



Carolina Power & Light Company

Brunswick Steam Electric Plant
P. O. Box 10429
Southport, N.C. 28461-0429

March 18, 1993

FILE: B09-13510C
SERIAL: BSEP-93-0040

10CFR50.73

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNIT 2
DOCKET NO. 50-324
LICENSE NO. DRP-62
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 2-93-002

Gentlemen:

In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted. This report fulfills the requirement for a written report within thirty (30) days of a reportable occurrence and is submitted in accordance with the format set forth in NUREG-1022, September 1983.

Very truly yours,

C. C. Warren, Plant Manager - Unit 2
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant

TMJ/

Enclosure

cc: Mr. S. D. Ebnetter
Mr. P. D. Milano
BSEP NRC Resident Office

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9303220252 930318
PDR ADOCK 05000324
S PDR

JE22

EXPIRES: 5/31/95

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNB 3714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20545-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)

Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Unit 2

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

05000324

PAGE (3)

1 of 3

TITLE (4)

INADVERTENT ESF ACTUATION DURING SURVEILLANCE TESTING WHEN A TEST LEAD CONTACTED GROUND

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
02	16	93	93	- 02 -	00	03	18	93	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
										05000
									FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
										05000

OPERATING MODE (9)	4	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)							
POWER LEVEL (10)	000	20.402(b)		20.405(c)	X	50.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(b)	
		20.405(a)(1)(i)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)		73.71(c)	
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)		OTHER	
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)		(Specify in Abstract and Text)	
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)			
		20.405(a)(1)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(ix)			

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME

Theresa M. Jones, Regulatory Compliance Specialist

TELEPHONE NUMBER

(919) 457-2039

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X	NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e. approximately fifteen single space typewritten lines) (16)

Unit 2 was in day 301 of an outage which began April 21, 1992. At 0944 (EST), 2MST-RWC32R, Reactor Water Cleanup (RWC) Area High Temperature Response Time Test, was in progress. A test cable was being connected as per step 7.4.1 of the procedure. While pulling the cable, one of the test leads inadvertently contacted ground. The grounded test lead caused fuse A71-F21 in panel 2-H12-P622 to blow resulting in unexpected equipment isolations and actuations. The fuse was replaced in accordance with work request/job order 93-AGAY1. The isolation signals were reset and the valves restored to their normal line-up, Reactor Building Ventilation and Drywell purge were restored to normal operation, and 2A SBTG was returned to standby line-up. The involved Technician was counselled and a real-time training session has been conducted with the Unit 2 Instrumentation and Control Maintenance Surveillance Test Crew personnel to make them aware of this event and expectations regarding surveillance activities. I&C and Electrical Maintenance Supervisors will discuss/review this LER with their personnel prior to May 01, 1993. This event was an unnecessary challenge to safety systems as a result of personnel error. It had minimal safety significance as the equipment operated in accordance with its design. A similar event was reported in LER 2-89-019.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 60.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Unit 2	05000324	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	2 of 3
		93	- 02 -	00	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

TITLE

INADVERTENT ESF ACTUATION DURING SURVEILLANCE TESTING WHEN A TEST LEAD CONTACTED GROUND

INITIAL CONDITIONS

Unit 2 was in COLD SHUTDOWN, in day 301 of an outage which began April 21, 1992. At 0944 (EST), 2MST-RWCU32R, Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) Area High Temperature Response Time Test, was in progress.

EVENT NARRATIVE

During the performance of 2MST-RWCU32R, a test cable was being connected as per step 7.4.1 of the procedure. One end of the cable was connected to test point 10 (TP10) and TP14 in the control room back panel designated 2-H12-P622. While attempting to connect the other end of the test leads to TP1 and TP2 the test leads would not reach the test points and an attempt was made to pull some slack out of the cable. While pulling the cable, one of the test leads inadvertently contacted ground. The Technician installing the led heard a relay in panel 2-H12-P622 change state and notified the control room. The grounded test lead caused fuse A71-F21 in panel 2-H12-P622 to blow resulting in the following actuation and isolations:

2A SBTG start. (2B was removed from service)
Drywell Purge secured.
Reactor Building Ventilation isolated.
Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Division I - Group 6, Containment Atmospheric Control (CAC) inboard isolation valves closed.
PCIS Division I - Group 2 Drywell Floor and Equipment Drain inboard isolation valves closed.
PCIS Division I - Group 1 Main Steam Line Drain inboard isolation valve closed.

CAUSE OF EVENT

This event occurred as a result of the test lead contacting ground.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The fuse was replaced in accordance with work request/job order 93-AGAY1. The isolation signals were reset and the valves restored to their normal line-up, Reactor Building Ventilation and Drywell purge were restored to normal operation, and 2A SBTG was returned to standby line-up. The involved Technician was counselled and a real-time training session has been conducted with the Unit 2 Instrumentation and Control (I&C) Maintenance Surveillance Test Crew personnel to make them aware of this event and expectations regarding surveillance activities.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

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Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Unit 2	05000324	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	3 of 3
		93	- 02 -	00	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

I&C and Electrical Maintenance Supervisors will discuss/review this LER with their personnel prior to May 01, 1993.

SAFETY ASSESSMENT

This event was an unnecessary challenge to safety systems as a result of personnel error. It had minimal safety significance as the equipment operated in accordance with its design.

PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS

LER 2-89-019: Electrical short caused by a Technician while performing 2MST-SCIS21R resulted in isolations and SBTG start. The 1989 event was due to a short cut being taken to access a terminal box resulting in a one handed attempt to terminate a hot lead. The lead slipped during the termination resulting in a short. The 1989 event was not related to this event.

EIIS COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION

<u>System/Component</u>	<u>EIIS Code</u>
RWCU	CE
2-H12-P622	NA/PL
2-H12-P613	NA/PL
SBGT	BH
FUSE	FU
Drywell Purge	VB
Reactor Building Ventilation	VA
CAC inboard isolation valves	JM
Drywell Floor and Equipment Drain inboard isolation valve	JM
Main Steam Line Drain inboard isolation valve	JM