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Docket No. 50-366

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant - Unit 2
Special Report 2-93-001
Fire Rated Sealing Device Inoperable for Greater Than 14 Days
Results in a Special Report as Required by the Fire Hazards Analysis

Gentlemen:

In accordance with the requirements of the Unit 2 Technical Specifications and the Fire Hazards Analysis, Georgia Power Company is submitting the enclosed Special Report concerning an event wherein a fire rated sealing device was inoperable for longer than 14 days as the result of planned activities. This event occurred at Plant Hatch - Unit 2.

Sincerely,

J. T. Beckham, Jr.

JKB/cr

Enclosure: Special Report 2-93-001

cc: Georgia Power Company
Mr. H. L. Sumner, General Manager - Nuclear Plant
NORMS

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C.
Mr. K. Jabbour, Licensing Project Manager - Hatch

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II
Mr. S. D. Ebner, Regional Administrator
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Enclosure

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant - Unit 2
Special Report 2-93-001

Fire Rated Sealing Device Inoperable for Greater Than 14 Days
Results in a Special Report as Required by the Fire Hazards Analysis

A. Requirement for Report

This report is required by the Plant Hatch Unit 2 Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.2, and the Plant Hatch Fire Hazards Analysis, Appendix B, Section 1.1.1. Specifically, Unit 2 Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.2 states:

Special Reports for fire protection equipment operating and surveillance requirements shall be submitted, as required, by the Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) and its Appendix B requirements.

FHA Appendix B, Section 1.1.1, states:

Fire-rated assemblies and sealing devices in fire-rated assembly penetrations separating portions of safety-related fire areas or separating redundant systems important to safe shutdown within a fire area shall be OPERABLE.

Furthermore, Action Statement (a) of Appendix B, Section 1.1.1, allows the fire rated assembly and/or sealing device to be inoperable for up to 14 days provided, within 1 hour, a continuous fire watch on at least one side of the affected assembly(ies) and/or sealing device(s) is established, or fire detectors are verified operable on at least one side of the inoperable barrier and an hourly fire watch patrol is established. Action Statement (b) states that if the 14-day time limit is exceeded, a Special Report must be submitted to the NRC within 30 days. On 4/7/93, fire rated sealing device 2Z43-H736D had been inoperable for greater than 14 days.

B. Unit Status at Time of Event

On 4/7/93 at 1050 CDT, Unit 2 was in the Run mode at a power level of 851 CMWT (35 percent rated thermal power).

C. Description of Event

This report describes an event in which a fire rated sealing device was breached in a controlled manner to support Unit 1 outage work and as a result was required to remain inoperable for more than 14 days.

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On 4/2/93, removal of valve 1P41-F363 commenced on the 112' elevation of the Unit 1 Turbine Building in accordance with Design Change Request (DCR) 1H92-057. The purpose of the valve is to provide a Plant Service Water (PSW) bypass of the Turbine Building to the circulating water system flume to accomplish circulating water system fill. This system alignment has not been used since unit startup; therefore, the valve did not provide a useful function and was being removed per the DCR. In order to support this activity, fire rated sealing device 2Z43-H736D was breached in a controlled manner to allow installation of a temporary supply and return line from the Unit 2 PSW system to the Computer Room/Carbon Dioxide Storage Tank Room Air Conditioning to ensure adequate cooling. Consequently, the sealing device was required to remain inoperable for greater than 14 days as the result of the modification activity. The subject sealing device is located in the Control Building 130' elevation Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning Room.

Because the DCR work would render the fire rated sealing device inoperable, licensed Control Room personnel were notified prior to start of work as required by plant procedures. Subsequently, Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 2-93-194 was initiated on 3/24/93 by licensed personnel to track the status of the affected fire rated sealing device as required by the FHA Appendix B, Section 1.1.1, Action (a) and the appropriate fire detectors were verified to be operable and an hourly fire watch patrol was established.

D. Cause of the Event

The fire rated sealing device was breached in a controlled manner to support scheduled refueling outage work, i.e., the removal of valve 1P41-F363 per DCR 1H92-057.

E. Analysis of Event

Licensed plant operations personnel declared the fire rated sealing device inoperable and established the required fire watches to ensure compliance with FHA Appendix B, Section 1.1.1 Action (a). The action statement requires that:

With one or more of the required fire rated assemblies and/or sealing devices (as stated in Section 1.1.1) inoperable, within 1 hour establish a continuous fire watch on at least one side of the affected assembly(ies) and/or sealing device(s) and establish an hourly fire watch patrol.

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The fire rated sealing device described in this report was breached in a controlled manner following approved administrative control procedures. An hourly fire watch was established and all requirements of the FHA were met. Thus, had a fire occurred in the affected areas, it would have been promptly detected and extinguished.

F. Corrective Actions

By 4/13/93, the fire rated sealing device was restored to operable status and LCO 2-93-194 was terminated.