

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT**

EXHIBIT A

CONTROL BLOCK:										(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)									
<div> <div>01</div> <div>S C N E E 3 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 4</div> <div>7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60</div> </div> <div>LICENSE CODE 14 LICENSE NUMBER 25 LICENSE TYPE 30 CAT 58 5</div>										<div> <div>01</div> <div>L 0 5 0 0 0 2 8 7 7 0 2 2 6 8 2 8 0 4 0 9 8 2 9</div> <div>60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100</div> </div> <div>REPORT SOURCE 90 DOCKET NUMBER 98 EVENT DATE 74 REPORT DATE 80</div>									
<div> <div>02</div> <div>EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES 10</div> <div>7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60</div> </div> <div>Non-destructive testing of the HPI nozzle areas revealed that the 3A2 thermal</div>										<div> <div>03</div> <div>sleeve was displaced and that there were cracks in the ID of the piping and safe</div> <div>7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60</div> </div>									
<div> <div>04</div> <div>end. The 3B1 radiographs indicated a partial radial gap between the thermal</div> <div>7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60</div> </div>										<div> <div>05</div> <div>sleeve and safe end. This piping is expected to leak before breaking. A rupture</div> <div>7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60</div> </div>									
<div> <div>06</div> <div>in this line would be classified as a small break LOCA, an accident for which</div> <div>7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60</div> </div>										<div> <div>07</div> <div>FSAR analysis shows that the plant could be safely shut down. Thus, the health</div> <div>7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60</div> </div>									
<div> <div>08</div> <div>and safety of the public were not affected.</div> <div>7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60</div> </div>										<div> <div>09</div> <div>SYSTEM CODE 11 CAUSE CODE 12 CAUSE SUBCODE 13 COMPONENT CODE 14 COMP. SUBCODE 15 VALVE SUBCODE 16</div> <div>7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60</div> </div>									
<div> <div>10</div> <div>LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 17 EVENT YEAR 21 SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 24 OCCURRENCE CODE 27 REPORT TYPE 30 REVISION NO. 32</div> <div>7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60</div> </div>										<div> <div>11</div> <div>ACTION TAKEN 33 FUTURE ACTION 34 EFFECT ON PLANT 35 SHUTDOWN METHOD 36 HOURS 37 ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED 40 NPRD-4 FORM SUB. 42 PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER 43 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER 46</div> <div>7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60</div> </div>									
<div> <div>12</div> <div>CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 27</div> <div>7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60</div> </div>										<div> <div>13</div> <div>The apparent cause of the cracking in the 3A2 safe end and piping appears to be</div> <div>7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60</div> </div>									
<div> <div>14</div> <div>thermal fatigue resulting from a loose thermal sleeve. The 3A2 cracked piping,</div> <div>7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60</div> </div>										<div> <div>15</div> <div>safe end, and thermal sleeve were replaced. The 3B1 thermal sleeve was hard roll</div> <div>7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60</div> </div>									
<div> <div>16</div> <div>expanded to return the thermal sleeve to its intended condition.</div> <div>7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60</div> </div>										<div> <div>17</div> <div>FACILITY STATUS 28 % POWER 29 OTHER STATUS 30 METHOD OF DISCOVERY 31 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION 32</div> <div>7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46</div></div>									

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PHONE: (704) 373-7139