Victoria Stello

MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
Helping Build Mississippi
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JAMES P. McGAUGHY, JR.
ASSISTANT VICE PRESIDENT

March 20, 1981

Office of Inspection & Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, N.W.
Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Attention: Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Director

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

SUBJECT: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station
Units 1 and 2
Docket Nos. 50-416/417
File 0260/15525/15526
PRD-81/10, Interim Report #1,
Possible MSIV Drain Line
Overpressurization
AECM-81/113

On February 18, 1981, Mississippi Power & Light Company notified Mr. P. A. Taylor, of your office, of a Potentially Reportable Deficiency (PRD) at the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS) construction site. The deficiency concerns the potential for overpressurization of the Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) Drain Line piping.

We have since determined the condition is reportable within the meaning of 10CFR50.55(e). The condition is not reportable under 10CFR21 because the component has not been offered to MP&L for acceptance. Attached is our interim report. We expect to submit a final report by September 16, 1981.

Yours truly,

For J. P. McGaughy, Jr.

ATR:mt
Attachment

cc: See page 2

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cc: Mr. N. L. Stampley
Mr. R. B. McGehee
Mr. T. B. Conner

Mr. Victor Stello, Director
Office of Inspection & Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Mr. G. B. Taylor
South Miss. Electric Power Association
P. O. Box 1589
Hattiesburg, MS 39401

INTERIM REPORT #1 FOR PRD-81/10

I. Description of the Deficiency

The Main Steam Isolation Valve Drain Line piping (System B21) between valves N1B21F021/F033 and Q1B21F113/F114 could be OVERPRESSURIZED. This could be caused by a loss of BOP power to the F033 solenoid valve which then causes the valve to fail open. With the F113 and/or the F114 valves in the closed position, while letting down condensate/steam through the F021/F033 valves, primary system pressure would be imposed on some 3" HBD and 6" HBC lines.

The piping is a common header for low point drain lines from the inside Main Steam Isolation Valves to the Main Condenser and is used for removing condensate generated during heatup and low power operation.

The failure of the piping could result in a degradation of the Auxiliary Building Isolation due to increased building pressure.

This is a design deficiency and is applicable to Units 1 and 2.

II. Approach to Resolution of the Problem

A. The causes of the condition were design errors in that the effects of overpressurization had not been considered on the inadvertent closure of valves F113 or F114 and in the failure to design the piping and valves for the maximum operating conditions.

B. To date, this type deficiency is known to exist only for the Nuclear Boiler System as described in Part I. Since the possibility exists for a similar problem in other systems which penetrate the Auxiliary Building, all mechanical systems are being reviewed to determine the extent of the deficiency.

C. Based on the results of the review noted in II.B above, actions to preclude recurrence will be established.

D. An engineering evaluation is in progress in an effort to eliminate the potential overpressurization of the main steam line drain piping and valves.

III. Status of Proposed Resolution

A. The cause of the condition has been identified as noted in II.A above.

B. The investigation into the extent of the deficiency is continuing.

IV. Reason Why A Final Report Will Be Delayed

A. The investigation in the extent of the deficiency has not been completed.

B. Corrective actions to resolve the specific deficiency identified and to preclude recurrence have not been established.

V. Date When A Final Report Will Be Submitted

We expect to submit a final report on or before September 16, 1981.