

CONTROL BLOCK:

						(1)
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0	1	N	C	B	E	P	2	2	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	3	4	1	1	1	1	4			5			
7	8	9	LICENSEE CODE						14	15	LICENSE NUMBER										25	26	LICENSE TYPE					30	57	CAT	58

0 1 7 8

REPORT SOURCE 1 6 0 5 0 - 0 3 2 4 7 0 4 0 1 8 2 8 0 4 1 4 8 2 9

60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

0 2 | On 3-29-82 the plant was notified by the NRC that several utilities had identified a
0 3 | problem with CFD type relays manufactured by General Electric, as previously reported
0 4 | in LER 2-79-16. Following an investigation, it was determined that CFD type relays,
0 5 | utilized as phase differential relays in the diesel generators control circuitry,
0 6 | are not seismically qualified as required by purchase specifications in the deener-
0 7 | gized state. This event did not affect the health and safety of the public.

09		SYSTEM CODE		CAUSE CODE		CAUSE SUBCODE		COMPONENT CODE				COMP. SUBCODE		VALVE SUBCODE			
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22		
		E	E	B		A		R	E	L	A	Y	X	D			
LER/RO REPORT NUMBER		EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE		REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.							
23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34						
8	2			0	1	2	/	0	1	T							
ACTION TAKEN		FUTURE ACTION		EFFECT ON PLANT		SHUTDOWN METHOD		HOURS		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED		NPRD-4 FORM SUB.		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER	
35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52
X		X		Z		Z		0	0	0	0	Y		Y		N	

1 0 If mechanically shocked while deenergized, these relays, Model No. 12CFD22B2A, can

1 1 actuate causing a lockout of the affected diesel generator. Following the completion

1 2 of a plant Engineering evaluation, these relays will either be replaced with others of

1 3 a qualified design or the affected diesel control circuitry will be modified as required

to correct the problem.

8 9
FACILITY STATUS (30) % POWER OTHER STATUS (31) METHOD OF DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)

1 5 E 28 0 7 4 29 NA C 31 Special Investigation

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

ACTIVITY CONTENT
RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)

1 6 Z 33 Z 34 NA

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES
NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION (39)

1 7 0 0 0 37 Z 38 NA

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

PERSONNEL INJURIES
NUMBER DESCRIPTION (41)

1 8 0 0 0 40 NA

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY
TYPE DESCRIPTION (43)

1 9 Z 42 NA

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

PUBLICITY
ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45)

2 0 N 44 8204280207 NA

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

NRC USE ONLY

PHONE: 919-457-9521

LER ATTACHMENT - RO #2-82-12

Facility: BSEP Unit No. 2

Event Date: April 1, 1982

On March 29, 1982, the plant was notified by the NRC that several utilities had identified problems with CFD type relays manufactured by General Electric similar to that previously reported to the NRC in LER 2-79-16. An investigation by plant Engineering, UE&C and General Electric of the application of this type relay at the Brunswick site was conducted. This relay, which is utilized as a phase differential relay on the diesel generators, was determined to not be seismically qualified while in the normally deenergized state (the generator not tied to the emergency bus). When the relay is deenergized, there is no current flow in the instrument restraint coils which would limit spurious actuation due to an accidental mechanical agitation. As a result, accidental mechanical agitation of the relay can result in a lockout of the affected diesel.

Plant Engineering is presently evaluating either replacing this type relay with one of a fully qualified design or modifying the diesel generator control circuitry to alleviate the problem.

Until final corrective action to this event is accomplished, signs have been placed on each diesel generator local control panel cautioning personnel of the inherent sensitivity of these relays to mechanical agitation and alert them to the results of accidental relay actuation. Also, shift training has been provided to each shift to ensure that Operations personnel were aware of the potential problem and know how to reset the lockout if it did occur.