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Ref. # 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)

March 8, 1993

William J. Cahill, Jr.
Group Vice President

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

SUBJECT: COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION (CPSES)
DOCKET NO. 50-446
MANUAL OR AUTOMATIC ACTUATION OF ANY
ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 93-001-00

Gentlemen:

Enclosed is Licensee Event Report 93-001-00 for Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station Unit 1, "Containment Ventilation Isolation Due to Loss of Power to Auxiliary Tripping Relay."

Sincerely,

William J. Cahill, Jr.

By:

D. R. Woodlan
Docket Licensing Manager

JET/bm

Enclosure

cc: Mr. J. L. Milhoan, Region IV
Mr. L. A. Yandell, Region IV
Resident Inspectors, CPSES (2)

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PDR ADOCK 05000446
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NRC FORM 386		U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION		APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 4/30/92	
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)				ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC. 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC. 20503.	
Facility Name (1) COMANCHE PEAK-UNIT 2				Docket Number (2) 05000446	Page (3) 1 OF 05
Title (4) CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION DUE TO LOSS OF POWER TO AUXILIARY TRIPPING RELAY					
Event Date (5)		LER Number (6)		Report Date (7)	
Month	Day	Year	Year	Sequential Number	Revision Number
02	07	93	93	001	00
				Report Date (7)	
				Month	
				Day	
				Year	
				03	
				05	
				93	
Other Facilities Involved (8) N/A					
Operating Mode (9) 6					
Power Level (10) 000					
This report is submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73. (Check one or more of the following) (11)					
20.402(b)		20.405(c)		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	
20.405(a)(1)(i)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)	
20.405(a)(1)(ii)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vi)	
20.405(a)(1)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)	
20.405(a)(1)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)	
20.405(a)(1)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(ix)	
Licensee Contact For This LER (12)					
Name D. J. REIMER, MANAGER, SYSTEM ENGINEERING				Area Code Telephone Number 817 897-5584	
Complete One Line For Each Component Failure Described In This Report (13)					
Cause	System	Component	Manufacturer	Reportable To NPRDS	
				N	
Supplemental Report Expected (14)					Expected Submission Date (15)
<input type="checkbox"/> Yes (If yes, complete Expected Submission Date)					
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No					
Abstract (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)					
<p>At 1655 on February 7, 1993, a breaker was tripped at a Non-1E Instrument Power Distribution Panel to allow replacement of the breaker. A Train B Containment Ventilation isolation (CVI) occurred simultaneously. The Containment Ventilation Isolation signal was reset and Containment Ventilation re-established at 1730 on February 7, 1993. Atmospheric conditions inside containment were normal and the actuation was determined to be the result of an invalid signal. The root cause for the Train B Containment Ventilation Isolation was de-energization of an auxiliary relay which was not shown on the electrical distribution drawing. Corrective action was to revise the affected drawing.</p>					

NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION		APPROVED OMR NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 4/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC. 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC. 20503.												
Facility Name (1) COMANCHE PEAK-UNIT 2	Docket Number (2) 0500044693	<table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <th colspan="3">LER Number (8)</th> <th>Page (3)</th> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;">Year</td> <td style="text-align: center;">Sequential Number</td> <td style="text-align: center;">Revision Number</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;">93</td> <td style="text-align: center;">- 001</td> <td style="text-align: center;">- 00</td> <td style="text-align: center;">03 OF 05</td> </tr> </table>	LER Number (8)			Page (3)	Year	Sequential Number	Revision Number		93	- 001	- 00	03 OF 05
LER Number (8)			Page (3)											
Year	Sequential Number	Revision Number												
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Text (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)														
<p>Uncertainty involving the applicability to CPSES of Modifications to Nuclear Power Reactor Event Reporting Requirements as described in 10CFR50.72 and 10CFR50.73 (Reference: Federal Register/Vol. 57, No. 176/Thursday, September 10, 1992/Rules and Regulations) led to a delay in the decision to report this event. The initial determination of the event concluded an invalid actuation signal had produced the Train B CVI signal and therefore the event was determined to be not reportable. Further evaluation determined that exclusion of invalid CVI signals has not been approved by the Station Reporting Program and a conservative decision was made to report the event.</p> <p><u>E. THE METHOD OF DISCOVERY OF EACH COMPONENT OR SYSTEM FAILURE, OR PROCEDURAL OR PERSONNEL ERROR</u></p> <p>At 1655 on February 7, 1993, Train B Containment Ventilation Isolation occurred and Containment Air Radiation High Alarm (EHS:(IB)) actuated. The Reactor Operator (utility, licensed) immediately responded to the alarm and recognized the Train B Containment Ventilation Isolation. The Control Room Radiation Monitor Display Panel (EHS:(PL)(IL)) did not alarm. On February 8, 1993, an Instrument and Control (I&C) Technician (utility, non-licensed) tested per procedure, "Digital Channel Operational Test, Containment Ventilation Isolation Actuation" the Containment Gas Process Radiation Monitor (EHS:(IK)) and obtained satisfactory results. Later February 8, 1993, the Non-1E Instrument Power Distribution Panel breaker was again tripped during troubleshooting and Train B CVI occurred. On February 11, 1993, an engineer (utility, non-licensed) performed a review of the schematic drawings versus the one-line drawings and a drawing error was found.</p> <p><u>II. COMPONENT OR SYSTEM FAILURES</u></p> <p><u>A. FAILURE MODE, MECHANISM, AND EFFECT OF EACH FAILED COMPONENT</u></p> <p>Not applicable - there were no component failures associated with this event.</p> <p><u>B. CAUSE OF EACH COMPONENT OR SYSTEM FAILURE</u></p> <p>Not applicable - there were no component failures associated with this event.</p> <p><u>C. SYSTEMS OR SECONDARY FUNCTIONS THAT WERE AFFECTED BY FAILURE OF COMPONENTS WITH MULTIPLE FUNCTIONS</u></p> <p>Not applicable - there were no failed components with multiple functions that affected this event.</p>														

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D. FAILED COMPONENT INFORMATION

Not applicable - there were no component failures associated with this event.

III. ANALYSIS OF THE EVENT**A. SAFETY SYSTEM RESPONSES THAT OCCURRED**

Containment Ventilation (EISS:(BK)) Isolation actuated automatically as a result of the event. All components within the system operated as designed.

B. DURATION OF SAFETY SYSTEM TRAIN INOPERABILITY

Not applicable - There were no safety systems which were rendered inoperable due to a failure.

C. SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE EVENT

Operability of the Particulate, Iodine, and Gas monitor (PIG) ensures that the associated action will be initiated when the radiation level monitored by each channel reaches its setpoint. The alarm setpoints are calculated and adjusted in accordance with the methodology and parameters in the CPSES Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) to insure that action will be initiated prior to exceeding the limits of 10CFR Part 20.

In this event, the PIG was operable and there was no increase in detectable activity in the containment atmosphere. The event occurred due to loss of power to an auxiliary tripping relay (EISS:(94)(IK)) and not due to an actual condition. It is concluded that this event did not adversely affect safe operation of the plant or the health and safety of the public.

IV. CAUSE OF THE EVENT

The auxiliary tripping relay was not shown on the one-line drawing for the Non-1E Instrument Power Distribution Panel. The auxiliary tripping relay is normally energized. De-energization of the auxiliary tripping relay closes a contact which initiates the ESF actuation of the Train B CVI.

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V. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

A Design Change Notice was issued to correct the one-line drawing. The schematics of other auxiliary relays associated with Containment Ventilation Isolation were reviewed. The other relays are shown on the one-line drawings and no further discrepancies were found.

VI. PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS

Licensee Event Report (LER) 90-038, "Gas Channel Alarm Initiated A Containment Ventilation Isolation Due to Stagnant Air Pockets In Containment", described an event in which a containment ventilation isolation was initiated due to a high radiation alarm from the containment PIG gas channel resulting from an over-conservative setpoint. However, the details of that event and the resultant corrective actions are sufficiently different from the details of this event to conclude that the previous corrective actions could not be expected to prevent the actuation described in this report.

VII. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

The times listed in the report are approximate and Central Standard Time.