MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
Helping Build Mississippi
P. O. BOX 1640, JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI 39205

April 9, 1982

NUCLEAR PRODUCTION DEPARTMENT

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Washington, D. C. 20555

Attention: Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director

Dear Mr. Denton:

SUBJECT: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station
Units 1 and 2
Docket Nos. 50-416 and 50-417
File 0260/6205
MSIV-LCS Instrument Line CTMT Isolation
AECM-82/102

During a final engineering design review of Grand Gulf Nuclear Station's (GGNS) containment isolation provisions, it was noted that the 3/4" MSIV-LCS instrument sensing lines for pressure transmitters E32-PT-N051A,E,J,N and E32-PT-N052A,E,J,N (P&ID,M-1097) located in the Auxiliary Building were provided with manual root valves which are not capable of automatic or remote manual operation.

Safety Guide 11 (3/10/71), Position C.1.c, recommends that instrument lines should be provided with an isolation valve capable of automatic or remote manual operation from the control room or another appropriate location and located in the line outside the containment as close to the containment as practical. The Safety Guide clarifies that the isolation valve should be outside of containment for greater accessibility.

In order to comply with the above design recommendations, the four manual root valves will be replaced with motor operated valves which will be remote manually operated from the control room with valve position indication located in the control room. This design modification will be implemented prior to startup from the first regularly scheduled, refueling outage.

Based on an engineering evaluation, it was determined that the current design configuration is justified for interim operations in that the inboard Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) is available to effectively isolate the instrument line should it fail and thus maintain containment and reactor coolant pressure boundary integrity.

Should the line fail within the steam tunnel, Class 1E temperature monitors would provide alarm indication to the control room operator. Should the line failure occur outside the steam tunnel, in the Auxiliary Building corridor, the leak would be detected by the Auxiliary Building vent radiation effluent monitoring system which services that area.

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With adequate provisions for isolation and leak detection, MP&L contends that interim operations is justified. If you have any questions or require further information, please contact this office.

Yours truly,

L. F. Dale
Manager of Nuclear Services

JTB/JGC/JDR:rg

cc: Mr. N. L. Stampley
Mr. R. B. McGehee
Mr. T. B. Conner
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Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director
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