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Docket No. 50-321

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005138

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
ATTN: Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant - Unit 1  
Special Report 1-93-002  
Fire Rated Assembly Inoperable for Longer Than 14 Days

Gentlemen:

In accordance with the requirements of the Unit 1 Technical Specifications and the Fire Hazards Analysis, Georgia Power Company is submitting the enclosed special report concerning an event where a fire rated assembly was inoperable for longer than 14 days. This event occurred at Plant Hatch Unit 1.

Please contact this office if you have any questions.

Sincerely,

  
J. T. Beckham, Jr.

MCM/cr

Enclosure: Special Report 1-93-002

cc: Georgia Power Company  
Mr. H. L. Sumner, General Manager - Nuclear Plant  
NORMS

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C.  
Mr. K. Jabbour, Licensing Project Manager - Hatch

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II  
Mr. S. D. Ebner, Regional Administrator  
Mr. L. D. Wert, Senior Resident Inspector - Hatch

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Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant - Unit 1  
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Fire Rated Assembly Inoperable for Greater Than 14 Days

A. Requirement for Report

This report is required by the Plant Hatch Unit 1 Technical Specifications section 6.9.2, and the Plant Hatch Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA), Appendix B, section 1.1.1. Specifically, Technical Specifications section 6.9.2 states:

"Special reports for fire protection equipment operating and surveillance requirements shall be submitted, as required, by the Fire Hazards Analysis and its Appendix B requirements."

FHA Appendix B, section 1.1.1, states:

"Fire-rated assemblies and sealing devices in fire-rated assembly penetrations separating fire areas or separating portions of redundant systems important to safe shutdown within a fire area shall be OPERABLE."

Furthermore, action statement (a) of Appendix B, section 1.1.1 allows the fire-rated assembly and/or sealing devices to be inoperable provided, within 1 hour, a continuous fire watch on at least one side of the affected assembly(s) and/or sealing device(s) is established, or fire detectors are verified Operable on at least one side of the inoperable barrier and an hourly fire watch patrol is established. Action statement (b) states that, if the barrier is not returned to Operable status within 14 days, a special report must be submitted to the NRC within the next 30 days. On 3/9/93, fire door 1L48-1C22 had been inoperable for greater than 14 days.

B. Unit Status at Time of Event

On 3/9/93, at 0745 CST, Unit 1 was in the Run mode at a power level of 2378 CMWT (97.6% rated thermal power). Unit 2 was shutdown for a fuel inspection outage.

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C. Description of Event

On 2/23/93 at 0700 CST, a nonlicensed plant operator passed through fire door 1L48-1C22 and discovered the door would not close properly. Deficiency Card 1-93-0485 was written to document the problem. Operations personnel declared the fire door inoperable due to the condition of the door. Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 1-93-142 was entered and an hourly fire watch was established as required by the FHA, Appendix B, section 1.1.1, action statement (a). Subsequently, the fire door remained inoperable for longer than 14 days.

D. Cause of Event

The cause of this event is component failure resulting from high usage and a management decision to leave this door blocked open during the current refueling outage. Fire door 1L48-1C22 serves as the main entrance between the control building and turbine building and as such is located in a high personnel traffic area. Over time, the door and parts of the door subject to wear, such as the hinges, door knob, latch, and closer, degraded. The degraded door was removed and a new door was ordered for its replacement.

This door receives greatly increased traffic during outage periods. Because a Unit 2 outage was in progress at the time, and because Unit 1 was scheduled to shutdown for a refueling outage on 3/17/93, Operations supervision decided to leave the door off and maintain the required fire watch rather than risk damage to a new door. Plant management later concluded the same purpose could be achieved by installing the new door and blocking it open. This was done on 3/12/93, and the fire watch which had been previously established continued without interruption. Currently, the door has been inoperable for a period exceeding 14 days and is expected to remain open for the duration of the Unit 1 outage. The outage is scheduled to end in early May 1993.

E. Analysis of Event

In this event, Operations personnel declared fire door 1L48-1C22 inoperable on 2/23/93. Appropriate fire detectors were verified to be Operable and an hourly fire watch patrol was established as required by the FHA, Appendix B, section 1.1.1, action statement (a).

Since all actions required by Appendix B of the FHA were taken immediately upon declaring the door inoperable and remain in effect, it is concluded this event did not adversely affect nuclear safety.

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This door was determined to be inoperable very soon after becoming inoperable. This can be asserted with a great deal of confidence because the operator rounds procedure requires Operability of this door to be checked twice daily. This check involves confirmation the door is closed and a requirement to challenge the latching mechanism to ensure it is secured. In addition, a full inspection of this door was performed on February 12, 1993 with satisfactory results.

F. Corrective Actions

Fire door 1L48-1C22 was declared inoperable, LCO 1-93-142 was initiated, appropriate fire detectors were verified to be Operable, and an hourly fire watch was established as required by the FHA, Appendix B, section 1.1.1, action statement (a). These actions were taken on 2/23/93 when the door was found to be deficient.

A replacement door was installed and blocked open on 3/12/93 under Maintenance Work Order (MWO) 1-93-771. The new door will remain blocked open, LCO 1-93-142 will remain in effect, and the fire watch will continue as required by the FHA for the duration of the 1993 Unit 1 refueling outage.