



Commonwealth Edison
LaSalle County Nuclear Station
2601 N. 21st. Rd.
Marseilles, Illinois 61341
Telephone 815/357-6761

March 18, 1993

Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Mail Station P1-137
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Sir:

Licensee Event Report #93-006-00, Docket #050-373 is being submitted to your office in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv).

G. F. Spedl
Station Manager
LaSalle County Station

GFS/WFB/mk1

Enclosure

xc: Nuclear Licensing Administrator
NRC Resident Inspector
NRC Region III Administrator
INPO - Records Center
IDNS Resident Inspector

220098

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PDR ADOCK 05000373
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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

Form Rev 2.0

Facility Name (1) LaSalle County Station Unit 1	Docket Number (2) 0 15 10 10 10 13 17 13	Page (3) 1 of 0 4
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Group 1 Isolation Due to Procedure Deficiency

Event Date (5)			LER Number (6)			Report Date (7)			Other Facilities Involved (8)	
Month	Day	Year	Year	Sequential Number	Revision Number	Month	Day	Year	Facility Names	Docket Number(s)
0	2	1 16	9 13	0 10 16	0 0	0	3	1 18		0 15 10 10 10 1 1

OPERATING MODE (9) POWER LEVEL (10) 0 0 0	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10CFR (Check one or more of the following) (11) 20.402(b) _____ 20.405(a)(1)(i) _____ 20.405(a)(1)(ii) _____ 20.405(a)(1)(iii) _____ 20.405(a)(1)(iv) _____ 20.405(a)(1)(v) _____	20.405(c) _____ 50.36(c)(1) _____ 50.36(c)(2) _____ 50.73(a)(2)(i) _____ 50.73(a)(2)(ii) _____ 50.73(a)(2)(iii) _____	X 50.73(a)(2)(iv) _____ 50.73(a)(2)(v) _____ 50.73(a)(2)(vii) _____ 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) _____ 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) _____ 50.73(a)(2)(x) _____	73.71(b) _____ 73.71(c) _____ Other (Specify in Abstract below and in Text)
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LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

Name William F. Belovec, Staff Supervisor, Instrument Maintenance Ex. 2673	TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 8 1 1 5 3 15 17 1 - 6 17 16 11
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COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS
D	T	G		No					

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

Expected Submission Date (15) Yes (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) X NO	Expected Month Day Year 1 1 1
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ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On February 16, 1993 Unit 1 was in operational condition 4 (Cold Shutdown) at 0% power. At 1452 hours a Group I isolation occurred due to the reinstallation of the Servo Amplifier Demodulator Indicator (SADI) Boards with low condenser vacuum condition, while the Main Turbine was reset and speed selected for 1800 rpm.

The Instrument Maintenance Department (IMD) was verifying the calibration of the Primary Speed Circuit Low Valve Gate per LIP-EH-24. A precaution of this procedure recommends removal of the SADI Boards per LIP-EH-28 "Methods of Preventing Valve Movement (EHC System)" in order to prevent undesired turbine valve movements. The procedures do not contain information concerning the potential of causing a Group I isolation. Following the completion of LIP-EH-24, the turbine is left in a reset condition with 1800 rpm selected and the SADI Boards removed. When the SADI Boards were installed with a speed selected, the associated turbine valves attempted to open. This resulted in a Group I isolation due to low condenser vacuum with turbine valves not full closed. Normally the EHC calibrations are performed during refuel outages where the Group I isolations are bypassed by operating procedures. The IMD Technicians, therefore, do not have to be concerned with generating isolation signals during the calibration. In this case, IMD was performing calibrations during a forced outage in which the isolations were not bypassed.

The cause of this event was inadequate directions within the procedure. The appropriate information was not contained in the procedure to ensure the turbine is tripped. The procedure will be revised.

This event is reportable as a License Event Report pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) due to an automatic actuation of an Engineered Safety Feature.

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TEXT Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX]

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION:

General Electric - Boiling Water Reactor

Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX].

A. CONDITION PRIOR TO EVENT

Unit(s): 1 Event Date: 2/16/93 Event Time: 1452 Hours
 Reactor Mode(s): 4 Mode(s) Name: Cold Shutdown Power Level(s): 0

B. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On February 16, 1993 Unit 1 was in operational condition 4 (Cold Shutdown) at 0% power. At 1452 hours a Group I isolation occurred due to the reinstallation of the Servo Amplifier Demodulator Indicator (SADI) Boards with low condenser vacuum condition, while the Main Turbine was reset and speed selected for 1800 rpm.

The Instrument Maintenance Department (IMD) Control System Technician (CST) and the cognizant Technical Staff (TS) System Engineer were verifying calibration of the Primary Speed Circuit Low Valve Gate per LaSalle Instrument Procedure LIP-EH-24 "Low Valve Gates Electro-Hydraulic Control System" (EHC,EH)[TG]. Procedure LIP-EH-24 precaution recommends removal of the SADI Boards per LIP-EH-28 "Methods of Preventing Valve Movement (EHC System)" in order to prevent undesired turbine valve movement. Therefore, the SADI Boards were removed utilizing LIP-EH-28. As a prerequisite to this procedure personnel are instructed to become familiar with LIP-EH-01 Electro-Hydraulic Control System General Calibration Procedure. None of these procedures indicate there is a potential of causing a Group I isolation.

Following completion of LIP-EH-24 the turbine is left in a reset condition with 1800 rpm selected, and the SADI Boards removed. As the SADI Boards were reinstalled with a speed selected, the associated turbine valves attempted to open. This resulted in a Group I isolation due to low condenser vacuum with turbine stop valves not fully closed. Normally the IMD performs the EHC calibrations during refuel outages where the Group I isolations are bypassed by Operating Procedures. The IMD CSTs, therefore, do not have to be concerned with generating Isolation Signals during the calibrations. In this case, the IMD was performing calibrations during a forced outage in which the isolations were not bypassed.

The cause of this event is inadequate directions within the procedure. The appropriate information was not contained within the procedure to ensure the turbine was tripped in LIP-EH-28.

This event is reportable to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as a License Event Report pursuant to 10CFR50.73 (a) (2) (iv) due to an automatic Group I isolation (actuation of an Engineered Safety Feature).

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION													Form Rev 2.0	
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C. APPARENT CAUSE OF EVENT

The cause of this event is a procedure that had missing steps/notes. IMD Procedure LIP-EH-28 does not give adequate directions on reinstallation of the SADI Boards. Specific directions need to be added to indicate what to do under "unusual" circumstances.

D. SAFETY ANALYSIS OF EVENT

The safety significance of this event is minimal. When the CST reinstalled the SADI Boards into the proper slots with the Turbine reset, the resultant control system signal opened the turbine valves with no condenser vacuum present. This removed the bypass of the low vacuum isolation. No loss of containment function occurred because the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) were shut with the reactor in Cold Shutdown. Normally the IMD perform the EHC calibrations during the refuel outages where the Group I isolations are bypassed by Operating Procedures. In this case, IMD was performing calibrations during a forced outage in which the isolations were not bypassed. This calibration would not be performed with the unit at power as the MSIVs would be open at that time.

E. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

Immediate Corrective actions taken by the Operating Department were to verify the validity of the actuation and reset the isolation.

Corrective actions to prevent recurrence will be the revision of IMD Procedure LIP-EH-28 to include directions on preventing a Group I isolation. This revision will be tracked by Action Item Record (AIR) 373-180-93-01701.

Further Corrective actions will be for the IMD to perform a review of similar procedures for this type of concern and to initiate revisions as appropriate. This will be tracked by AIR 373-180-93-01702.

F. PREVIOUS EVENTS

A search of the License Event Reports and Deviation Reports Tracking System for previous similar events of isolations caused by defective procedures was performed.

LER Number	Title
373/87-009-00	Group IV isolation During Surv. Testing/Procedure Deficiency
373/87-029-00	RWCU 1G33-F004 Isolation/Procedural Deficiency
373/89-026-00	Inadvertent PCIS Isolation Actuation Due to Inadequate Logic Setup
373/89-027-01	Primary Containment Isolation During Surveillance Testing

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F. PREVIOUS EVENTS CONTINUED

LER Number	Title
374/86-006-01	Reactor Water Cleanup Isolation/Misposition Valves/Procedure Problems
374/89-013-01	Primary Containment Isolation During Instrument Surveillance Testing Due To Procedure Error
374/90-007-00	Partial Group 2 Isolation During RPS Transfer Due To Inadequate Procedure
374/92-014-00	Improper Performance of Local Leak Rate Test on RWCU Isolation Valve Due To Procedure Error

G. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA

None.

EVENT SUMMARY AND CAUSE CODES

DVR Number
01-1-93-017

<input type="checkbox"/> Lost generation	<input type="checkbox"/> Reactor trip	<input type="checkbox"/> NRC violation, level
<input type="checkbox"/> Cost > \$25,000	<input type="checkbox"/> ESF actuation	<input type="checkbox"/> GSEP event, class
<input type="checkbox"/> Hazard or Spill	<input type="checkbox"/> NRC reportable	<input type="checkbox"/> Tech Spec LCO
<input type="checkbox"/> Personnel injury	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> LER	<input type="checkbox"/> Potential or future loss
<input type="checkbox"/> Component type	<input type="checkbox"/> PSR	<input type="checkbox"/> SALP functional area
	Failure mode	

Department	
X	
X	
X	

Licensed? L or blank	Type	Level	Department	Detail code
A				
A				
A				

Type	Detail Code	Department
B		
B		
B		
B		

Type	Detail code
C	

Type of deficiency	Detail code	Procedure type
D	I I I L I I P	
D	I I 2 I L I I P	
D		

or

Type	Detail code	Department
E		
E		
E		