



Commonwealth Edison
LaSalle County Nuclear Station
2601 N. 21st. Rd.
Marseilles, Illinois 61341
Telephone 815/357-6761

March 25, 1993

Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Mail Station P1-137
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Sir:

Licensee Event Report #93-005-00, Docket #050-373 is being submitted to your office in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i).

G. F. Spedl
Station Manager
LaSalle County Station

GFS/RPD/mkl

Enclosure

xc: Nuclear Licensing Administrator
NRC Resident Inspector
NRC Region III Administrator
INPO - Records Center
IDNS Resident Inspector

9303290172 930324
PDR ADOCK 05000373
S PDR

Form Rev 2.0

High Radiation Door Violation Due To Security Computer Problems

OPERATING MODE (9)		1		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10CFR (Check one or more of the following) (11)			
POWER LEVEL		20.402(b)	20.405(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)		
(10) 0 8 7		20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)		
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	Other (Specify		
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	X 50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	in Abstract		
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	below and in		
		20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	Text)		

Name	TELEPHONE NUMBER											
	AREA CODE											
Raymond P. Dillon, Security Administrator, Extension 2288	8	1	5	3	5	7	1	-	6	7	6	1

[illegible]

<input type="checkbox"/> Yes (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> X	<input type="checkbox"/> NO	Submission Date (15)						
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On February 22, 1993 Unit 1 was in Operational Condition 1 (Run) at 87% power. Two High Radiation Doors, #52 and #213, were found to be unsecured (open).

On February 18, 1993 the Security Uninterruptable Power Supply (UPS) was found on alternate power feed. Attempts were made to transfer back to the normal power supply. When this could not be accomplished a work request was generated to correct the problem. Troubleshooting per this work request revealed a blown fuse on the 'C' phase output of the static switch.

At approximately 1230 hours on February 22, 1993 Electrical Maintenance Department (EMD) replaced the fuse. After replacing the fuse, the UPS was re-energized and placed on normal supply per LOP-IS-01. The inverter carried the load for less than 5 seconds when the new fuse blew and the UPS auto-transferred to the alternate feed. Coincidental with the auto-transfer of the UPS, another fuse failed in a multiplexer cabinet. The multiplexers are "information hubs" between the door card readers and the Security Computer System. During this same time period several High Radiation Doors Alarmed on the Security Computer System. Security notified Radiation Protection (RP) Shift Supervisor, so the RP Department could physically verify the doors status. There was a communication problem and only 12 of the 14 doors that had alarmed were inspected.

At approximately 1511 hours a High Radiation Door was found to be unsecured and RP was contacted. This was Door 52 and was one of the 14 doors that had alarmed at 1230 hours but not verified closed. Door 52 was verified secured after the RP Technician ensured no one in the area. At 1705 hours Security questioned RP concerning the status of door 213 which was still in alarm status. The RP Department immediately responded, found the door opened slightly, and secured the door after verifying no one in the area.

The loss of control of a High Radiation Door is a violation of Technical Specification 6.1.1.2. This is reportable to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as a Licensee Event Report pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i) due to a High Radiation Barrier being unsecured (condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications).

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

Form Rev 2.0

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)						Page (3)		
		Year	///	Sequential Number	///	Revision Number				
LaSalle County Station Unit 1	0 5 0 0 0 3 7 3	9 3	-	0 0 5	-	0 0	0 2	OF	0 4	

TEXT Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX]

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION:

General Electric - Boiling Water Reactor

Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX].

A. CONDITION PRIOR TO EVENT

Unit(s): 1 Event Date: 02/22/93 Event Time: 1200 Hours
 Reactor Mode(s): 1 Mode(s) Name: Run Power Level(s): 87%

B. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On February 22, 1993 Unit 1 was in Operational Condition 1 (Run) at 87% power. Two High Radiation Doors were found unsecured.

On February 18, 1993 the Security Uninterruptable Power Supply (UPS, IS) [1A] was found on alternate power feed. Attempts were made to transfer back to the normal power supply but were unsuccessful. A work request (L21501) was generated to correct the problem. Troubleshooting per this work request revealed a blown fuse on the 'C' phase output of the Static Switch.

At approximately 1230 hours on February 22, 1993 Electrical Maintenance Department (EMD) replaced the fuse. After replacing the fuse, the UPS was re-energized and placed on normal supply per LaSalle Operating Procedure LOP-IS-01 "Security UPS Operation". The inverter carried the load for less than 5 seconds when the new fuse blew and the UPS auto-transferred to the alternate feed. Coincidental with the auto-transfer of the UPS, another fuse failed in a multiplexer cabinet. The multiplexers are "information hubs" between the door card readers and the Security Computer System. Several High Radiation Door Alarms were received on the Security Computer System. Security notified Radiation Protection (RP) Department to physically verify the status of the doors. There was a communication problem at this time and only 12 of the 14 doors in alarm status were physically verified.

A RP Technician was sent to investigate a report that High Radiation Door 52 was unsecured. This was one of the doors that had alarmed at 1230 hours but not been verified at that time. The door was found open and unattended. The RP Technician (RPT) verified no personnel in the area and secured the door.

At approximately 1705 hours, Security questioned the RP Department concerning the status of Door 213 which was still in alarm status. This was the remaining door of the 14 that had alarmed at 1230 hours. A RP Technician investigated the status of this door and found the door slightly open. After verifying no one in the area, the door was secured.

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LaSalle County Station Unit 1	0 5 0 0 0 3 7 3	9 3	-	0 0 5	-	0 0	0 3	OF	0 4	

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C. APPARENT CAUSE OF EVENT

Troubleshooting per WR# L21501 revealed a blown fuse on the "C" phase output of the static switch. EMD replaced the fuse. After replacing the fuse, the UPS was re-energized and placed on normal supply per LOP-IS-01. The inverter carried the load for less than 5 seconds when the new fuse blew and the UPS auto-transferred to the alternate feed.

The fuse blowing in the UPS apparently caused a short duration (less than 1 second) power outage at the card readers. The UPS contains Door Strike Timers that hold the associated door latch open for a set time to allow personnel entry through the door after removing their security card from the card reader. When the power returned, the Door Strike Timers released the 2 doors allowing them to open. Negative air pressure in a room pulled door 52 open. Door 213 popped open due to the way the door fit into the frame. Since both doors were slightly open, the latches could not automatically re-secure them.

D. SAFETY ANALYSIS OF EVENT

The safety consequences of the event were minimal. Radiation Protection surveys indicated the doses in these areas had readings greater than 1 R/Hr at 18", which requires the areas to be classified as High High Radiation. The two doors that were unsecured were in areas that had minimal activity, out of normal walkways and low traffic areas. Personnel would not have used these doors without proper authorization and protective equipment.

E. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

Immediate corrective action was to dispatch a RPT to investigate the alarms on the doors identified by Security. The two doors found open were secured following Radiation Protection checks of the area for personnel. The RP Supervisor also performed a check of the Radiation Work Permits, High Radiation Key and Key Card Logs to determine if personnel had been authorized to enter these areas. It was determined no personnel had been authorized to enter these areas during this time. All other alarming doors were found secured. This was completed at 1755 hours on 2/22/93.

Security and Technical Staff performed a Special Test to determine if these doors could have opened when the Security System electrically unlock the door for approximately 15 seconds (threw a strike). When Security threw a strike on Door 213, it did open without assistance. Door 52 remained secured during the testing.

On March 16, 1993, troubleshooting involving a team consisting of Computer Operational Analysis Department (OAD), EMD, and the System Engineer revealed that Doors 213 and 52 both had two problems. Both doors were still equipped with an older style strike timer. This timer holds the door latch open for a set time after the card reader has been used. The older style timer will open the door latch upon re-energization from a loss of power. Both doors were also found to have sticking latches. Both timers have been replaced with a newer model that does not open the strike when energized. Both door latches have also been replaced. As a preventative action, the EMD door surveillance will be amended to include a check for the new model strike timer. Action Item Record (AIR) 373-180-93-02101 will track completion of the surveillance amendment.

Radiation Protection Personnel and Security Personnel were tailgated regarding the event. Security and Radiation Protection have instituted a Repeat Back System to be used when communicating door numbers to eliminate misunderstandings.

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F. PREVIOUS EVENTS

DVR NUMBER	TITLE
373/84-042-00	Hi Rad Door Unsecured And Unposted/Lack Of Management Communication
373/84-079-00	Hi Rad Door Open And Not Posted/Cancelled Guard Post on Wrong Door
374/84-034-00	Hi Rad Door Unsecured And Unposted/Lack Of Management Communication
374/84-049-00	Hi Rad Door Unsecured/Status Level In Security Computer Wrong
373/92-011-00	Wrong High Radiation Door Downgraded Due to Personnel Error

G. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA

None.

EVENT SUMMARY AND CAUSE CODES

DVR Number
01-1-93-021

<input type="checkbox"/> Lost generation	<input type="checkbox"/> Reactor trip	<input type="checkbox"/> NRC violation, level
<input type="checkbox"/> Cost > \$25,000	<input type="checkbox"/> ESF actuation	<input type="checkbox"/> GSEP event, class
<input type="checkbox"/> Hazard or Spill	<input type="checkbox"/> NRC reportable	<input type="checkbox"/> Tech Spec LCO
<input type="checkbox"/> Personnel injury	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> LER	<input type="checkbox"/> Potential or future LCO
<input type="checkbox"/> Component type	<input type="checkbox"/> PSR	<input type="checkbox"/> SALP functional area
	Failure mode	

Component type		Failure mode		Department	
X	CE	X	MA	X	EMD
X		X		X	
X		X		X	

Licensed? L or blank		Type		Detail code	
Level		Department			
A					
A					
A					

Type		Detail Code		Department	
B					
B					
B					
B					

Type		Detail code	
C			

Type of deficiency		Detail code		Procedure type	
D					
D					
D					

Type		Detail code		Department	
E					
E					
E					