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Vogtle Project



April 2, 1993

ELV-05365

Docket No. 50-424

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Gentlemen:

VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.0.3 ENTRY DUE TO PRESSURIZER
CODE SAFETY VALVES LIFT SETPOINTS OUT OF TOLERANCE

In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73, Georgia Power Company submits the enclosed report related to an event which occurred on March 13, 1993.

Sincerely,

C. K. McCoy

CKM/NJS

Enclosure: LER 50-424/1993-002

xc: Georgia Power Company
Mr. W. B. Shipman
Mr. M. Sheibani
NORMS

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Mr. S. D. Ebnetter, Regional Administrator
Mr. D. S. Hood, Licensing Project Manager, NRR
Mr. B. R. Bonser, Senior Resident Inspector, Vogtle

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT - UNIT 1										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 05000424				PAGE (3) 1 OF 3		
TITLE (4) TECH. SPEC. 3.0.3 ENTRY DUE TO PRESSURIZER CODE SAFETY VALVES LIFT SETPOINTS OUT OF TOLERANCE																
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)						
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQ NUM	REV	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES				DOCKET NUMBER(S)			
03	13	93	93	002	00								05000			
OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR (11)														
3		20.402(b)				20.405(c)				50.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)		
POWER LEVEL		20.405(a)(1)(i)				50.36(c)(1)				50.73(a)(2)(v)				73.71(c)		
0		20.405(a)(1)(ii)				50.36(c)(2)				50.73(a)(2)(vii)				OTHER (Specify in Abstract below)		
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)				X 50.73(a)(2)(i)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)						
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)				50.73(a)(2)(ii)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)						
		20.405(a)(1)(v)				50.73(a)(2)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(x)						
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																
NAME										TELEPHONE NUMBER						
MEHDI SHEIRANI, NUCLEAR SAFETY AND COMPLIANCE										AREA CODE		706 826-3209				
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC-TURER	REPORT TO NRPDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC-TURER	REPORT TO NRPDS						
B	AB	RV	C710	Y												
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)												EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)												<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO				
ABSTRACT (16)																

On March 13, 1993, while in Mode 3 (Hot Standby) during a plant shutdown for refueling, personnel were performing surveillance testing of pressurizer code safety valves (PSVs). The lift setpoint for valve 1PSV-8010B was found to be in excess of the Technical Specification (TS) allowable limit, and the unit shift supervisor (USS) entered the TS limiting condition for operation (LCO). Testing proceeded and the lift setpoint for a second pressurizer valve, 1PSV-8010C, was also found to be in excess of the TS limit. The USS entered TS 3.0.3 since there is no action statement for more than one PSV being out of service in Mode 3. Operation per TS 3.0.3 was exited at 0648 EST, when the unit entered Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown) as the unit cooled down for a planned refueling outage.

The cause of this event was two PSVs with lift setpoints in excess of the TS limit. The PSVs have been sent to a vendor for testing and adjustment of the setpoints.

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TEXT

A. REQUIREMENT FOR REPORT

This report is required per 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i) because the unit operated in a condition prohibited by the Technical Specifications (TS) when more than one pressurizer code safety valve (PSV) was inoperable, requiring entry into TS 3.0.3.

B. UNIT STATUS AT TIME OF EVENT

At the time of this event, Unit 1 was in Mode 3 (Hot Standby) at 0 percent of rated thermal power and was cooling down for a refueling outage. Other than that described herein, there was no inoperable equipment that contributed to the occurrence of this event.

C. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On March 13, 1993, while in Mode 3 during a plant shutdown for refueling, personnel were performing surveillance testing per Procedure 28215-C, "Pressurizer Code Safety Valve Setpoint Verification." The lift setpoint for valve 1PSV-8010B was found to be 2531 psig. Since this was in excess of the TS 3.4.2.2 allowable limit of 2485 psig plus or minus 1 percent, the unit shift supervisor (USS) entered the TS limiting condition for operation (LCO) action statement at 0217 EST. Testing proceeded, and at 0228 EST, the lift setpoint for valve 1PSV-8010C was found to be 2526 psig, which is also in excess of the TS limit. The USS entered TS 3.0.3 since there is no action statement for more than one PSV being out of service. Operation per TS 3.0.3 was exited at 0643 EST, when the unit entered Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown), and TS 3.4.2.2 requirements no longer applied.

Discussions with the NSSS vendor determined that the valves were actually inoperable from the time the hydraulic testing devices were installed on 1PSV-8010B and 1PSV-8010C, approximately 15 minutes prior to the first valve test. These hydraulic testing devices will restrict the valve from going to a full open position. Therefore, TS 3.0.3 was actually applicable at the time the testing devices were installed rather than following the failure of the second valve, approximately 25 minutes later.

D. CAUSE OF EVENT

The cause of this event was two PSVs which had failed to maintain their lift setpoints within the 1 percent tolerance.

E. ANALYSIS OF EVENT

The transient analyses of record assume the PSVs begin to open at 2485 psig and are fully open at 2560 psig. In practice, and based on other testing experience, these valves "pop" fully open rather than ramp open. At VEGP, a gag is placed on the PSV for the setpoint verification such that a stroke to the full open position is not permitted during the test. Therefore, had

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TEXT

the gags not been in place, we believe 1PSV-8010B would have been fully open at 2531 psig and 1PSV-8010C would have been fully open at 2526 psig, which is within the bounds of the transient analyses. Also, the deviations from TS 3.4.2.2 were limited to 21 psig (101.9 percent of setpoint) for 1PSV-8010B and 16 psig (101.6 percent of setpoint) for 1PSV-8010C. Finally, the two valves were gagged simultaneously for only a relatively short period (approximately 25 minutes), and during this time no event occurred which required the valves to function. Based on these considerations, there has been no adverse effect on plant safety or on the health and safety of the public as a result of this event.

F. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

1. All three Unit 1 PSVs have been sent to a vendor for testing and adjustment of the lift setpoints.
2. Procedure 28215-C has been changed to prevent the hydraulic testing device from being installed on more than one PSV simultaneously while in Modes 1,2, or 3, or on more than 2 PSVs while in Modes 4 and 5.
3. As a followup to Information Notice 89-90 and Westinghouse Owners Group initiatives, Georgia Power Company intends to request a change to the TS lift setpoint tolerance.

G. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

1. Failed Components:

Valves manufactured by Crosby Valve & Gage Company
Style # HB-BP86

2. Previous Similar Events:

None

3. Energy Industry Identification System Code:

Reactor Coolant System - AB