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Southern Nuclear Operating Company  
*the southern electric system*

J. D. Woodard  
Vice President  
Farley Project

10 CFR 50.73

March 12, 1993

Docket No. 50-364

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
ATTN: Document Control Desk  
Washington, DC 20555

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Unit 2  
Licensee Event Report No. LER 93-002-00

Gentlemen:

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Unit 2 Licensee Event Report Number  
LER 93-002-00 is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73. If you  
have any questions, please advise.

Respectfully submitted,

  
J. D. Woodard

BHW:cht-licevent.nrc  
NEL-93-0100  
Enclosure

cc: Mr. S. D. Ebnetter  
Mr. G. F. Maxwell

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## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 DOCKET NUMBER (2) 05000364 PAGE (3) 1 OF 3

TITLE (4)  
Missed Technical Specification Surveillance on the TDAFWP

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQ NUM	REV	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
02	11	93	93	002	00				J. M. Farley-Unit 1	05000348
										05000

OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR (11)									
POWER LEVEL	049	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)						
		20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)						
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in						
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	X 50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	Abstract below)						
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)							
		20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)							

## LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
R. D. Hill, General Manager - Nuclear Plant	AREA CODE 205 899-5156

## COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORT TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORT TO NPRDS

## SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)		X NO		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
		X	NO				

## ABSTRACT (16)

As a result of a self assessment on the Reactor Protection System, at 1550 on 02-11-93, it was determined that the actuation of two B train slave relays for the Unit 2 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (TDAFWP) had not been verified within the last 18 months. These relays initiate the TDAFWP start on undervoltage on two out of three reactor coolant pump buses and the start on steam generator low-low water level on two out of three steam generators. The verification of this function is part of the required surveillance testing associated with Technical Specification (T.S.) 4.7.1.2.

Surveillance Test Procedures (STPs) tested only an A Train initiated start every 18 months (not separate A and B Train initiations); however, other procedures have tested a B Train initiated start at least once every 36 months.

FNP-2-STP-33.1 was modified to test the B Train initiated start while in mode 1. This was completed satisfactorily at 1914 on 02-11-93, at which time the Unit 2 TDAFWP was declared operable. It was determined that credit could be taken for B Train surveillance on Unit 1 based on FNP-1-STP-246.18, "TDAFWP Response Time Test", which was performed on 11-28-92.

Surveillance test procedures for the testing of Unit 1 and 2 TDAFWP automatic starts from the B Train signals have been revised.

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TEXT

Plant and System Identification

Westinghouse - Pressurized Water Reactor

Energy Industry Identification System codes are identified in the text as [XX].

Summary of Event

As a result of a self assessment on the Reactor Protection System, at 1550 on 02-11-93, it was determined that the actuation of two B Train slave relays for the Unit 2 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (TDAFWP) [JK] had not been verified within the last 18 months. These relays initiate the TDAFWP start on undervoltage on two out of three reactor coolant pump buses and the start on steam generator low-low water level on two out of three steam generators. The verification of this function is part of the required surveillance testing associated with Technical Specification (T.S.) 4.7.1.2.

Description of Event

During the Reactor Protection System Safety System Self Assessment conducted during February 1993, the procedural practice of functionally testing only A Train automatic start signals for the TDAFWP was questioned by the internal audit team. Subsequently, Southern Nuclear determined that these TDAFWP signals should be tested from both trains of SSPS.

Since plant startup, Operations has functionally tested the automatic start of the TDAFWP (T.S. 4.7.1.2.2.c.2) from only A Train. This was considered to be adequate since the original FNP design for the TDAFWP automatic starting was associated with A Train. In 1978 a design change diversified the automatic start signals to include B Train solid state protection system start signals in addition to A Train. However, surveillances were not modified to require A and B Train automatic start testing.

It should be noted that TDAFW automatic start circuitry is also tested per FNP-1/2-STP-246.18, "TDAFWP Response Time Test". However, this procedure is performed on a staggered basis such that each train is tested on a 36 month interval versus the 18 month interval required by T.S. 4.7.1.2.2.c.2. It was determined that credit could be taken at this time for B Train surveillance on Unit 1 based on STP-246.18 being performed in the last 18 months.

Unit 2 was at power when it was determined that a surveillance requirement had not been met. A test procedure was developed for plant operational mode 1. This test combined with other test procedures provides sufficient test overlap to assure that the automatic start function of the Unit 2 TDAFWP was operable from the Unit 2 B Train signals.

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TEXT

Cause of Event

This event was caused by inadequate procedural guidance. Existing procedures did not test the actuation of two B Train slave relays which start the TDAFWP on undervoltage on two out of three reactor coolant pumps and on steam generator low-low level on two out of three steam generators at the frequency required by the Technical Specifications.

Reportability Analysis and Safety Assessment

This event is reportable because the Unit 2 Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.7.1.2.2.c.2 was not met within the required time frame.

The T.S. Surveillance required that the TDAFWP be tested at least once per 18 months during shutdown to verify that the pump starts automatically upon receipt of the test signals for undervoltage on two out of three reactor coolant pump buses and for steam generator water level low-low in two steam generators. The Unit 2 TDAFWP automatic start from B train SSPS has not been tested since 01-01-91 which exceeds the 18 month surveillance and the allowable grace period.

It was determined that credit could be taken for B Train surveillance on Unit 1 based on STP-246.18, which was performed on 11-28-92.

No adverse condition resulted and there was no effect on plant operation. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected by this event.

Corrective Action

A 72 hour Limiting Condition for Operation was initiated. FNP-2-STP-33.1 was modified to test B Train initiation while in mode 1 and was completed satisfactorily at 1914 on 02-11-93, at which time the TDAFWP was declared operable. This combined with other test procedures, provides sufficient test overlap to assure that this function was operable from Unit 2 B Train SSPS.

Surveillance Test Procedures for the testing of Unit 1 and Unit 2 TDAFWP automatic starts from the B Train signals have been revised.

Additional Information

No similar events have been reported by Farley Nuclear Plant involving missed Technical Specifications on the TDAFWP.

No components failed during this event.