z (34) AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35): NA LOCATION OF RELEASE (36): NA

17 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER: 0 0 0 (37) TYPE: Z (38) DESCRIPTION (39): NA

18 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER: 0 0 0 (40) DESCRIPTION (41): NA

19 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43) TYPE: Z (42) DESCRIPTION: NA

20 PUBLICITY ISSUED: N (44) DESCRIPTION (45): NA NRC USE ONLY

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GPO 917-326

LER #: 50-321/1982-13
Licensee: Georgia Power Company
Facility Name: Edwin I. Hatch
Docket #: 50-321

Narrative Report
for LER 50-321/1982-13

On 2-13-82, at approximately 67% CMWT during a reactor startup following a scram recovery, an OD1 (Whole-Core LPRM Calibration) and P1 (Periodic Core Evaluation) were run which revealed CMFLPD (Core Maximum Fraction of Limiting Power Density) greater than FRTP (Fraction of Rated Core Thermal Power). Corrective action was initiated within 15 minutes to restore the CMFLPD/FRTP ratio but was not completed within the 2 hour time limit per Tech Specs 3.1.B. A power reduction to 25% was not required as subsequent actions corrected the problem and startup was continued. This is not a repetitive occurrence. There were no effects upon public health and safety due to this event.

The initial corrective action was unsuccessful due to the spatial redistribution of xenon from burnout, coupled with an ineffective control rod pattern adjustment by the reactor engineer. A report is being prepared by the cognizant engineer detailing the actions and reasons for their ineffectiveness for the benefit of the other reactor engineers.

Also, an extension on the 2 hour time limit to 6 hours will be sought through a Tech Spec revision. At the present the 2 hour limit does not always allow enough time to evaluate the situation, make appropriate corrections and then verify the results. The extension of the LCO to 6 hours will allow time for more effective corrective action, including updating of the process computer base distribution by the engineer, re-distribution of the local xenon concentrations in the core, and selection of rod maneuvers and/or core flow adjustments that will alleviate the problem.