



Commonwealth Edison
LaSalle County Nuclear Station
2601 N. 21st. Rd.
Marseilles, Illinois 61341
Telephone 815/357-6761

March 31, 1993

Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Mail Station P1-137
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Sir:

Licensee Event Report #93-009-00, Docket #050-373 is being submitted to your office in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i).

G. F. Spedl
Station Manager
LaSalle County Station

GFS/RLV/grv

Enclosure

xc: Nuclear Licensing Administrator
NRC Resident Inspector
NRC Region III Administrator
INPO - Records Center
IDNS Resident Inspector

290094

9303290295 930331
PDR ADOCK 05000373
S PDR

IE22
11

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

Form Rev 2.0

Facility Name (1) LaSalle County Station Unit 1 Docket Number (2) 0 15 10 10 10 13 17 13 Page (3) 1 of 0 3

Title (4)

Fire Barrier Inoperable Greater Than Seven Days Due To Corebores Not Being Resealed

Event Date (5)			LER Number (6)			Report Date (7)			Other Facilities Involved (8)	
Month	Day	Year	Year	Sequential Number	Revision Number	Month	Day	Year	Facility Names	Docket Number(s)
0 3	0 2	9 3	9 3	0 0 9	0 0	0 3	3 1	9 3		0 15 10 10 10 1 1 1

OPERATING
MODE (9)

4

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10CFR
(Check one or more of the following) (11)

POWER LEVEL (10)	0 0 0	20.402(b)	20.405(a)(1)(i)	20.405(a)(1)(ii)	20.405(a)(1)(iii)	20.405(a)(1)(iv)	20.405(a)(1)(v)	20.405(c)	50.36(c)(1)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	73.71(b)	73.71(c)	Other (Specify in Abstract below and in Text)
					X																	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

Name Rodney Vickers, System Engineer, Extension 2445
TELEPHONE NUMBER
AREA CODE 8 1 5 3 15 17 1 -16 17 16 11

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC-TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC-TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS
X				N					

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

Expected Submission Date (15) X 1 NO

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On March 2, 1993 at 2145 hours with Unit 1 in Operational Condition 4 (Cold Shutdown), Operations personnel discovered three open corebore penetrations in the floor of the three Hour Fire Rated Assembly. The Floor Slab is located in the Balance-of-Plant Cable Area at elevation 731' Auxillary Building (AB) Fire Zone 5B13 and was found while performing general plant inspections.

The three six inch diameter corebores were drilled in order to run cables into the Demodulator Panel 1PLG3J. However, the corebores were never used or sealed. All cabling to the panel enters 1PLG3J from the top. These open corebores were not detected during the initial Unit 1 Fire Barrier Integrity Inspection because the corebores were concealed by a piece of material at the base of and inside panel 1PLG3J. Their location from the 710' Turbine Building (TB) elevation below (Fire Zone 5C11) is obstructed by cable trays and pipes.

An Hourly Fire Watch was established (Fire Impairment #50-93) at 2145 hours on March 2, 1993 in accordance with LaSalle Technical Specification 3.7.6. Work request No. L21897 was written to have the corebores filled with grout. The corebores were sealed in accordance with this work request and the barrier was declared operable on March 8, 1993 at 0730 hours.

This event is reportable to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as a Licensee Event Report pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i) due to the Fire Rated Assembly being inoperable (a condition prohibited by LaSalle Technical Specifications 3.7.6).

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION														Form Rev 2.0										
FACILITY NAME (1)			DOCKET NUMBER (2)				LER NUMBER (6)						Page (3)											
							Year	///	Sequential Number	///	Revision Number													
LaSalle County Station Unit 1			0	5	0	0	0	3	7	3	9	3	-	0	0	9	-	0	0	0	2	OF	0	3

TEXT Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX]

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION:

General Electric - Boiling Water Reactor

Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX].

A. CONDITION PRIOR TO EVENT

Unit(s): 1 Event Date: 3/02/93 Event Time: 2145 Hours
 Reactor Mode(s): 4 Mode(s) Name: Cold Shutdown Power Level(s): 0

B. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On March 2, 1993 Unit 1 was in operational condition 4 (Cold Shutdown) at 0% power. At 2145 hours Operations Personnel discovered three open corebore penetrations in the floor of the Balance-of-Plant Cable Area (Fire Zone 5B13) at elevation 731' AB during general plant inspections. The floor slab of Fire Zone 5B13 is a Technical Specification 3.7.6 Three Hour Fire Rated Barrier.

The corebores were located inside Demodulator Panel 1PLG3J at Column 13.5 and Row N.7. They were concealed by a piece of material which was located inside the panel on the floor. An Hourly Fire Watch was established in accordance with Technical Specification 3.7.6 Fire Rated Assemblies. The corebores were sealed with grout in accordance with Work Request No. L21897 and the barrier was declared operable on March 8, 1993 at 0730 hours.

C. APPARENT CAUSE OF EVENT

The cause of this event is unknown. The penetrations in the floor of Fire Zone 5B13 are required to be sealed to a Three Hour Fire Rating by Technical Specification 3.7.6. It is believed that the three-six inch diameter corebores were never used or sealed. All cabling to the panel enters 1PLG3J from the top. These open corebores were never identified during the initial Unit 1 Fire Assembly Integrity Inspection which was performed prior to the Technical Specification surveillance being written. The reasons for failure to identify these open corebores are; (1) Demodulator Panel 1PLG3J is normally locked - The key to the panel is controlled by Operations. (2) The hidden location - The corebores were located inside Panel 1PLG3J and were concealed by a piece of material at the base of the cabinet. The location from the floor elevation below (elevation 710'-6" TB) is obstructed by cable trays and pipes. (3) The lack of identification numbers for the penetrations - Corebores are not assigned penetration numbers unless they are sealed with a fire seal material other than grout. It is common practice to have rigid conduit penetrate the core hole and then fill the remaining space between the conduit and the corebore with grout. As such, the penetration would be considered part of the concrete and would not be assigned a penetration number.

D. SAFETY ANALYSIS OF EVENT

Fire Zone 5B13 contains cables for both Auxiliary Electric Equipment Room (AEER) Ventilation Trains. The Train A and B cables are separated by redundant 2 Hour Fire Rated Walls with 1 1/2 Hour Fire Rated Doors. Both trains of Control Room Ventilation and at least one train of AEER Ventilation would be available for Safe Shutdown in the event of a fire in this zone.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

Form Rev 2.0

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)						Page (3)		
		Year	///	Sequential	///	Revision				
				Number		Number				
LaSalle County Station Unit 1	0 5 0 0 0 3 7 3	9 3	-	0 0 9	-	0 0	0 3	OF	0 3	

TEXT Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX]

D. SAFETY ANALYSIS OF EVENT CONTINUED

The Fire Zone below 5B13 is 5C11 (Turbine Building Ground Floor General Area) at elevation 710'-6" TB. This zone contains a 125 VDC Battery Room and its cables for Unit 2 Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Division 1. A fire in this zone could degrade the Unit 2 ESF Division 1 125 VDC Battery Room and it's associated cables. However, the Unit 2 ESF Division 1 125 VDC Battery Room is completely enclosed by 3 Hour Fire Rated Barriers thus minimizing potential degradation. Such a fire would not affect the Unit 1 ESF Division 1 125 VDC Battery Room.

A fire in either Fire Zone 5B13 or 5C11 would not affect the Safe Shutdown of the plant. The Ionization Detection System would sound an alarm locally and in the Control Room which will quickly bring personnel to extinguish any fire and prevent it from spreading.

Based on the fact that Unit 1 was in Cold Shutdown and because the degradation would not have prevented the Safe Shutdown of Unit 1, the safety significance of this is considered to be minimal. U-2 Division I 125 VDC Battery could become disabled however, U-2 Division II and Division III are not affected and would be fully operable to provide Safe Shutdown functions for Unit 2.

E. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The initial corrective action was to establish an Hourly Fire Watch in accordance with LaSalle Technical Specification 3.7.6.

Additionally, Work Request No. 21897 was written to have the corebores filled with grout. The corebores were sealed in accordance with this Work Request and the barrier was declared operable on March 8, 1993 at 0730 hours.

Unit 2 Demodulator Panel 2PLG3J was inspected in addition to a random sample of cabinets/panels (e.g. computer cabinets, monitoring panels, distribution panels, control panels etc.) to determine if there was a generic problem with unsealed penetrations inside cabinets/panels. No unsealed penetrations were found in this random sample.

F. PREVIOUS EVENTS

LER NUMBER	TITLE
373/89-024-00	Unsealed Openings In The Control Room Due To Original Construction
374/91-001-001	Fire Rated Assembly Found Inoperable During Inspection

G. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA

There were no component failures in this event. Consequently no NPRDS search was performed.

EVENT SUMMARY AND CAUSE CODES

 DVR Number
 OL-1-93-074

<input type="checkbox"/> Lost generation	<input type="checkbox"/> Reactor trip	<input type="checkbox"/> NRC violation, level__
<input type="checkbox"/> Cost > \$25,000	<input type="checkbox"/> ESF actuation	<input type="checkbox"/> GSEP event, class_____
<input type="checkbox"/> Hazard or Spill	<input type="checkbox"/> NRC reportable	<input type="checkbox"/> Tech Spec LCO
<input type="checkbox"/> Personnel injury	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> LER	<input type="checkbox"/> Potential or future loss
<input type="checkbox"/> Component type	<input type="checkbox"/> PSE	<input type="checkbox"/> SALP functional area__
	Failure mode	

Department	
X	Unknown
X	
X	

Licensed? L or blank		Type	
Level		Detail code	
Department			
A			
A			
A			

Type		Detail Code	
Department			
B			
B			
B			

Type		Detail code	
C			

Type of deficiency		Detail code		Procedure type	
D					
D					
D					

Type		Detail code		Department	
E					
E					
E					