



Carolina Power & Light Company

Brunswick Nuclear Plant
P. O. Box 10429
Southport, N.C. 28461-0429

APR 01 1993

FILE: B09-13510C
SERIAL: BSEP-93-0046

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNIT 1
DOCKET NO. 50-325
LICENSE NO. DRP-71
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 1-93-006

Gentlemen:

In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted. This report fulfills the requirement for a written report within thirty (30) days of a reportable occurrence and is submitted in accordance with the format set forth in NUREG-1022, September 1983.

Very truly yours,

C. C. Warren, Plant Manager Unit 2
Brunswick Nuclear Plant

GT/gt

Enclosure

cc: Mr. S. D. Ebnetter
Mr. P. D. Milano
BSEP NRC Resident Office

9304060055 930401
PDR ADDCK 05000325
S PDR

EXPIRES: 5/31/95

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 60.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20565-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)

Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Unit 1

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

05000325

PAGE (3)

1

TITLE (4)

INOPERABLE FIRE BARRIER PENETRATION SEALS

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
3	2	93	93	-06-	0	4	1	93	BSEP UNIT 2	05000324
									FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
										05000
OPERATING MODE (9)		4	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following)(11)							
			20.402(b)			20.405(c)			50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
POWER LEVEL (10)		0	20.405(a)(1)(i)			50.36(c)(1)			50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
			20.405(a)(1)(ii)			50.36(c)(2)			50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER
			20.405(a)(1)(iii)		X	50.73(a)(2)(i)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	(Specify in Abstract and Text)
			20.405(a)(1)(iv)			50.73(a)(2)(ii)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
			20.405(a)(1)(v)			50.73(a)(2)(iii)			50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME

Glen M. Thearling, Regulatory Compliance Specialist

TELEPHONE NUMBER

(919) 457-2038

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X	NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e. approximately fifteen single space typewritten lines) (16)

On March 2, 1993, both Units were in Cold Shutdown as part of the outage started April 21, 1992.

The on-going Fire Barrier Inspection program (DG-IV.0020) identified several fire barrier penetrations with fire seal application discrepancies. The Fire Barrier Inspection program was previously implemented to establish the methodology for inspection/reinspection and documentation for fire barrier configurations against specified acceptance criteria. This inspection includes visually verifying the integrity of 100% of the fire barrier penetrations, and ensuring the correctness of the Fire Barrier Index Drawings.

Five cable tray penetrations through the roof of the battery rooms were identified with a Delta Maid One Shot seal (insulating cement for piping) which had previously been tested only for wall seal applications.

Four other non-qualified penetrations, between each of the four Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) cells and the associated fuel oil cells were noted with classification discrepancies. Although the Fire Barrier Penetration Index showed the seal design as "N/A," the analysis to justify this could not be located.

These items are of minor safety significance, and as reported in LER 1-92-012 the Fire Barrier Inspection program is continuing. Repair of the deficiencies is to be completed prior to the end of the present Unit 1 outage and the next Unit 2 refueling outage.

EXPIRES: 5/31/95

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Unit 1	05000325	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	2
		93	-06-	0	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 365A's) (17)

TITLE

INOPERABLE FIRE BARRIER PENETRATION SEALS

INITIAL CONDITIONS

On March 2, 1993, both Units were in Cold Shutdown as part of the outage started April 21, 1992.

The on-going Fire Barrier Inspection program Design Guide (DG-IV.0020) was implemented to establish the methodology for inspection/reinspection and documentation for fire barrier configurations against specified acceptance criteria. This inspection includes visually verifying the integrity of 100% of the fire barrier penetrations, and ensuring the correctness of the Fire Barrier Index Drawings.

EVENT NARRATIVE

The on-going Fire Barrier Inspection program per DG-IV.0020 identified several fire barrier penetrations with discrepant fire seal applications. Discrepancies were noted for five cable tray penetrations (CB-1-059, CB-1-060, CB-1-094, CB-1-098, CB-1-105) through the roof of the battery rooms. These contain a Delta Maid One Shot seal (insulating cement for piping) which has been tested only for wall seal applications. Four seals (DG-2-192, DG-2-117, DG-2-152, DG-2-076) were identified in the Emergency Diesel Generator Building with indeterminate fire seals. The Fire Barrier Penetration Index showed the seal design as "N/A," but no analysis justifies this designation. The seals were between each of the four EDG cells and their fuel oil cells.

CAUSE OF EVENT

The cause of the inadequate fire seal design is not known but the 100% inspection of fire seals will assure the seals are installed as required.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

Fire watches are stationed and will remain in place until the deficient fire seals are restored and the Fire Barrier Inspection program for areas with deficiencies are completed.

Reinspection of 100% of the fire barriers per DG-IV.0020 is continuing with repair of deficiencies to be completed prior to the end of the present Unit 1 outage and the next Unit 2 refueling outage. Currently 91% of Unit 2, 38% of Unit 1, and 79% of the EDG Building have been inspected. This reinspection includes a visual inspection of the fire barrier penetrations to verify their integrity and to ensure the correctness of the Fire Barrier Index Drawings. The reinspection will determine whether the barriers have degraded so as not to be in accordance with acceptance criteria based on original plant design documentation.

An ongoing review is being conducted of the Fire Barrier Inspection program findings to insure the programmatic controls needed to prevent the reintroduction of similar deficiencies are in place (Report scheduled for November 30, 1993).

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

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FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Unit 1	05000325	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	3
		93	-06-	0	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

SAFETY ASSESSMENT

The safety significance of the deficient seals is minor due to the administrative controls for combustible materials, installed fire detection, and suppression systems in these areas.

PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS

Related items were previously identified in LER 1-92-012 and Special Report 1-92-004.