



Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37379-2000

Robert A. Fenech  
Vice President, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

May 17, 1993

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
ATTN: Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

In the Matter of )  
Tennessee Valley Authority )

Docket No. 50-327

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) - UNIT 1 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-77 -  
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) 3.7.12 SPECIAL REPORT 93-04

The enclosed special report provides details concerning a fire barrier  
being breached for a period greater than the TS allowable timeframe in  
support of the Unit 1 refueling outage.

This report is being submitted in accordance with TS 3.7.12 Action  
Statement (a).

If you have any questions concerning this submittal, please telephone  
C. H. Whittemore at (615) 843-7210.

Sincerely,

Robert A. Fenech

Enclosure  
cc: See page 2

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Page 2  
May 17, 1993

cc (Enclosure):

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ENCLOSURE

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1  
SPECIAL REPORT 93-04

SHIELD BUILDING PENETRATION (MK. 22)

Description of Event

On April 15, 1993, with Unit 1 shut down for the Unit 1 Cycle 6 (U1C6) refueling outage (RFO), Shield Building Penetration MK 22 (auxiliary building, Unit 1 east valve room, Elevation 706.0) was breached to support the RFO activities. The penetration was breached in excess of the technical specification (TS) allowable time period of seven days. This condition is being reported in accordance with TS 3.7.12. Action Statement (a).

Cause of Condition

The MK 22 penetration was breached in order to route video and communication equipment cables into containment to aid in the radiological control of activities. The penetration will remain breached for the duration of the U1C6 RFO.

Corrective Action

In accordance with Limiting Condition for Operation 3.7.12 Action Statement (a), fire detectors on one side of the penetration were verified operable; a roving fire watch was immediately established and will be maintained until the breach is removed and the fire barrier is reestablished at the end of the U1C6 RFO.