



**UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**

REGION III
2443 WARRENVILLE ROAD, SUITE 210
LISLE, ILLINOIS 60532-4352

January 31, 2020

Mr. Mark Bezilla
Site Vice President
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co.
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station
5501 N. State Rte. 2, Mail Stop A-DB-3080
Oak Harbor, OH 43449-9760

SUBJECT: DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION – INTEGRATED INSPECTION
REPORT 05000346/2019004 AND 07200014/2019001

Dear Mr. Bezilla:

On December 31, 2019, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station. On January 16, 2020, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Doug Huey and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

Two findings of very low safety significance (Green) are documented in this report. Two of these findings involved violations of NRC requirements. We are treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

Licensee-identified violations which were determined to be Severity Level IV are documented in this report. We are treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violations or the significance or severity of the violations documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding."

Sincerely,

/RA/

Billy C. Dickson, Jr, Chief
Branch 2
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket No. 05000346; 07200014
License No. NPF-3

Enclosure:
As stated

cc w/ encl: Distribution via LISTSERV®

Letter to Mark Bezilla from Billy Dickson dated January 31, 2020.

SUBJECT: DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION – INTEGRATED INSPECTION
REPORT 05000346/2019004 AND 07200014/2019001

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Inspection Report

Docket Number: 05000346; 07200014

License Number: NPF-3

Report Number: 05000346/2019004; 07200014/2019001

Enterprise Identifier: I-2019-004-0063; I-2019-001-0114

Licensee: FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company

Facility: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

Location: Oak Harbor, OH

Inspection Dates: October 01, 2019 to December 31, 2019

Inspectors: J. Cassidy, Senior Health Physicist
J. Dalzell, Health Physicist
R. Edwards, Senior Health Physicist
N. Fields, Health Physicist
M. Garza, Emergency Preparedness Inspector
J. Harvey, Resident Inspector
M. Learn, Reactor Engineer
D. Mills, Senior Resident Inspector
J. Rutkowski, Project Engineer

Approved By: Billy C. Dickson, Jr, Chief
Branch 2
Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensee's performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to <https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html> for more information. Licensee-identified non-cited violations are documented in report section: 60855.1.

List of Findings and Violations

Inadvertent Injection into Once Through Steam Generator 1 while Running the Emergency Feedwater Pump			
Cornerstone	Significance	Cross-Cutting Aspect	Report Section
Initiating Events	Green NCV 05000346/2019004-02 Open/Closed	[H.12] - Avoid Complacency	71152
A self-revealed finding of very low safety significance (Green) and associated non-cited violation of Technical Specification Section 5.4.1.a for the licensee's failure to establish a procedure to address the requirements of RG 1.33 Appendix A, Section 9. Specifically, the licensee failed to properly pre-plan and establish documented instructions that included provisions to ensure EFW recirculation. This resulted in an inadvertent injection into Steam Generator 1 affecting performance of the steam generator and causing operation outside of the acceptable region of the steam generator level to superheat curve, and affecting performance of the reactor core due to an uncontrolled reactivity insertion.			

Emergency Ventilation System Inadequate Acceptance Criteria			
Cornerstone	Significance	Cross-Cutting Aspect	Report Section
Barrier Integrity	Green NCV 05000346/2019004-03 Open/Closed	[H.11] - Challenge the Unknown	71153
A self-revealed finding of very low safety significance and an associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Title 10 <i>Code of Federal Regulations</i> Part 50, Appendix B, criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," was identified when the licensee failed to prescribe the appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria in a procedure used for determining that activities important to safety were satisfactorily completed. Specifically, the licensee failed to have appropriate acceptance criteria incorporated into the Emergency Ventilation System train 1 surveillance which resulted in the licensee failing to recognize the test had failed.			

Additional Tracking Items

Type	Issue Number	Title	Report Section	Status
URI	05000346/2019004-01	Unresolved Item Regarding Peak Fuel Clad Temperature During Vacuum Drying of Canister #9	60855.1	Open

LER	05000346/2019-001-00	LER 2019-001-00 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, Emergency Ventilation System Train Inoperable due to Non-specific Test Description of Damper Operation	71153	Closed
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PLANT STATUS

The unit operated at or near full rated thermal power for the entire inspection period.

On April 25, 2018, FirstEnergy Solutions (FES) / FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC) notified the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) that they intend to shut down all four of their operating nuclear power plants (ADAMS Accession Number ML18115A007). On March 21, 2018, FES, FirstEnergy Nuclear Generation (FENGEN), and FENOC filed for bankruptcy. On July 26, 2019, FES/FENOC submitted a letter to the NRC withdrawing the April 25, 2018, certification of permanent cessation of power operations for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station and Perry Nuclear Power Plant (ADAMS Accession Number ML19207A097). The NRC continues to maintain focus on public health and safety and the protection of the environment. This will include a continuous evaluation by inspectors to determine whether the licensee's financial condition is impacting safe operation of the plant.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html>. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, "Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase." The inspectors performed plant status activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, "Plant Status," and conducted routine reviews using IP 71152, "Problem Identification and Resolution." The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

REACTOR SAFETY

71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection

Seasonal Extreme Weather Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors evaluated readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions prior to the onset of seasonal cold temperatures for the following:
 - Station building heating
 - Piping heat tracing function
 - Intake canal frazil ice compensatory measure preparation

71111.04Q - Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

- (1) Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 1 while EDG 2 was out of service for planned maintenance during the week ending October 5, 2019

- (2) Diesel Fire Pump while the Electric Fire Pump was removed from service during the week ending October 26, 2019
- (3) High Pressure Injection (HPI) 1 while HPI 2 was out of service for planned testing during the week ending November 2, 2019
- (4) Motor Driven Feedwater Pump after planned testing during the week ending November 2, 2019
- (5) Decay Heat/Low Pressure Injection (DH/LPI) Pump 2 while DH/LPI 1 was out of service for planned maintenance during the week ending November 16, 2019
- (6) Auxiliary Feed Water (AFW) 1 while AFW 2 was out of service for planned maintenance during the week ending November 23, 2019

71111.04S - Equipment Alignment

Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the containment spray system on during the week ending November 9, 2019.

71111.05Q - Fire Protection

Quarterly Inspection (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated fire protection program implementation in the following selected areas:

- (1) High Voltage Switchgear Room B, Fire Area Q, during the week ending October 5, 2019
- (2) Makeup Pump Room, Fire Area AB, during the week ending November 2, 2019
- (3) Auxiliary Feed Pump 1 Room, Fire Area E, during the week ending November 23, 2019
- (4) Spent Fuel Pool Pump Room, Fire Area U, during the week ending December 28, 2019

71111.07A - Heat Sink Performance

Annual Review (IP Section 02.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated readiness and performance of:

- (1) The Chemical Injection system, which helps maintain the integrity and heat removal capability of the service water system.

71111.11A - Licensed Operator Regualification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Regualification Examination Results (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors reviewed and evaluated the licensed operator examination failure rates for the regualification annual operating tests administered from October 19 through December 11, 2019.

71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Regualification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the Control Room during shift turnover, operator workstation computer replacement, axial power shaping rod position adjustment, and a Decay Heat/Low Pressure Injection Pump quarterly surveillance run during the week ending December 21, 2019.

Licensed Operator Regualification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated a licensed operator regualification simulator scenario during the week ending December 7, 2019.

71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness

Routine Maintenance Effectiveness Inspection (IP Section 02.01) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of routine maintenance activities associated with the following equipment and/or safety significant functions:

- (1) Emergency Ventilation System Unavailability and Reliability
- (2) Motor Driven Feed Pump Target Rock Valve power converter installation
- (3) Motor Driven Feedwater Pump Unavailability and Reliability

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities:

- (1) Planned preventive maintenance activities on Emergency Diesel Generator 2 during the week ending October 5, 2019
- (2) Plant process computer outage during the week ending November 2, 2019
- (3) Planned maintenance on Startup Transformer X01 during the week ending November 16, 2019
- (4) Emergent work on the Train 1 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) sump pumps during the week ending November 23, 2019

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 02.02) (6 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

- (1) Clarification needed with respect to motor driven feedpump alignment in Mode 1, Condition report (CR) 2019-07507

- (2) OP3006 miscellaneous instrument shift checks performed with invalid Group 38 data, CR 2019-09248
- (3) Battery specific gravity is out of program limit, CR 2019-09966
- (4) ECCS [Emergency Core Cooling System] Room 1 Sump Pump 1A degraded operation, CR 2019-09729
- (5) EMD [Electro-Motive Diesel] fuel injector seized plunger and bushing Part 21, CR 2019-09010
- (6) Pressure Differential Switch Found Outside Tech Spec Allowable As-Found Range, CR 2019-10422

71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing

Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance tests:

- (1) Emergency Diesel Generator 2 after planned maintenance during the week ending October 5, 2019
- (2) Auxiliary Feedpump 2 comprehensive test after planned maintenance during the week ending November 23, 2019

71111.22 - Surveillance Testing

The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:

Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

- (1) Local leak rate testing of containment personnel hatch after containment entry during the week ending November 16, 2019
- (2) Safety Features Actuation System Channel 3 response time testing during the week ending December 7, 2019

71114.04 - Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes

Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01-02.03) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors evaluated the following submitted Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan changes.
 - DB-2018-031-00, 10 CFR 50.54(q)(2) Analysis, August 23, 2018
 - DB-2018-031-00, 10 CFR 50.54(q)(3) Screen/Evaluation, August 23, 2018

This evaluation does not constitute NRC approval.

71114.06 - Drill Evaluation

Select Emergency Preparedness Drills and/or Training for Observation (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated:

- (1) Emergency preparedness drill on October 15, 2019

RADIATION SAFETY

71124.03 - In-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation

Engineering Controls (IP Section 02.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated airborne controls and radioactive monitoring.

- (1) The inspectors reviewed the following:

Installed Ventilation Systems

- Radwaste Area Ventilation System

Temporary Ventilation System Setups

- None were available during this inspection

Portable or Installed Monitoring Systems

- AMS-4 on refuel floor
- AMS-4 in waste handling area

Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus for Emergency Use (IP Section 02.03) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated self-contained breathing apparatus program implementation.

- (1) The inspectors reviewed the following:

Status and Surveillance Records for Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus

- SCBA Unit 31
- SCBA Unit 45
- SCBA Unit 66

Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus Fit for On-Shift Operators

- Three operators on shift "5"

Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus Maintenance Check

- SCBA Unit 31
- SCBA Unit 45
- SCBA Unit 66

71124.04 - Occupational Dose Assessment

Source Term Categorization (IP Section 02.01) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors evaluated the licensee's characterization of the source term and use of scaling factors for the use of hard-to-detect radionuclide activity.

External Dosimetry (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors evaluated the external dosimetry program implementation.

Internal Dosimetry (IP Section 02.03) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the internal dosimetry program implementation.

- (1) The inspectors reviewed the following:

Whole Body Counts

- Whole Body Count(s) associated with Personal Contamination Event #Outage 18-005
- Investigation Bioassay for High Pressure 80 valve work: Plant ID 19260

In-Vitro Internal Monitoring

- None were available during this inspection.

Dose Assessments Performed Using Air Sampling and Derived Air Concentration-Hour Monitoring

- None were available during this inspection.

Special Dosimetric Situations (IP Section 02.04) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the following special dosimetric situation:

- (1)
- Declaration of Pregnancy, 12/10/2018
 - Declaration of Pregnancy, 08/20/2019

71124.08 - Radioactive Solid Waste Processing and Radioactive Material Handling, Storage, and Transportation

Radioactive Material Storage (IP Section 02.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated radioactive material storage.

- (1) The inspectors toured the following areas:
- Low Level Radioactive Waste Storage Facility
 - Building 7

The inspectors performed a container check (e.g., swelling, leakage and deformation) on the following containers:

- 6 containers in the Low Level Radioactive Waste Storage Facility
- 4 Containers in Building 7

Radioactive Waste System Walkdown (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the following radioactive waste processing systems during plant walkdowns:

- (1) Liquid or Solid Radioactive Waste Processing Systems
- Advanced Liquid Processing System

Radioactive Waste Resin and/or Sludge Discharges Processes

- Primary Resins

Waste Characterization and Classification (IP Section 02.03) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the radioactive waste characterization and classification for the following waste streams:

- (1)
 - Dry Active Waste
 - Primary Resin
 - Primary Filters

Shipment Preparation (IP Section 02.04) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the following radioactive material shipment preparation processes:

- (1) The inspectors evaluated training and qualification records for selected individuals due to limited observation of the radioactive material shipment preparation process.

Shipping Records (IP Section 02.05) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the following non-excepted package shipment records:

- (1)
 - 2018-1008; Cask with filters in Poly Container
 - 2018-1029; Metal Cask of Filters
 - 2019-1001; Cask with resin in Poly Container

OTHER ACTIVITIES – BASELINE

71151 - Performance Indicator Verification

The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:

MS10: Cooling Water Support Systems (IP Section 02.09) (1 Sample)

- (1) July 1, 2018 - September 30, 2019

BI02: RCS Leak Rate Sample (IP Section 02.11) (1 Sample)

- (1) October 1, 2018 - September 30, 2019

71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution

Semiannual Trend Review (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective action program for potential adverse trends in FLEX equipment battery issues that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue.

Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 02.03) (1 Sample)

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:

- (1) CR 2019-07705 - Water was flowed from the EFWST [Emergency Feedwater Storage Tank] to OTSG 1 [Once Through Steam Generator 1] while running the EFW [Emergency Feedwater] pump to recirculate engine coolant

71153 - Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion

Event Report (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):

- (1) LER 05000346/2019-001-00, "Emergency Ventilation System Inoperable due to Non-Specific Test Description of Damper Operation," ML19282A383. The inspectors determined the issue was within the licensee's ability to foresee and correct and that a violation of NRC requirements occurred. The circumstances surrounding this LER are documented in the inspection results section.

OTHER ACTIVITIES – TEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS, INFREQUENT AND ABNORMAL

60854.1 - Preoperational Testing of Independent Spent Fuel Storage Facility Installation at Operating Plants

Preoperational Testing of Independent Spent Fuel Storage Facility Installation at Operating Plants (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors reviewed documents, interviewed plant personnel, and performed in-field observations to assess the licensee's preoperational testing of an ISFSI. The licensee's preoperational testing activities took place partially at the vendor's facility and partially at the licensee's facility.

The inspectors performed an independent assessment that the licensee had adequately demonstrated its readiness to safely perform ISFSI loading and unloading operations. Specifically, the inspectors evaluated the following:

- (1) The licensee performed preoperational dry run activities. The inspectors evaluated following activities:
 - The inspectors observed dry run activities on October 7 – 10, 2019. Specifically, the inspectors observed insertion and removal of a DSC into an HSM, transport of a transfer cask (TC) between the ISFSI and the Auxiliary Building, unloading of a TC from the transporter to the cask wash pit (dry), and movement of the TC between the cask wash pit and the spent fuel pool.
 - The inspectors completed an in-office review of the welding and processing dry run documentation on September 23 – October 4, 2019.

(2) Fuel Selection

- The inspectors reviewed cask fuel selection packages to verify that the licensee was loading fuel in accordance with TS 2.1, "Fuel to be Stored in the Standardized NUHOMS System."

60855.1 - Operation of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation at Operating Plants

Operation of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation at Operating Plants (1 Sample)

(1) Operation of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation at Operating Plants (60855.1)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's independent spent fuel storage installation cask loadings on October 14 – 19 and November 4 – 8, 2019. Specifically, the inspectors observed the following activities:

- Fuel selection and fuel loading for the first canister planned for the campaign, DSC-9, and DSC-11
- Heavy load movement of the Outer Top Cover Plate and lifting the Transfer Cask from the processing area and placing it on the transport vehicle
- Drying and backfill evolutions
- Closure welding and non-destructive weld evaluations
- Transfer and transport evolutions
- Radiological field surveys

The inspectors performed walkdowns of the ISFSI pad, including independent radiation surveys, and walkdowns of the ISFSI haul path and vertical cask transporter (VCT).

The inspectors evaluated the following:

- Selected corrective action program action requests
- Selected 72.48 screenings and evaluations

60856 - Review of 10 CFR 72.212(b) Evaluations

Review of 10 CFR 72.212(b) Evaluations (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors evaluated the licensee's compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 72.212 and 10 CFR 72.48. Prior to use of a dry cask storage system, the licensee is required to perform written evaluations in accordance with 10 CFR 72.212(b)(5)(i) to establish that the terms, conditions, and specifications of a CoC or an amended CoC have been met. Specifically, the inspectors performed an in-office review of the following from May 2019 through October 2019:
- 10 CFR 72.212 Evaluation Report for the NUHOMS® EOS System Certificate of Compliance 1042, Revision 0 and associated calculations
 - ECP 15-0086, "Dry Cask Storage Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI Parent)" and supporting engineering changes and referenced calculations
 - Licensee's Quality Assurance Program Manual

60856.1 - Review of 10 CFR 72.212(b) Evaluations at Operating Plants

Review of 10 CFR 72.212(b) Evaluations at Operating Plants (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors evaluated the licensee's revised engineering documentation and calculations associated with the NUHOMS® EOS CoC 072-01042, Revision 0. Specifically, from May through October 2019, the inspectors performed an in-office review the following:

- Transfer Cask Lifting Yoke Assembly
- Doerfer Transporter Skid Modifications
- Auxiliary Building and Crane Structural Analysis
- ISFSI Pad Structural Capacity Qualification

INSPECTION RESULTS

Unresolved Item (Open)	Unresolved Item Regarding Peak Fuel Clad Temperature During Vacuum Drying of Canister #9 URI 05000346/2019004-01	60855.1
<p><u>Description:</u> During the processing of Dry Shielded Canister (DSC) 9, the canister loaded with spent fuel took longer than expected to achieve the required dryness criterion. Various attempts to achieve dryness were made, including backfilling the canister with helium and attempting additional drying. Through their investigation, the licensee identified a vacuum leak in a fitting that connected the vacuum drying equipment to the DSC. The fitting was safely repaired, and the DSC was successfully dried. Given the extended time in vacuum drying and the changing thermal environment in the DSC during troubleshooting, the inspectors questioned whether the canister conditions encountered during troubleshooting were consistent with the design basis thermal analysis described in Chapter 4 of the NUHOMS EOS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 1. To determine whether DSC-9 remained in an analyzed condition, the licensee consulted with Orano to perform an evaluation into the maximum peak cladding temperature and also to determine whether the thermal cycling conditions specified in the UFSAR were met during processing. At the time of the inspection, this evaluation was ongoing and unavailable to the inspectors.</p> <p>Planned Closure Actions: Upon receipt of the calculations, the agency will perform its review to determine if there are any technical issues or a violation occurred.</p> <p>Corrective Action References: CR-2019-09156</p>		

Licensee-Identified Non-Cited Violation	60855.1
<p>This violation of very low safety significance was identified by the licensee and has been entered into the licensee corrective action program and is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.</p>	
<p>Violation: Title 10 CFR 72.158, 'Control of special processes,' requires the licensee, applicant for a license, certificate holder, and applicant for a CoC shall establish measures to ensure that special processes, including welding, heat treating, and nondestructive testing, are controlled and accomplished by qualified personnel using qualified procedures in accordance with applicable codes, standards, specifications, criteria, and other special requirements.</p>	

Contrary to the above, between October 15, 2019, and October 21, 2019, the licensee did not ensure that the nondestructive examinations completed on seven welds were accomplished using qualified procedures. Specifically, the developer that was used during the examination of the welds was not as specified in the procedures.

Significance/Severity: Severity Level IV. The inspectors assessed the significance of the violation using the NRC Enforcement Policy and Enforcement Manual. Because ISFSIs are not part of the Reactor Oversight Process, this violation was assessed using Traditional Enforcement in accordance with Section 2.2 of the Enforcement Policy. Consistent with the guidance in Section 1.2.6.D of the Enforcement Manual, if a violation does not fit an example in the Enforcement Policy Violation Examples, it should be assigned a severity level: (1) commensurate with its safety significance; and (2) informed by similar violations addressed in the Violation Examples. The inspectors found no similar violations in the violation examples. This violation has been determined to be of very low safety significance because the licensee was able to have the nondestructive examination procedure requalified to allow for the use of the developer that had been used to complete the examination with no issues.

Corrective Action References: CR-2019-08736

Licensee-Identified Non-Cited Violation	60855.1
This violation of very low safety significance was identified by the licensee and has been entered into the licensee corrective action program and is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.	
<p>Violation: Title 10 CFR 72.146, "Design Control" requires, in part, that the licensee, "shall establish measures to ensure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis, as specified in the license or CoC application for those structures, systems, and components to which this section applies, are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. These measures must include provisions to ensure that appropriate quality standards are specified and included in design documents and that deviations from standards are controlled. Measures must be established for the selection and review for suitability of application of materials, parts, equipment, and processes that are essential to the functions of the structures, systems, and components which are important to safety."</p> <p>Contrary to the above, on October 11, 2019, the licensee found several errors in the approved fuel selection calculations resulting in several of the fuels assemblies not meeting the requirements of TS 2.1, "Fuel to be Stored in the EOS-37PTH DSC." Specifically, the calculations that had initially been approved contained several errors, including the heavy metal mass, burn-up, and the number of days that some fuel assemblies were in the operating reactor.</p> <p>Significance/Severity: Severity Level IV. The inspectors assessed the significance of the violation using the NRC Enforcement Policy and Enforcement Manual. Because ISFSIs are not part of the Reactor Oversight Process, this violation was assessed using Traditional Enforcement in accordance with Section 2.2 of the Enforcement Policy. Consistent with the guidance in Section 1.2.6.D of the Enforcement Manual, if a violation does not fit an example in the Enforcement Policy Violation Examples, it should be assigned a severity level: (1) commensurate with its safety significance; and (2) informed by similar violations addressed in the Violation Examples. The inspectors found no similar violations in the violation examples. This violation is of very low safety significance because the errors were found and corrected before any fuel had been loaded into the dry cask canisters.</p>	

Corrective Action References: CR-2019-08369, CR-2019-08339, CR-2019-08408, CR-2019-08449, CR-2019-08457, CR-2019-08503, CR-2019-08709, CR-2019-08901

Inadvertent Injection into Once Through Steam Generator 1 while Running the Emergency Feedwater Pump			
Cornerstone	Significance	Cross-Cutting Aspect	Report Section
Initiating Events	Green NCV 05000346/2019004-02 Open/Closed	[H.12] - Avoid Complacency	71152
<p>A self-revealed finding of very low safety significance (Green) and associated non-cited violation of Technical Specification Section 5.4.1.a for the licensee's failure to establish a procedure to address the requirements of RG 1.33 Appendix A, Section 9. Specifically, the licensee failed to properly pre-plan and establish documented instructions that included provisions to ensure EFW recirculation. This resulted in an inadvertent injection into Steam Generator 1 affecting performance of the steam generator and causing operation outside of the acceptable region of the steam generator level to superheat curve, and affecting performance of the reactor core due to an uncontrolled reactivity insertion.</p>			
<p><u>Description:</u></p> <p>On September 19, 2019, operators locally started the diesel driven emergency feedwater pump (EFWP) per work order 200724732 as part of a maintenance activity. The operators ran EFWP for one minute to clear cooling system voids following replacement of the diesel engine coolant. The licensee's intention was to run the pump with valves lined up to recirculate the water to the EFWP storage tank for roughly one minute. However, the work order mistakenly directed operators to operate the EFWP with valves aligned for steam generator injection. This resulted in unintended EFWP injection into Steam Generator 1 (SG1) for one minute and seventeen seconds. Relatively cold water injection into the steam generator resulted in a reduction in steam superheat which moved SG1 into the unacceptable range of the water level to steam superheat curve for six minutes. The licensee correctly entered Technical Specification limiting condition for operation 3.7.18, Steam Generator Level, condition A, which requires restoration of steam generator level to within limits within 15 minutes. This limiting condition for operation ensures that the mass and energy release to the containment and/or the amount of reactor coolant system cooling (and corresponding positive reactivity insertion) resulting from a main steam line break would be bounded by the accident analysis. The licensee restored steam generator level within six minutes. The reduction in SG1 superheat and fact that the EFW injects into the steam generators through the Auxiliary Feedwater path at a higher location than main feedwater caused slight overcooling of RCS flow into the core that resulted in an inadvertent positive reactivity insertion and reactor power change. This reactivity change was of a small magnitude and resulted in a very small power change.</p> <p>The licensee performed an immediate investigation, communicated the event to staff, and issued a night order to reinforce expectations that operations staff review marked-up drawings and flow-paths during pre-job briefs. The licensee performed a causal evaluation to determine the cause of the inadvertent EFWP injection into SG1. The causal evaluation identified that the procedure section referenced by the work order (Section 3.4 of DB-OP-06234) had a generic title "Starting EFW Pump" that was not descriptive enough and included no cautions about the potential for water injection into the steam generators. The licensee</p>			

concluded that these deficiencies were contrary to the Davis-Besse procedure writing guide (NG-QS-00121). It was not identified that the improper procedure was specified in the work order during the planning process, nor during independent reviews by the reactor operations staff, the shift crews, or the operators performing the evolution. Additionally, the pre-job brief did not verify the flow-path and the control room crew did not evaluate for the possibility of feeding the steam generators.

Corrective Actions: The licensee performed a causal evaluation to determine the cause of the inadvertent EFWP injection into SG1 and identify corrective actions. The causal evaluation identified that in addition to the procedure being inadequately written, human performance errors occurred during work planning, shift review, pre-job brief, and performance of the maintenance run. The licensee revised procedure DB-OP-06234 to move the Section 3.4 content into the "Emergency Operations" section and added a new Section 3.4 written to direct operation of the EFWP in recirculation mode. The licensee also performed an engineering analysis to confirm that the steam generator was not damaged by the inadvertent EFW injection. Additionally, the associated operators were removed from shift and remediated.

Corrective Action References: Condition Report 2019-07705

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The licensee's failure to utilize an appropriate procedure to operate the EFWP without inadvertently injecting into steam generator 1 was a performance deficiency.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Procedure Quality attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, the licensee failed to utilize an appropriate procedure to operate the EFW pump, resulting in the unplanned EFW injection into steam generator 1 that caused an uncontrolled positive reactivity insertion and entry into technical specification LCO 3.7.18 for six minutes due to operation outside the acceptable range of steam generator level for the amount of steam superheat.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power." The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, "Initial Characterization of Findings," and Appendix A, "Significance Determination of Reactor Inspection Findings for At - Power Situations." The inspectors determined that the finding had very low safety significance (Green) because it: (1) was not a design deficiency; (2) did not represent a loss of system and/or function; (3) did not represent an actual loss of function of at least a single train for longer than its technical specification allowed outage time; and (4) did not result in the loss of a high safety-significant, non-technical specification train.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.12 - Avoid Complacency: Individuals recognize and plan for the possibility of mistakes, latent issues, and inherent risk, even while expecting successful outcomes. Individuals implement appropriate error reduction tools. Specifically, the licensee failed to use their human performance tools to ensure the correct procedure was identified and performed for the circumstance. Licensee work planner review of the work order during the planning process did not identify that an improper procedure was specified, nor did

separate reviews by the reactor operations staff, the shift crews, and the SRO's performing the evolution. Additionally, the pre-job brief did not verify the flow path and the control room crew did not evaluate for the possibility of feeding the steam generators.

Enforcement:

Violation: Technical Specification Section 5.4.1.a requires, in part, that "written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978." NRC Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, Section 9 addresses "Procedures for Performing Maintenance" and Section a, states in part "Maintenance that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment should be properly pre-planned and performed in accordance with written procedures, documented instructions, or drawings appropriate to the circumstances."

Contrary to the above, on September 18, 2019, the licensee failed to establish a procedure to address the requirements of RG 1.33 Appendix A, Section 9. Specifically, the licensee failed to properly pre-plan and establish documented instructions that included provisions to ensure EFW recirculation. This resulted in an inadvertent injection into Steam Generator 1 affecting performance of the steam generator and causing operation outside of the acceptable region of the steam generator level to superheat curve, and affecting performance of the reactor core due to an uncontrolled reactivity insertion.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

Observation: Trend in FLEX Batteries

71152

During a semi-annual trend review, the inspectors noted multiple condition reports initiated since January 2019 related to FLEX battery issues. Specifically, these condition reports identified issues with spent fuel pool level instrumentation batteries, various FLEX generators, the FLEX debris removal trucks and the alternate low-pressure FLEX emergency feedwater pump. The inspectors discussed the battery observations with the licensee and the licensee stated the issue was being concurrently tracked, as discussed in CR 2019-14009. The inspectors performed a search of the corrective action program and validated that the licensee considered proper inputs. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's evaluation to address the adequacy of FLEX battery maintenance activities. The inspectors did not identify any additional concerns.

Emergency Ventilation System Inadequate Acceptance Criteria

Cornerstone	Significance	Cross-Cutting Aspect	Report Section
Barrier Integrity	Green NCV 05000346/2019004-03 Open/Closed	[H.11] - Challenge the Unknown	71153
A self-revealed finding of very low safety significance and an associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Title 10 <i>Code of Federal Regulations</i> Part 50, Appendix B, criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," was identified when the licensee failed to prescribe the appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria in a procedure used for determining that activities important to safety were satisfactorily completed. Specifically, the licensee failed to have appropriate acceptance criteria incorporated into the Emergency Ventilation			

System train 1 surveillance which resulted in the licensee failing to recognize the test had failed.

Description:

On July 19, 2019, the licensee was performing a scheduled monthly surveillance test of the emergency ventilation system (EVS) train 1. During this test, the operators noted the fan failed to produce the desired negative pressure within the shield building negative pressure area because the recirculation and exhaust dampers were not modulating as required. Specifically, the differential pressure controller was set to maintain -0.75 inches water gauge by recirculation and exhaust damper modulation. The licensee declared the train inoperable and entered Technical Specification limiting condition of operation (LCO) 3.7.12, Station Emergency Ventilation System, Condition A, which states, in part, to restore the station EVS train to operable status within 7 days. The licensee determined that infantile failure of a controller caused the issue. They replaced the controller and the system tested satisfactorily within the LCO completion time.

While performing a past operability review due to the July failure, the licensee noted the surveillance performed on June 21, 2019, also failed to produce the desired negative pressure. The licensee determined this was a reportable condition because the 30-day inoperability time between the June surveillance and identification in July was in excess of the seven-day LCO plus the specified shutdown time. Specifically, TS 3.7.12 condition C requires the licensee to be in Mode 3 in 6 hours and Mode 5 in 36 hours if the required action and associated completion time was not met for Condition A. The licensee submitted licensee event report 05000346/2019-001 in accordance with Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as a condition which was prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.

The licensee performed a causal analysis and determined the failure to identify the failed surveillance test in June was due to a combination of inadequate procedural guidance and a gap in crew knowledge. Specifically, the acceptance criterion in DB-SS-03250, Emergency Ventilation system Train 1 Monthly Test, Revision 9, stated, in part, emergency ventilation system train 1 started from the control room and operated properly for at least fifteen minutes. Proper operation was not specifically described in the acceptance criterion step. However, Note 4.7 stated, in part, recirculating damper CV5000B and exhaust damper CV5000A modulate to maintain a negative pressure of approximately 0.75 inch water gauge in the annulus area. Step 4.7 stated, in part, immediately after starting EVS fan 1, perform the following local checks: CV5000B, EVS fan 1 exhaust recirculation damper is controlling to maintain a negative 0.75 inches water gauge as indicated on PDI5000 or PDC5000. During the June test, the operator noted the dampers were maintaining at -0.45 inches water gauge; however, at the time this wasn't determined to be a failed test.

Through review of the causal analysis, the inspectors noted the licensee had an additional opportunity to identify the failed surveillance before the July test. Specifically, the system engineer questioned the June test results on July 10 while reviewing the completed surveillance. The individual discussed the observation with supervision and the on-shift operations crew, which was the same crew that had performed the June test. However, the licensee failed to identify the June surveillance test as an issue and therefore did not write a condition report. Instead, the licensee generated informal actions to have additional observation during the next surveillance scheduled for July 19, 2019. The inspectors also recognized the non-conservatism associated with the informal action to wait nine days until the next surveillance test, as it was not in alignment with the LCO completion time of seven

days. The licensee subsequently identified the adverse condition of EVS during the July surveillance.

Corrective Actions: Immediate corrective actions included replacing the controller. Additionally, both EVS train surveillance test procedures were modified to include specific acceptance criteria associated with the negative pressure. Additionally, a failure of the same model controller occurred in 2017. The licensee sent both the 2017 and 2019 failed controllers to the vendor for additional analysis.

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The licensee failed to prescribe appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities were satisfactorily completed. Specifically, the licensee failed to include detailed acceptance criteria in the emergency ventilation system train 1 surveillance procedure, which resulted in a missed failed surveillance test.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the SSC and Barrier Performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power." Using Exhibit 3, "Barrier Integrity Screening Questions," the inspectors determined the finding screened as having very low safety significance (Green) because the finding only represented a degradation of the radiological barrier function provided for the control room, auxiliary building or spent fuel pool.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.11 - Challenge the Unknown: Individuals stop when faced with uncertain conditions. Risks are evaluated and managed before proceeding. Specifically, during the June 2019 surveillance test, when faced with unexpected pressure measurements the licensee failed to stop and evaluate the meaning of the test results.

Enforcement:

Violation: Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, criterion V, Instructions, Procedures and, Drawings, states, in part, activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings. Instructions, procedures, or drawings shall include appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished. The licensee established DB-SS-03250, the Emergency Ventilation System Train 1 Monthly Test, Revision 9 and prior, as the implementing procedure to ensure that EVS train 2 was able to perform its intended safety function, an activity affecting quality.

Technical Specification LCO 3.7.12, Station Emergency Ventilation System (EVS) requires, in part, two station EVS trains shall be operable in Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4. With one station EVS train inoperable, LCO 3.7.12 requires restoration to operable status within seven days. If the required action and associated completion time is not met, be in Mode 3 in six hours and Mode 5 in 36 hours.

Contrary to the above, prior to September 10, 2019, the licensee failed to have a procedure that included the appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria for determining

that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished. Specifically, the licensee failed to include acceptance criteria in the Emergency Ventilation System test procedures that ensured the surveillance had be completed satisfactorily.

Additionally, because the licensee was not aware of the EVS inoperability from June 21, 2019, to July 19, 2019, the licensee failed to take the actions required by TS LCO 3.7.12.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as an non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

- On January 16, 2020, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr. D. Huey, General Plant Manager and other members of the licensee staff.
- On October 25, 2019, the inspectors presented the Emergency Preparedness Inspection Exit Meeting inspection results to Mr. J. Vetter, Emergency Preparedness Manager and other members of the licensee staff.
- On December 13, 2019, the inspectors presented the radiation protection inspection results inspection results to Mr. D. Huey, General Plant Manager and other members of the licensee staff.
- On December 19, 2019, the inspectors presented the Licensed Operator Requalification program annual examination results review inspection results to Mr. D. Witt, Licensed Operator Requalification Training Supervisor and other members of the licensee staff.
- On January 16, 2020, the inspectors presented the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Loading inspection results to Mr. D. Huey, General Plant Manager and other members of the licensee staff.
- On January 16, 2020, the inspectors presented the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Preoperational Testing inspection results to Mr. D. Huey, General Plant Manager and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
60854.1	Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection	CR-2019-08812	Clarify Reporting Requirements for Dry Fuel Storage at Davis-Besse	10/23/2019
	Miscellaneous		2019 ISFSI Dry Run Training Exercise	05/16/2019
			Dry Run Training Exercise Observations	05/24/2019
			Response to NRC DFS Questions	10/16/2019
			DSC Welding and NDE Dry Run Records	05/23/2019
			NUHOMS EOS Weld Demonstration	04/25/2019
	Procedures	DB-MM-12314	Dry Shielded Canister Drying, Backfill and Sealing Operations	0
60855.1	ALARA Plans	119-1081	ISFSI Loading Campaign ALARA Plan	0
	Calculations	503948-0403	Thermal Evaluation of Loading Operation for the EOS-37PTH DSC at Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station for 33" Water Drain out in the TC/DSC Annulus	2
		C-NF-062.02-068	Fuel Selection for the 2019 Davis-Besse Dry Cask Storage Campaign, Revision 1, Addendum 3	10/18/2019
		C-NF-062.02-068	Fuel Selection for the 2019 Davis-Besse Dry Cask Storage Campaign, Revision 1, Addendum 1	10/13/2019
		C-NF-062.02-068	Fuel Selection for the 2019 Davis-Besse Dry Cask Storage Campaign	1, 2
		C-NF-062.02-068	Fuel Selection for the 2019 Davis-Besse Dry Cask Storage Campaign, Revision 1, Addendum 1	10/15/2019
	Corrective Action Documents		Selected Corrective Action Documents Created Since 2017	
		CR-2019-07062	Error in Fuel Selected for 2019 Dry Cask Campaign	08/22/2019
		CR-2019-08339	Assembly Weight Error in Fuel Selection Calculation for the 2019 Dry Cask Loading at Davis Besse	10/12/2019
		CR-2019-08369	Decay Heat Error in the Fuel Selection Calculation for the 2019 Dry Cask Loading at Davis Besse	10/13/2019
		CR-2019-08408	Errors in Dry Fuel Storage Characterization Calc and Selection Calc Related to 2019 Canister 1	10/14/2019

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
		CR-2019-08449	Errors in Dry Fuel Storage Characterization Calc and Selection Calc Related to 2019 Canister 2	10/15/2019
		CR-2019-08457	Need to Replace Four Assemblies Identified in planned Dry Cask Loading Identified	10/15/2019
		CR-2019-08503	Errors in Dry Fuel Storage Characterization Calc and Selection Calc Related to 2019 Canister 3	10/16/2019
		CR-2019-08709	Errors in Dry Fuel Storage Characterization Calc Related to 2019 Contingency Assemblies	10/21/2019
		CR-2019-08736	Dry Cask Storage - NDE Procedure Discrepancy	10/22/2019
		CR-2019-08816	Dry Cask Storage Procedure Enhancement	10/23/2019
		CR-2019-08892	Dry Cask Storage – Operational Issues with the Doerfer Wheelift Transporter	10/25/2019
		CR-2019-08901	Need to Replace Assemblies in Davis-Besse EOS4-8 Canisters Identified	10/25/2019
		CR-2019-08946	Dry Cask Storage - Transfer Cask Trunnion Indication	10/26/2019
		CR-2019-09019	Dust-Like Debris Identified on Assembly ID during Video Verification of Dry Cask	10/28/2019
		CR-2019-09135	Dry Cask Storage-Dose Rate Alarm	10/30/2019
		CR-2019-09156	Thermal Cycle Counting for DSC #009	10/31/2019
		CR-2019-09337	Dry Cask Storage - Wrong Beveling for DSC #11 Inner Top Cover Weld Surface	11/04/2019
		CR-2019-09611	Increased Dose due to More Work on Dry Shielded Canister #12	11/13/2019
		CR-2019-09779	Dry Cask Storage - Challenges with Dry Shielded Canister #15 Vacuum Drying	11/19/2019
		CR-2019-09792	Dry Cask Storage – DSC#15 Drain Port Cover Root Pass Weld Unable to be Completed	11/20/2019
		CR-2019-09828	Dry Cask Storage - Potential Issue with Fuel Drop Analysis	11/21/2019
		CR-2019-09830	Dry Cask Storage – Several suspect welds on Doerfer Wheelift transporter	11/21/2019
		CR-2019-10082	Individual Alarmed Passive Monitoring	12/02/2019
		CR-2019-10088	Dry Cask Storage - Individual Received Dose Rate Alarm	12/03/2019
		CR-2019-10187	Vendor Supplied Thermoluminescent Dosimetry Results	12/06/2019

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
	Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection	CR-2019-09200	Failure to Perform 10 CFR 72.48 Review for Dry Fuel Storage Procedure Administrative Changes	11/01/2019
		CR-2020-00135	Document Reference Excluded from the Davis-Besse EOS 10 CFR 72.212 Report	01/08/2020
	Miscellaneous		Action Plan to Resume Vacuum Drying at Davis Besse	6
			Selected 10 CFR 72.48 Screenings and Evaluations	
			NUHOMS EOS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report	1
			2019 DCS Loading Campaign Oversight Review Plan	08/15/2019
		721042- 146	TN Americas 10 CFR Part 72. 48 Applicability Review Regarding Water Boiling in the TC/DSC Annulus	10/18/2019
		721042-148	TN Americas 10 CFR Part 72. 48 Applicability Review Regarding Water Level in the TC/DSC Annulus	10/20/2019
	NDE Reports	6007-19-006-0807-103019-03	NDE Report for Canister #10	10/30/2019
		607-19-006-0807-110419	Liquid Penetrant Examination Report for DSC #11	
		607-19-006-0807-111119	Liquid Penetrant Examination Report for DSC #12	11/11/2019
	Procedures	DB-MM-12312	Dry Shielded Canister Preparations for Loading NUHOMS-EOS-37PTH	0
		DB-MM-12313	Transfer Cask Handling for Fuel Loading NUHOMS-EOS-37PTH	0, 2
		DB-MM-12314	Dry Shielded Canister Drying, Backfill and Sealing Operations NUHOMS-EOS- 37PTH	0-5
		DB-MM-12315	Movement of Transfer Cask to the ISFSI Pad and Dry Shielded Canister Insertion into EOS-HSM	0, 1
		DB-MM-12316	Dry Shielded Canister Extraction from EOS-HSM	1
		DB-MM-12318	Guidance for ISFSI Equipment Malfunctions NUHOMS-EOS-37PTH	0
		DB-MM-12319	Dry Shielded Canister Removal of Field Welds NUHOMS-EOS-37PTH	0
		NOP-OP-4503	Personnel Contamination Monitoring	11
	Radiation	DB-M-20180613-2	2018 ISFSI Pad Survey Report	06/13/2018

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
	Surveys	DB-M-20190411-4	2019 ISFSI Radiation Survey Report	04/11/2019
		DB-M-20191024-6	Survey of HSM, ISFSI Pad and Perimeter for DSC #9	10/24/2019
		DB-M-20191031-4	Survey of HSM, ISFSI Pad and Perimeter for DSC #10	10/31/2019
		DB-M-20191220-2	Post DCS Campaign HSM Pad Survey/	12/20/2019
	Work Orders	200731159	2019 SFP Cask Crane Functional Test	09/20/2019
		200765066	2019 SFP Cask Crane Annual Inspection	08/29/2019
60856.1	Calculations	155170-C-C-00003	ISFSI Pad Structural Capacity Qualification	2
		155170-C-C-00004	Auxiliary Building Structural Qualification	6
		EOS01-0205	EOS Horizontal Storage Module (EOS-HSM) Weight & CG Calculation	1
		EOSTE-0206	EOS-TC125 Lifting Yoke Assembly Evaluation	1, 2
	Corrective Action Documents	CR-2019-08808	Transfer Cask Lifting Yoke Design Calculation	10/23/2019
	Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection	CR-2019-04479	Concerns Identified With Cask Crane Corbel Design Calculation	05/17/2019
		CR-2019-04963	Concerns Identified with Cask Crane Concrete Corbel (Bracket) Design Calculation	07/05/2019
		CR-2019-08808	Transfer Cask Lifting Yoke Design Calculation	10/23/2019
		CR-2019-08912	NRC Dry Cask Inspection Identified Inadequate Technical Basis in Calculation 155170-C-C-00003	10/25/2019
	Drawings	EOS01-3112	NUHOMS EOS System Construction and Assembly of EOS-HSMS-FPS Segmented Base	2
		EOSTE-4008	NUHOMS EOS System Transfer Equipment EOS-TC125 Lifting Yoke Assembly	2
		EOSTE-4008	Orano TN Drawing, EOS-TC125 Lifting Yoke Assembly	0, 2
		I4105-0000	Transfer Skid Assembly	1
		NUH-03-7103	Standardized NUHOMS Horizontal Storage Module, HSM-H Base	5
	Engineering Changes	ECP No. 18-0014	Cask Crane Seismic Restraint Modification	04/15/2019
	Miscellaneous		Response to NRC Questions on Pad Model	03/05/2019
			Cask Crane Repair Basis	
		EOSTE-0101	AREVA TN Document, "Design Criteria Document (DCD)	1

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
			for the Lifting Yokes	
		Study 1002263	Charpy Testing Temperature and Acceptance Criteria for ANSI N14.6-1993 Lift Yokes	04/10/2019
	Procedures	DB-MM-06004	Spent Fuel Cask Crane Operation	Revision 11
71111.01	Corrective Action Documents	CR 2019-07524	Discrepancies Associated with BA Heat Trace Circuit 148	09/11/2019
		CR 2019-08535	CFPP18Q Freeze Protection Cabinet Found Deenergized	10/17/2019
		CR 2019-09186	Freeze Protection CKT 15 Indicates "****. **"	11/01/2019
		CR 2019-09575	Heat Trace Circuits Not Operating Correctly PM-5289	11/12/2019
		CR 2019-10068	TIC20350S Indicates "Open In P"	12/02/2019
		CR 2019-10069	TIC20487S Indicates "Open In P"	12/02/2019
	Procedures	DB-OP-06913	Seasonal Plant Preparation Checklist	35
71111.04Q	Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection	ATA-2019-14112	Several Fire Protection Procedures Need to be Enhanced to Reflect the Same Information for FP Locked Valves	10/29/2019
	Drawings	12501	Auxiliary Feedwater System	60
		M-033C	Decay Heat Train 2	30
		OS 041A Sheet 1	Emergency Diesel Generator Systems	35
	Procedures	DB-OP-06011	High Pressure Injection System	34
		DB-OP-06012	DH Loop 2 Normal Lineup Valve Checklist	73
		DB-OP-06233	AFW Train 1 Switch and Breaker Checklist	45
		DB-OP-06316	Diesel Operating Procedure	63
		DB-OP-06610	Station Fire Suppression Water System	40
		DB-SS-03091	MDFP Flow Path Valve Checklist	20
71111.04S	Corrective Action Documents	CR 2018-10646	Containment Spray Pump #1 Motor Leads with Broken Strands	12/04/2018
		CR 2018-11082	CS Pump 2 Pump Inboard Bearing Oiler Needs Adjusted	12/18/2018
	Drawings	M-034	Emergency Core Cooling System Containment Spray and Core Flooding Systems	72
		OS-005	Containment Spray System	14
	Procedures	DB-OP-06013	Containment Spray System	27
	Work Orders	WO 200707980	CS Pump 1 Comprehensive Quarterly Test	02/28/2019
		WO 200713413	CS Pump 2 Quarterly Test	04/07/2019

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
71111.05Q	Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection	CR 2019-08098	Pre-Fire Plan PFP-AB-323 Drawing Error Identified	10/03/2019
	Fire Plans	PFP-AB-237	Auxiliary Feed Pump 1 Room Fire Area E	4
		PFP-AB-312	Spent Fuel Pool Pump Room	6
		PFP-AB-323	Risk Significant Area, High Voltage Switchgear Room B, Room 323, Fire Area Q	5
	Miscellaneous		Davis-Besse Unit 1 Fire Hazard Analysis Report	28
	Procedures	PFP-AB-225	Makeup Pump Room Vestibule Rooms 225 and 226A	04
71111.07A	Corrective Action Documents	CR 2018-01158	POD 2017-03523, Revision 1, Elbow Wall Thinning	03/09/2018
		CR 2019-07376	Impact to Plant Due to Extended Actibrom Chem Feed Shutdown	09/05/2019
	Drawings	OS-020	Service Water System	103
		OS-048A	Chlorination System	16
	Procedures	DB-CH-06043	Intake Chlorination System	2
		DB-CH-06900	Operational Chemical Control Limits	65
71111.11A	Miscellaneous		Davis-Besse Licensed Operator Requalification Program Annual Examination Summary Results for 2019	12/19/2019
71111.11Q	Miscellaneous	ORQ-EPE-S111-R-14	Davis-Besse Licensed Operator Requalification Scenario	12/04/2019
	Procedures	DB-SP-03447	Decay Heat Train 2 Pump and Valve Test	6
		NOBP-LP-2601	Human Performance Program	13
		NOP-OP-1002	Conduct of Operations	14
71111.12	Corrective Action Documents	CR 2010-78416	AF 6451 Issue during AFW Train #2 Flowpath Verification DB-SP-03164	06/17/2010
		CR 2010-78435	Potential Rework for ZC6451	06/17/2010
		CR 2010-79809	AF6451 Found Failed Open and De-energized	07/17/2010
		CR 2010-81273	Past Operability Review of AFW Positioner ZC6451	08/16/2010
		CR 2017-12439	MDFP Oil Leak on LO Cooler Discharge Pipe Union	12/27/2017
		CR 2018-02517	DC Bus Ground Received during Restoration of FW6459, MDFP Discharge to OTSG 1	10/09/2018
		CR 2018-06706	CV 5000A and CV 5000B Failed to Operated During EVS	07/27/2018

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
			Train 1 Monthly Test	
		CR 2018-08883	DC Bus Ground Received during Restoration of FW6459, MDFP Discharge to OTSG 1	10/09/2018
		CR 2019-06418	Critical Order ECP15-0138-004 Target Rock Work Dropped at T+1	07/30/2019
		CR 2019-06625	MDFP Minimum Recirc Flow 210 GPM	08/07/2019
		CR 2019-06899	EVS Train #1 Exceeded Maintenance Rule Unavailability Limit	08/16/2019
		CR 2019-07507	Clarification Needed with Respect to Motor Driven Feedpump Alignment in Mode 1	09/11/2019
	Drawings	12501	Containment and Penetration Rooms	29
		OS-0330	Emergency Ventilation System	16
	Engineering Changes	ECP 15-0138-004	Target Rock Auxiliary Feedwater Power Supply Isolation (FV6460)	8
	Miscellaneous		Operator Logs	
		DB-SUB34-01	Station Emergency Ventilation System	07/19/2019
		MRPM 37	Maintenance Rule Program Manual	
		NORM-ER-3102	FENOC Motor	8
		NORM-ER-3103	Low and Medium Voltage Switchgear and Motor Control Centers	7
	Procedures	DB-SS-03090	Motor Driven Feed Pump Monthly Valve Verification	11
		DB-SS-03091	Motor Driven Fuel Pump Quarterly Test	21
		NG-DB-00001	On-Line Risk Management	15
		NOBP-ER-3900	Equipment Reliability Common Definitions and Structure	11
		NOP-ER-1001	Continuous Equipment Performance Improvement	6
		NOP-ER-3004	FENOC Maintenance Rule Program	5
		NORM-ER-3311	I&C Loop Components	10
	Work Orders	200638294	Install Target Rock Power Converter per ECP 0138-004	08/28/2019
		200772426	Terminate Control Cables within the Newly Installed Target Rock AC/DC-DC Power Converter	06/24/2019
		200798332	Identification of Cable to Support WO 200638294	08/28/2019
71111.13	Corrective Action Documents	CR 2019-01589	DFP Room Sump Pump Check Valves Degraded	02/21/2019
		CR 2019-01929	In Field Inspections for ECCS Sump Pump Suction	03/04/2019

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
			Strainer and Base Plate Bolt	
		CR 2019-01937	DR42 Leaks When Only the 'A' Pump Runs in the DH Cooler Pit Sump	03/05/2019
		CR 2019-02244	BACC: Pinhole Leak Discovered in #1 ECCS Sump Pump Discharge Line	03/13/2019
		CR 2019-02845	ECCS Room 1 Sump Pump Mechanical Alternator not Operating	03/27/2019
		CR 2019-04724	Trending of ECCS Sump Pump Discharge Piping Leakage	05/28/2019
		CR 2019-05791	Inadequate Coatings in Order 200428692	07/08/2019
		CR 2019-08598	BACC: Leak on 46-HSC-155-1 Shop Weld 'C' on ECCS #1 Sump Pump Discharge	10/18/2019
		CR 2019-08601	BACC: Leak on Field Weld '16' on Drawing M-0246B (ECCS #1 Sump Pump Discharge)	10/18/2019
		CR 2019-08602	BACC: Leak on Field Weld '17' on Drawing M-0246B (ECCS #1 Sump Pump Discharge)	10/18/2019
		CR 2019-08604	BACC: Leak on 46-HSC-155-6 Shop Weld 'A' (DH Cooler Pit Sump Pump Discharge)	10/18/2019
		CR 2019-08605	BACC: Leak on 46-HSC-155-6 Shop Weld 'E' (ECCS #1 and DH Cooler Pit Sump Pump Discharge Connection)	10/18/2019
		CR 2019-08606	BACC: Leak on 46-HSC-155-6 Shop Weld 'F' (ECCS #1 and DH Cooler Pit Sump Pump Discharge Connection)	10/18/2019
		CR 2019-09729	ECCS Room 1 Sump Pump 1A Degraded Operation	11/18/2019
		CR 2019-09782	ECCS #1 Sump Clean-Out Findings	11/19/2019
		CR 2019-10345	Accumulation of Sludge in DH Cooler Pit Sump	12/12/2019
	Miscellaneous		System Description for Plant Process Computer System	09/26/2019
		NOP-OP-1007-01	Risk Management Plan	7
	Procedures	DBBP-OPS-0003	On-Line Management Process	15
		NOP-OP-1007	Risk Management	30
	Work Orders	WO 200704931	Remove and Replace the Existing Plant Computer	10/15/2019
71111.15	Corrective Action Documents	CR 2019-01425	Station Battery 2N Found with Low Specific Gravity	02/15/2019
		CR 2019-01589	DFP Room Sump Pump Check Valves Degraded	02/21/2019
		CR 2019-01929	In Field Inspections for ECCS Sump Pump Suction Strainer and Base Plate Bolt	03/04/2019

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
		CR 2019-01937	DR42 Leaks When Only the 'A' Pump Runs in the DH Cooler Pit Sump	03/05/2019
		CR 2019-02244	BACC: Pinhole Leak Discovered in #1 ECCS Sump Pump Discharge Line	03/13/2019
		CR 2019-02845	ECCS Room 1 Sump Pump Mechanical Alternator not Operating	03/27/2019
		CR 2019-04724	Trending of ECCS Sump Pump Discharge Piping Leakage	05/28/2019
		CR 2019-05791	Inadequate Coatings in Order 200428692	07/08/2019
		CR 2019-07507	Clarification Needed with Respect to Motor Driven Feedpump Alignment in Mode 1	09/11/2019
		CR 2019-07971	EDG #2 Cylinder 7 Injector Linkage has Slight Drag	09/30/2019
		CR 2019-08044	#2 EDG Piston Cylinder #14 has Small Indication on Piston Ring	10/02/2019
		CR 2019-08057	Missing Roller Pins Identified on Air Box Covers 14, 18, and 19	10/02/2019
		CR 2019-08315	#2 Emergency Diesel Generator Outage Critique Roll-Up	10/11/2019
		CR 2019-08598	BACC: Leak on 46-HSC-155-1 Shop Weld 'C' on ECCS #1 Sump Pump Discharge	10/18/2019
		CR 2019-08601	BACC: Leak on Field Weld '16' on Drawing M-0246B (ECCS #1 Sump Pump Discharge)	10/18/2019
		CR 2019-08602	BACC: Leak on Field Weld '17' on Drawing M-0246B (ECCS #1 Sump Pump Discharge)	10/18/2019
		CR 2019-08604	BACC: Leak on 46-HSC-155-6 Shop Weld 'A' (DH Cooler Pit Sump Pump Discharge)	10/18/2019
		CR 2019-08605	BACC: Leak on 46-HSC-155-6 Shop Weld 'E' (ECCS #1 and DH Cooler Pit Sump Pump Discharge Connection)	10/18/2019
		CR 2019-08606	BACC: Leak on 46-HSC-155-6 Shop Weld 'F' (ECCS #1 and DH Cooler Pit Sump Pump Discharge Connection)	10/18/2019
		CR 2019-08607	BACC: Leak on 46-HSC-145-31 Shop Weld 'M' (ECCS Sump to MWDT Header)	10/18/2019
		CR 2019-08814	Degraded Spare Fuel Injector Identified during the Performance of PM 11219	10/23/2019
		CR 2019-09010	10CFR21-0127 From Engine Systems Incorporated (ESI):	10/28/2019

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
			EMD Fuel Injector - Seized Plunger and Bushing	
		CR 2019-09248	OP 3006 Miscellaneous Instrument Shift Checks Performed with Invalid Group 38 Data	11/02/2019
		CR 2019-09251	Group 38 Rod Index not Updating, Indicated 293.36 while Actual RI on the PIP was a Different Value	11/02/2019
		CR 2019-09729	ECCS Room 1 Sump Pump 1A Degraded Operation	11/18/2019
		CR 2019-09782	ECCS #1 Sump Clean-Out Findings	11/19/2019
		CR 2019-09966	Battery Specific Gravity is out of Program Limit	11/26/2019
		CR 2019-10345	Accumulation of Sludge in DH Cooler Pit Sump	12/12/2019
		CR 2019-10422	Pressure Differential Switch Found Outside Tech Spec Allowable As-Found Range	12/16/2019
	Drawings	E-18, sh 2	SFRCS Logic Diagram Logic Channels 2 & 4 and Actuation Channel 2	6
		M-0060	Auxiliary Feedwater System	60
		M-006C	Main Feedwater System	31
		M-0078	Piping and Instrument Diagram Steam Generator Secondary System	62
	Miscellaneous		Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Train 2 Class 1E Safety Related 125 Volt Batteries, Battery 2P and Battery 2N Expected Life and Condition Assessment; Standby Power System Consultants, Inc.	12/13/2018
	Procedures	DB-ME-03004	Station Battery Monthly Surveillance	7
		DB-MI-03204	Channel Functional Test and Calibration of SFRCS [Steam and Feedwater Rupture Control System] Actuation Channel 2, Steam Generator Differential Pressure Inputs PDS-2685A, PDS-2685B, PDS-2686C and PDS-2686D	16
		DB-OP 03006	Miscellaneous Instrument Shift Checks	63
	Work Orders	200808350	Replace ECCS Sump 1-1 Pump/Motor with Motor/Pump from DB-P89-3A	11/19/2019
		200808351	Troubleshoot ECCS Sump 1-1 Pump B	11/18/2019
71111.19	Drawings	OS-041C	Emergency Diesel Generator Diesel Oil System	19
	Procedures	DB-OP-06316	Diesel Generator Operating Procedure	63
	Work Orders	WO 200728256	AFP 2 Quarterly Test	11/20/2019

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
		WO 200733023	PM 0728, PM 0728 KS2 - CIn Ins EDG2	
71111.22	Drawings	7749-E-30-34	Schematic Diagram Davis-Besse Safety Feature Activation System	
		J-102 SH. 17A	RC LOOP 1 HLG WR Press SFAS Ch3 (PD-RC2B3)	1
	Miscellaneous		Final Report of AMS Tests Response Time Testing of Pressure Transmitters at Davis Besse Unit 1	12/2019
	Procedures	DB-MI-03119	Safety Features Actuation System On-Line Response Time Data Collection	8, 9
		DB-PF-03291	Containment Personnel and Emergency Airlocks Seal Leakage Test	14
71114.04	Corrective Action Documents	CR-2018-09935	MS-C-18-11-24 Incorrect Procedure Revision Identified in TSC	11/08/2018
		CR-2019-00093	Emergency Plan Rev 33 Submittal to the NRC did not Meet a Requirement in NG-NS-00500, Nuclear Emergency Response	01/04/2019
		CR-2019-05255	10CFR 50.54(q) Review was not Performed on Procedure Revisions	06/17/2019
	Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection	CR-2019-08756	Need to Perform 50.54(q) Reviews on Three Procedures that were Revised and Made Effective Without these Reviews	10/22/2019
	Miscellaneous	DB-2018-031-00	10 CFR 50.54(q)(3) Screen/Evaluation	08/23/2018
71114.06	Corrective Action Documents	CR 2019-08495	EP Drill - Failure to Notify On-Call ERO Personnel within Ten Minutes of Classification of an Event that Requires Initial Activation	10/16/2019
		CR 2019-08504	EP Drill - Controller Provided Incorrect Coaching to Dose Assessment	10/15/2019
		CR 2019-09204	RMT Communication Issues Identified in the October 15, 2019 EP Integrated Drill	11/01/2019
71124.03	Miscellaneous	Kit Number C005140	Breathing Air Quality Report - Bauer System	04/08/2019
		Sample Kit Number 105974S	Breathing Air Quality Report - Bauer System	12/19/2018
		Sample Kit Number 1711	Breathing Air Quality Report - Bauer System	07/26/2019

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
	Procedures	DB-HP-060000	Operation of Air Compressors	9
		NOP-OP-4303	Respirator Quantitative Fit Test Portacount Pro 8030	5
		NOP-OP-4310	Firehawk M7 Self Contained Breathing Apparatus	9
71124.04	Corrective Action Documents	CR-2019-10082	Individual Alarmed Passive Monitoring	12/09/2019
		CR-2019-10187	Vendor Supplied Thermoluminescent Dosimetry Results	12/06/2019
	Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection	ATA-2019-15867	NOP-OP-4205 TLD/DRD Comparison Enhancement	12/13/2019
		CR-2019-10379	Diving Dosimetry Enhancements	12/13/2019
	Miscellaneous	TLD 2301380218	TLD/DRD Deviation Investigation Report	05/03/2018
		TLD 2304500218	TLD/DRD Deviation Investigation Report	05/03/2018
		TLD 2305640218	TLD/DRD Deviation Investigation Report	05/03/2018
		TLD 2307040218	TLD/DRD Deviation Investigation Report	05/03/2018
71124.08	Corrective Action Documents	CR-2018-03364	Performance Issues with the Liquid Waste Processing System	4/18/2018
		CR-2019-05986	GEM-5 Portal Monitor at LLRWSF High Background Counts During TPE Calibration	7/31/2019
		CR-2019-06639	Continued Rainwater Roof Leakage into the LLRWSF Cell Area	8/14/2019
		CR-2019-08786	Potential Trend - Reverse Osmosis/Duratek Equipment Reliability	10/23/2019
	Miscellaneous	GEN-USDOT_FEN	US DOT Regulations Awareness Training	1
		RP-RADSHIPPING_FEN	Radioactive Material Packaging, Transport and Disposal Training USDOT and NOP-OP-5021 Training	2
	Procedures	Davis-Besse PCP	Process Control Program	9
		DB-HP-01344	Source Term Determination	3
		DB-HP-01511	Low-Level Radioactive Storage Facility (LLRSWF)	8
		DB-HP-01712	10 CFR 61 Sampling for Waste Classification	1
	Shipping Records	2018-1008	Cask with Filters in Poly Container	06/22/2018
		2018-1029	Metal Cask of Filters	12/15/2018
		2019-1001	Cask with Resin in Poly Container	06/29/2019
71151	Miscellaneous	NEI 99-02	Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline	7
	Procedures	DB-SP-03357	RCS Water Inventory Balance	20

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
		NG-EN-00327	RCS [Reactor Coolant System] Integrated Leakage Program	3
71152	Corrective Action Documents	2019-07705	Water was Flowed from the EFWST to OTSG 1 while Running the EFW Pump to Recirc Engine Coolant	09/18/2019
		CR 2018-10631	Low Radiator Fluid in EFW Pump	12/03/2018
		CR 2019-03728	FLEX Portable Generator FX-PG1 will not Start	04/21/2019
		CR 2019-03969	Flex Truck DRT2 will not Start	04/30/2019
		CR 2019-04317	FLEX Generator for Fan Alley and FLEX Building Failed to Start	05/11/2019
		CR 2019-04572	FLEX Portable Diesel Generator Battery Failure Trend CR	05/21/2019
		CR 2019-05699	Cabinet CS787A, Primary SFPLI, and CS787B, Backup SFPLI, Batteries	07/03/2019
		CR 2019-05754	SFPLI Batteries not Charged for Greater than 72 Hours	07/06/2019
		CR 2019-08692	Fuel Cube 1 Battery Requires Recharge	10/21/2019
		CR 2019-08693	Fuel Cube 2 Battery Requires Recharge	10/21/2019
		CR 2019-08781	FLEX Debris Removal Truck #1 - Dead Battery	10/22/2019
		CR 2019-09022	L5701 BKR 34 Found Tripped (SFP Level Indicator C5787B)	10/28/2019
		CR 2019-09042	Alt. LP FLEX EFW Pump Failure to Start	10/29/2019
		CR 2019-09330	FLEX - Battery Issues - Trending	11/04/2019
	Miscellaneous		Davis-Besse Unit Log	
		Technical Specifications	Davis-Besse Tech Spec Bases	
	Procedures	DB-OP-06234	Emergency Feedwater System	Multiple Revisions
	Work Orders	200724732	PM 12055 EFW Diesel, Gear and Pump	0
71153	Corrective Action Documents	CR 2017-10586	Damper CV5000A Failed to Open during DB-SS-03250 (EVS Train 1 Monthly)	10/19/2017
		CR 2018-06706	CV 5000A and CV 5000B Failed to Operate during EVS Train 1 Monthly Test	07/27/2018
		CR 2019-06097	CVS5000A, EVS Fan 1 Discharge Damper, not Operating Properly	07/19/2019
		CR 2019-06613	EVS Train 1 Past Operability Review Identifies Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications	08/06/2019

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
	Miscellaneous	LER 2019-001	Emergency Ventilation System Train Inoperable due to Non-Specific Test Description of Damper Operation	0
	Work Orders	WO 200720913	EVS Train 1 Monthly Test	06/21/2019