



Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37379-2000

Robert A. Fenech
Vice President, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

April 16, 1993

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

In the Matter of)
Tennessee Valley Authority)

Docket No. 50-327

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) - UNIT 1 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-77 -
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) 3.7.12 SPECIAL REPORT 93-01

The enclosed special report provides details concerning eight fire barriers being breached for a period greater than the TS allowable time frame in support of outage-related activities. The enclosure contains details of the conditions for each barrier.

This report is being submitted in accordance with TS 3.7.12 Action Statement (a).

If you have any questions concerning this submittal, please telephone C. H. Whittemore at (615) 843-7210.

Sincerely,

Robert A. Fenech

Enclosure
cc: See page 2

220009

9304220184 930416
PDR ADOCK 05000327
S PDR

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Page 2
April 16, 1993

cc (Enclosure):

Mr. D. E. LaBarge, Project Manager
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
One White Flint, North
11555 Rockville Pike
Rockville, Maryland 20852-2739

NRC Resident Inspector
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant
2600 Igou Ferry Road
Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37379-3624

Regional Administrator
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30323-2711

ENCLOSURE

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPORT 93-01

A. SHIELD BUILDING PENETRATIONS

1. MK 100 (Elevation 700) breached April 1, 1993
2. MK 101 (Elevation 698.5) breached April 1, 1993
3. MK 21 (Elevation 707) breached April 13, 1993

Description of Condition

With Unit 1 shut down for the Cycle 6 refueling outage, the three shield building penetrations noted above were breached to support the Unit 1 Cycle 6 (U1C6) refueling outage activities. These penetrations will be breached in excess of the technical specification (TS) allowable time period of seven days. This condition is being reported in accordance with TS Action Statement 3.7.12.a.

Cause of Condition

The penetrations were breached in order to route the video and communications equipment cables into containment to aid in the radiological control of activities. The penetrations will remain breached for the duration of the U1C6 refueling outage.

Corrective Action

In accordance with Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.12 Action Statement (a), the fire detectors on one side of the penetrations were verified operable; a roving fire watch was immediately established and will be maintained until the breaches are removed and the fire barriers are reestablished at the end of the U1C6 refueling outage.

B. SHIELD BUILDING PENETRATION (MK 72)

Description of Condition

On March 23, 1993, with Unit 1 shut down for the U1C6 refueling outage, shield building penetration MK 72 (Elevation 717) was breached to support the steam generator (S/G) maintenance activities. The penetration will be breached in excess of the TS allowable time period of seven days. This condition is being reported in accordance with TS Action Statement 3.7.12.a.

Cause of the Condition

The MK 72 penetration was breached in order to route hoses and cables to support sludge lancing and eddy-current testing activities associated with S/G maintenance. The penetration will remain breached for the duration of the U1C6 refueling outage.

Corrective Action

In accordance with LCO 3.7.12 Action Statement (a), the fire detectors on one side of the penetration were verified operable; a roving fire watch was immediately established and will be maintained until the breach is removed and the fire barrier is reestablished at the end of the outage.

C. UNIT 1 UPPER (ELEVATION 734) AND LOWER (ELEVATION 690) CONTAINMENT AIRLOCKS

Description of Condition

On March 17, 1993, with Unit 1 shut down for the U1C6 refueling outage, the upper containment airlock on Elevation 734 was breached open. On March 26, 1993, the lower containment airlock on Elevation 690 was breached open. These airlocks were breached to support the U1C6 refueling outage activities. The airlocks will be breached in excess of the TS allowable time period of seven days. This condition is being reported in accordance with TS Action Statement 3.7.12.a.

Cause of the Condition

The upper and lower containment airlocks were breached to facilitate the movement of equipment, material, and personnel traffic into Unit 1 containment. The airlocks will remain breached for the duration of the U1C6 refueling outage except during the core alteration sequence (fuel movement) when the airlocks will be temporarily closed.

Corrective Action

In accordance with LCO 3.7.12 Action Statement (a), the fire detectors on one side of each of the airlocks were verified operable; a roving fire watch was immediately established for each airlock and will be maintained until the breach is removed and the fire barriers are reestablished before entering Mode 4.

D. FIRE DOOR A-62

Description of Condition

On March 25, 1993, with Unit 1 shut down for the U1C6 refueling outage, auxiliary building double fire door No. A-62 was breached open. The fire door was breached to support the U1C6 refueling outage. The breach will exceed the TS allowable seven-day time period. This condition is being reported in accordance with TS Action Statement 3.7.12.a.

Cause of the Condition

Auxiliary building fire door No. A-62 is a double door going into the Elevation 690 Unit 1 penetration room. The door will be breached to accomodate video and communication cables necessary to support S/G work and radiological control of activities. The fire door will remain breached for the duration of the UIC6 refueling outage.

Corrective Action

In accordance with LCO 3.7.12 Action Statement (a), the fire detectors on one side of the fire barrier were verified operable; a roving fire watch was immediately established and will be maintained until the breach is removed and the fire barrier is reestablished at the end of the outage.

E. REACTOR BUILDING UNIT 1 BIOLOGICAL SHIELD BLOCKS

Description of Condition

On March 24, 1993, with Unit 1 shut down for the UIC6 refueling outage, the biological shield blocks were removed and the Unit 1 equipment hatch was opened. The hatch will be open in excess of the seven-day TS allowable time period. This condition is being reported in accordance with TS Action Statement 3.7.12.a.

Cause of the Condition

The shield blocks were removed to facilitate the movement of equipment, material, and personnel traffic into Unit 1 containment. The shield blocks will remain removed and the hatch will remain open for the duration of the UIC6 refueling outage except during the core alteration sequence (fuel movement) when the hatch will be temporarily closed.

Corrective Action

In accordance with LCO 3.7.12 Action Statement (a), the fire detectors on one side of the hatch were verified operable; a roving fire watch was immediately established and will be maintained until the hatch is closed and the blocks are reinstalled, reestablishing the fire barrier before entering Mode 4.