



VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION

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BVY 93-49
May 13 , 1993

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

REFERENCE: Operating License DPR-28
Docket No. 50-271

SUBJECT: Report of Inoperable Equipment in the Fire
Protection System

Dear Sirs:

As required by Vermont Yankee Technical Specifications,
Section 6.7.C.2, we are submitting the attached Fire Protection
System Report.

Very truly yours,
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation

Robert J. Wanczyk
Plant Manager

cc: USNRC Resident Inspector
USNRC Regional Administrator
VT Department of Public Service

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FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM REPORT

REPORT DATE: May, 13, 1993

OCCURRENCE DATE: April 19, 1993

FACILITY:

Vermont Yankee, Vernon, Vermont

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

In accordance with Vermont Yankee Technical Specifications Section 3.13.D.2, this report is submitted as notification that the two Switchgear Room High Pressure CO₂ Suppression Systems were inoperable for greater than the fourteen days specified in the Technical Specifications.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Normal full power operation

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

From 1645 hours on April 5, 1993, until 1453 hours on April 22, 1993 the Switchgear Room CO₂ Systems were declared inoperable. This duration of 17 days exceeds the 14 days specified in Technical Specifications Section 3.13.D.2.

The Switchgear Room CO₂ Systems were declared inoperable in conjunction with inspection/repair activities undertaken to resolve fire barrier penetration questions (Reference LER 93-01). Removal of the manhole covers in the floor of the rooms changed the room volume and as such it was conservatively considered that the CO₂ Systems were inoperable even though the CO₂ systems were armed and ready to discharge in the event of a fire. The manhole covers were removed to allow surveillance of the manhole areas by continuous "fire watch" personnel equipped with portable fire suppression equipment, pending investigation and resolution of the questions related to the manhole and embedded conduit configurations. The manhole and conduit configurations and interconnection between the rooms were initially questioned as to whether they met the requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R.

On April 22, 1993 a Temporary Modification was approved which installed temporary clear covers on the manholes restoring the room volume to normal and allowing the CO₂ systems to be declared operable while permitting continuation of continuous "fire watch" of the manhole areas.

On April 28, 1993 an engineering analysis was completed that

concluded that the manhole and embedded conduit configuration are in compliance with Appendix R. The manhole "fire watches" will conservatively be continued until enhancements recommended in the engineering analysis are implemented.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

The cause of the occurrence was the performance of inspection and evaluation of Switchgear Room manholes and embedded conduits.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

Compensatory "fire watches" were put in place while the CO₂ Systems were declared inoperable and will remain in place until recommended enhancements are implemented.