

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)

Cooper Nuclear Station

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

0 5 0 0 0 2 9 8 1 OF 0 3

PAGE (3)

TITLE (4)

Violation of Technical Specifications Due to Lack of Fire Watch Awareness of a Thermo-Lag Fire Barrier

EVENT DATE (5)

LER NUMBER (6)

REPORT DATE (7)

OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)

MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)								
0	2	0	2	9	3	9	3	0	0	2	9	8	1	0	5	0	0	0

OPERATING MODE (9)

N

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)

POWER LEVEL (10)	20.402(b)	20.405(a)(1)(i)	20.405(a)(1)(ii)	20.405(a)(1)(iii)	20.405(a)(1)(iv)	20.405(a)(1)(v)	20.406(c)	50.36(c)(1)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(vi)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)	50.73(a)(2)(ix)	73.71(b)	73.71(c)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Test, NRC Form 366A)
0	9	5																			

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME

TELEPHONE NUMBER

Donald L. Reeves, Jr.

AREA CODE

4 0 2 8 2 5 1 - 3 8 1 1

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)

MONTH DAY YEAR

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)

X NO

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single space typewritten lines) (16)

On February 2, 1993, an NRC Inspector, conducting a Fire Protection inspection, interviewed a Security officer assigned as a Fire Watch in the Control Building Basement (El. 882' 6") where Thermo-Lag material is installed. When questioned about assigned duties, the Fire Watch was unaware of one of the Thermo-Lag fire barriers in the area that had been declared inoperable on June 25, 1992, in response to NRC Bulletin 92-01. As a consequence, a Notice of Violation (NOV) was issued indicating that because the Fire Watch was not in a position to monitor the inoperable Thermo-Lag fire barrier, compliance with Technical Specification requirements for a Fire Watch was not achieved. At the time, the plant was operating at approximately 95 percent power, at nearly 760 MWe, on end of cycle coastdown with all rods fully withdrawn.

This event occurred due to a lapse in personnel attention induced by a procedural deficiency. While supplemental information identifying the Thermo-Lag areas of concern was provided for the benefit of Fire Watch personnel, it was not specified or referred to on the Fire Watch Log. Therefore, over time, the Fire Watch who was interviewed did not maintain an awareness of the subject barrier.

Assigned Fire Watch personnel were re-familiarized with the Thermo-Lag areas of concern. Further, specific watch standing instructions, including a diagram of the basement area demarcating the inoperable Thermo-Lag locations, were developed. The Fire Watch procedure will be updated to ensure that Fire Watch requirements for Technical Specification impairments are addressed on the Fire Watch/Fire Watch Patrol Log. During the current refueling outage, modifications will be made that will eliminate the need for this Fire Watch station.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/88

FACILITY NAME (1) Cooper Nuclear Station	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 9 8 9 3	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
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		0 3			OF 0 3		

*EXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

A. Event Description

On February 2, 1993, an NRC Inspector, conducting a Fire Protection inspection, interviewed a Security officer assigned as a Fire Watch in the Control Building Basement (El. 882' 6") where Thermo-Lag material is installed. This "L" shaped open area contains the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Service Water Booster pumps, Service Air compressors and Instrument Air dryers. When questioned about assigned duties, the Fire Watch was unaware of one of the Thermo-Lag fire barriers in the area that had been declared inoperable on June 25, 1992, in response to NRC Bulletin 92-01, "Failure of Thermo-Lag 330 Fire Barrier System To Maintain Cabling in Wide Cable Trays and Small Conduits Free From Fire Damage".

B. Plant Status

Operating at approximately 95 percent power, at nearly 760 MWe, on end of cycle costdown with all rods fully withdrawn.

C. Basis for Report

Failure of the Fire Watch to be cognizant of one of the Thermo-Lag fire barriers installed in the area. As a consequence, NRC issued a Notice of Violation (NOV) on February 26, 1993, indicating that because the Fire Watch was not in a position to monitor the inoperable Thermo-Lag fire barrier, compliance with paragraph 3.19.B of the Technical Specifications, "a continuous fire watch shall be established on at least 1 side of the penetration within 1 hour," was not achieved. This condition is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), as a violation of Technical Specification requirements.

D. Cause

On June 25, 1992, upon establishing the Fire Watch, a Fire Watch/Fire Watch Patrol Log was issued in accordance with procedural requirements. To ensure that Fire Watch personnel were aware of the barriers of concern, a sketch of the area identifying the Thermo-Lag barriers was provided. Additionally, photographs of the barriers were subsequently taken and provided to Fire Watch personnel to further enhance their ability to identify the barriers.

However, the specific barriers were not identified on the Fire Watch/Fire Watch Patrol Log, nor were any special instructions issued specifying barrier monitoring requirements. During the eight month time frame between initiation of the Fire Watch and the NRC Inspection, because the specific barriers were not specified or referred to on the Fire Watch Log, the Fire Watch who was interviewed did not maintain an awareness of the subject barrier. Had this information been specified or referred to on the Fire Watch Log, it is expected that the Fire Watch would have been fully cognizant of the requirements.

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Cooper Nuclear Station

YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION
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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

E. Safety Significance

This condition had minimal safety significance. According to the Fire Hazards Analysis for this area, the combustible loading will support a design basis fire for an approximate two minute duration. The subject fire barrier is used to provide one hour protection for redundant 4160 VAC conduit banks routed from the floor through the ceiling to the Cable Spreading Room. The conduits contain Service Water pump power and Diesel Generator switchgear control power. Had a fire occurred in the immediate vicinity of the subject Thermo-Lag barrier, it would have been detected by the installed automatic detection system in service in the area, annunciating an alarm in the Control Room. Further, it would have been expected that the assigned Fire Watch who was in the immediate vicinity would also have detected the fire as a result of smoke and odors in the room, and following notification of the Control Room, would have promptly extinguished the fire using manual fire suppression equipment.

F. Safety Implications

Plant operation at full power is the "worst case" initial conditions from which to achieve safe shutdown in the event of a fire and loss of offsite power (LOOP). Since June 25, 1992, when the Thermo-Lag fire barriers were declared inoperable, the plant operated at nearly full power, except for a four day outage in September, until shut down on March 5, 1993 for the 1993 Refueling Outage.

G. Corrective Action

Immediate corrective actions taken included re-familiarizing assigned Fire Watch personnel with the Thermo-Lag areas of concern and development of specific watch standing instructions, including a diagram of the basement area demarcating the inoperable Thermo-Lag fire barrier locations. The frequency with which Fire Protection personnel tour the area and ensure that assigned Fire Watch personnel are familiar with their duties and responsibilities was increased. Additionally, the Fire Watch procedure was revised to specifically identify compensatory actions for Technical Specification fire protection impairments. A further update to the procedure will be made to ensure that Fire Watch requirements for these impairments are addressed on the Fire Watch/Fire Watch Patrol Log.

During the current refueling outage, the subject fire barrier will be modified, eliminating the Thermo-Lag material, and the affected conduit will be rerouted. Upon completion of the modifications, the requirement for a Fire Watch in the area will be eliminated.

H. Similar Events

None