

PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY
Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station
Delta, Pennsylvania
17314

September 26, 1980

Mr. Boyce M. Grier
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region 1
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

SUBJECT: REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE - PROMPT NOTIFICATION

Confirming Steve Roberts' conversation with Mr. Cowgill on
September 26, 1980.

Reference: Docket No. 50-277
Peach Bottom Unit 2
Technical Specification Reference: 3.4.B.1

Report No. 2-80-20/1P
Occurrence Date: September 26, 1980

Identification of Occurrence:

With the unit operating at 99% power, annunciator "SBLC loss of continuity" alarmed, alerting the operator to a possible failure or firing of the 'B' standby liquid control squib valve. The explosive valve is continuously monitored by a light sensitive meter circuit in series with the squib firing mechanism. A loss of continuity in the circuit or the firing of a squib valve will alarm the continuity alarm.

The valve firing and monitoring circuitry is fed from a 480 V/120 V step down transformer in the pump breaker compartment. Investigation following the alarm found the breaker (52-3723) to be open. The feed was immediately restored. The NRC resident inspector was notified of the situation. Continued operation was permissible under technical specification limiting condition for operation 3.4.B.1. Due to the system being quickly returned to service, no testing on the 'A' SBLC pump was performed.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence:

Unit 2 operating at essentially full power. Both SBLC pumps and injection valves operable.

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Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

The breaker is located adjacent to a "step-off pad" at approximately knee level. It is believed the breaker was tripped accidentally by bumping into the throw switch while entering or exiting the area.

Analysis of Occurrence:

The SBLC system is designed to be used as a redundant and independent system to bring the reactor from full power to a cold, xenon free shutdown in the event of control rod failure to insert. The system is manually initiated from the control room through a three position key switch. Had initiation been required, the operator would have observed the failure of the 'B' pump to start and no flow. He would then be able to turn the switch to start the 'A' pump. Upon actuation of the switch both valves are designed to fire. However, only the 'A' would have opened under these conditions. Since the SBLC is designed to be able to provide the boron solution with only one pumping system available, the loss of one pump had minimal safety significance as described in technical specification 3.4 bases.

Corrective Action:

After the breaker was restored, satisfactory operation was verified by manually cycling the breaker open and closed. To preclude further inadvertent operation, the breaker switch was locked in the 'ON' position. The step-off pad in this vicinity is also being relocated.

Previous Failures:

None similar.

Very truly yours,



W. T. Ullrich
Station Superintendent

WTT:llh