

PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY
Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station
Delta, Pennsylvania
17314

February 13, 1981

Mr. Boyce M. Grier
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region 1
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

SUBJECT: REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE - PROMPT NOTIFICATION

Confirming R. S. Fleischmann's conversation with Mr. Cowgill on February 11, 1981.

Reference: Docket No. 50-278
Peach Bottom Unit 3
Technical Specification Reference: 3.7.A.2 & 6.9.2a(3)

Report No. 3-81-8/1P.
Occurrence Date: February 11, 1981

Identification of Occurrence:

During the installation of a new penetration test connection to a containment atmospheric dilution line, primary containment integrity was breached for a short time period.

With the unit at initially full load, permission was obtained from the operating group to install a new test connection on the CAD containment penetration. The operating group had supposedly isolated the section of piping to be modified by closing the manual valve between containment and the location where the pipe was to be cut. Due to an incorrect location identification for the manual valve on a system check-off list, the operator closed the manual isolation valve on the 'B' CAD loop instead of the isolation valve on the 'A' loop which was being modified. Construction then proceeded to cut the 'A' loop 1" piping and install a 1" socket weld Tee connection. In attempting to make the closure weld on this new Tee, the slight differential pressure which existed between primary containment and secondary containment alerted the craftsman to the error. Primary containment was breached for less than 90 minutes.

Conditions Prior to the Occurrence:

Unit 2 operating at essentially full power.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

Improper designation of valve location on a system procedure resulted

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in an operator being directed to close a manual containment isolation valve on the incorrect loop. The isolation valves in this location did not have identification tags.

Analysis of Occurrence:

Primary containment was breached to secondary containment for approximately 90 minutes. Differential pressure between primary containment and secondary containment was very small, thereby minimizing leakage and making it difficult to identify the valving error immediately upon cutting the 1" pipe. The 1" pipe was cut in two locations and a socket weld Tee with the test connection and valves already fabricated was inserted. Leakage from containment was, therefore, minimum during this 90 minute period. A manual valve was available between containment and the cut which would have permitted isolating this line quickly had a significant differential pressure between primary and secondary containment occurred. Containment integrity was recovered after the problem was identified.

Corrective Action:


Immediate corrective action was taken to isolate the leak by closing the inboard manual isolation valve. This re-established primary containment integrity. Until the valving associated with this work could be corrected, both containment atmospheric dilution penetrations were isolated. This condition is permissible for a period of 30 days in accordance with paragraph 3.7.A.6.a. Operability of the '8' CAD system was re-established within one hour.

Additional corrective action associated with correcting the equipment location on the system procedure and installation of identification tags on these valves will be completed in the near future.

Previous Failures:

None similar.

Very truly yours,



W. T. Ullrich
Station Superintendent

WTU:ljm