

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK / / / / / / / (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

<u>/0/1/</u>	<u>/V/A/N/A/S/1/</u> (2)	<u>/0/0/-/0/0/0/0/0/-/0/0/</u> (3)	<u>/4/1/1/1/1/</u> (4)	<u>/ / /</u> (5)
LICENSEE CODE	LICENSE NUMBER	LICENSE TYPE	CAT	

REPORT SOURCE L/ (6) /0/5/0/0/0/3/3/8/ (7) /0/1/0/6/8/1/ (8) /0/1/2/8/3/1/ (9)
DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE

[illegible]

10/2/ While performing Type C penetration leak testing, it was determined to date /

10/3/ / that 14 valves had combined leakage that exceeded allowable limits. Since the /

10/4/ / penetrations containing the leaking valves did have additional isolation valves/

/0/5/ / or were in closed systems, the health and safety of the public was not jeopardized. /

10/6/ / dized. This event is reportable per Technical Specification 6.9.1.9.d. /

SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMP. COMPONENT CODE	COMP. SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE
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<u>0/9/</u>	<u>/S/D/</u> (11)	<u>/E/</u> (12)	<u>/X/</u> (13)	<u>/V/A/L/V/E/X/</u> (14)	<u>/X/</u> (15)	<u>/X/</u> (16)
LER/RO	EVENT	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.	OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE	REVISION NO.

(17)	REPORT NUMBER	DATE	REPORT NO.	CODE	TYPE	NO.
		/8/1/	/-/ /0/0/9/	/ / \ /	/0/3/	/L/
						/-/ /0/

ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME COMP.	COMPONENT SUPPLIER MANUFACTURER
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/0/ (18) /Z/ (19) /Z/ (20) /Z/ (21) /0/0/0/0/ (22) /Y/ (23) /N/ (24) /A/ (25) /X/9/9/9/ (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

/1/0/ / Valve leakage is believed to be due to deterioration of valve seats and in the /

/1/1/ / case of MOV-HV-100D, the limit switch was improperly set preventing full /

/1/2/ / closure of the valve. In all cases, valves will be reworked or adjusted until /

1/1/3/ / total containment Type C leakage is acceptable. /

FACILITY STATUS	%POWER	OTHER STATUS	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
/G/ (28)	/0/0/0/ (29)	/ NA / (30)	/B/ (31)	TYPE C TESTING /

/1/5/ /G/ (28) /0/0/0/ (29) / NA / (30) /B/ (31) / TYPE C TESTING /

[illegible]

/1/6/	/Z/ (33)	/Z/ (34)	/	NA	/	/	NA	/
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PERSONNEL EXPOSURES		
NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION (39)

11/7/ 10/0/0/ (37) 12/ (38) / NA /

PERSONNEL INJURIES	
NUMBER	DESCRIPTION (41)
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11/8/	10/0/0/	(40)	/	NA	/
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LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)	
TYPE	DESCRIPTION

1/1/9/ /Z/ (42) / NA

PUBLICITY

ISSUED	DESCRIPTION (45)
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2120	...
21	

/2/0/	/N/ (44)	/	NA	/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
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NAME OF PREPARER W. R. CARTWRIGHT

PHONE (703) 894-5151

Virginia Electric and Power Company
North Anna Power Station, Unit #1
Docket No. 50-338
Report No. LER 81-009/03L-0

Attachment: Page 1 of 2

Description of Event

While performing Type C penetration leak testing, it was determined, thus far, that 14 valves had combined leakage that exceeded maximum allowable limits. These valves are noted on the attached list. The total leakage resulting from the valves was such that the 0.6La limit was exceeded. When the leak testing is completed, an updated LER will be submitted to report any additional valve leakages.

Probable Consequences of Occurrence

The penetrations containing the leaking valves did have additional isolation valves or were in completely closed systems which mitigated any direct contact with the environment. The containment has operated at a vacuum such that any leakage from the primary which has occurred during this period of operation was not released to the environment. As a result, the public health and safety was not affected.

Cause of Event

Valve leakage is believed to be due to deterioration of the valve seats and the improper limit switch setting on MOV-HV-100D.

Immediate Corrective Action

Type C penetrations are being repaired or readjusted during the present outage.

Scheduled Corrective Action

All Type C penetrations will be repaired and retested until the total Type C leakage is within acceptable limits prior to Mode 4 operation.

Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence

The surveillance program for Type C penetrations has been instituted at North Anna in accordance with NRC guidelines. This program is designed to identify potential leakage paths and repair these valves on a regularly scheduled basis. Therefore, no further actions are required.

Generic Implications

The deterioration of valve seats is considered normal wear.

<u>Valves</u>	<u>Comp. Subcode</u>	<u>Valve Code</u>	<u>Component Manufacturer</u>
1-CC-559	C	D	M-360
1-CC-572	C	D	M-360
1-CH-322	C	D	E-090
TV-BD-100A	F	D	F-130
TV-BD-100B	F	D	F-130
TV-BD-100C	F	D	F-130
TV-BD-100D	F	D	F-130
TV-BD-100E	F	D	F-130
TV-BD-100F	F	D	F-130
TV-LM-100D	F	D	F-130
TV-SI-101	F	D	F-130
TV-SV-102-1	F	D	F-130
MOV-HV-100D	B	D	F-130
MOV-RS-101A	B	D	F-130