

DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING

422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28242

12 ~~11~~ 1 10:20  
APR

WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.  
VICE PRESIDENT  
STEAM PRODUCTION

March 24, 1982

TELEPHONE: AREA 704  
373-4083

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region II  
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re: Oconee Nuclear Station  
IE Inspection Report  
50-269/82-04  
50-270/82-04  
50-287/82-04


Dear Sir:

With regard to Mr. F. J. Long's letter of March 4, 1982 which transmitted the subject inspection report, Duke Power Company does not consider the information contained therein to be proprietary.

Please find attached responses to the cited item of noncompliance.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the statements set forth herein are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, executed on March 24, 1982.

Very truly yours,



William O. Parker, Jr.

JFN/php  
Attachment

DUKE POWER COMPANY

Responses to IE Inspection Reports 50-269/82-04, 50-270/82-04, and 50-287/82-04

Violation

Technical Specification 3.8.6 requires that during the handling of irradiated fuel in the reactor building at least one door on the personnel and emergency hatches shall be closed. The equipment hatch shall be in place with a minimum of four bolts securing the cover to the sealing surface.

Contrary to the above, on January 17, 1982 for a period of 14 hours, fuel handling transpired on Oconee Unit 2 with the equipment hatch unsecured. Bolts had been installed but a gap existed between the hatch and sealing surface.

This is a Severity Level V Violation (Supplement I.E.).

Response

1) Admission or denial of the alleged violation:

This violation is correct as stated. This incident was reported as RO-270/82-01.

2) Reasons for violation:

This violation resulted from personnel error on the part of the maintenance crew that had previously secured the hatch. The crew did not verify that the hatch properly contacted the sealing surface.

3) Corrective actions taken and results:

Fuel handling was suspended immediately upon discovery of the unsealed hatch. The hatch was properly secured and fuel handling was resumed. The appropriate procedure has been revised to require an inspection of the sealing surfaces to meet the intent of Technical Specification 3.8.6 during fuel handling operations. The crew involved in this incident was counseled, and appropriate maintenance personnel have reviewed the incident.

4) Corrective actions to be taken to avoid further violations:

See item (3) above.

5) Date when full compliance will be achieved:

All corrective actions have been completed.