GPU Nuclear

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C321-93-2062
February 26, 1993

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir:

Subject: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Docket No. 50-219
Licensee Event Report

This letter forwards one (1) copy of Licensee Event Report 93-003.

Sincerely,

John J. Barton
Vice President and Director
Oyster Creek

JJB/BDEM:jc
Enclosure

cc: Administrator, Region 1
Senior NRC Resident Inspector
Oyster Creek NRC Project Manager

(LER-COVLTR$)

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NRC Form 366
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/88

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Oyster Creek, Unit 1	0 5 0 0 0 2 1 9	1 OF 0 4

TITLE (4)
Scram Discharge Volume High Level Scram Caused by Inadequate Procedure

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
										0 5 0 0 0
0 1 3 0	9 3	9 3	— 0 0 3 —		0 0	0 2	2 6	9 3		0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)	N	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)			
POWER LEVEL (10)	0 0 0	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	X 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
		20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
		20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
Lynne W. Munzing, Operations Engineer	AREA CODE 6 0 9 — 9 7 1 - 4 3 8 9

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

A full reactor scram was initiated while performing system lineups to return the Control Rod Drive system to its normal configuration after a Primary Containment integrated leak rate test on January 30, 1993, at 1258 hours. The plant was shut down for a refueling outage at the time. The cause of the occurrence was an inadequate procedure. The order in which the procedure steps were written led the operator to remove the Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) high water level scram bypass signal while there was still a high water level in the SDV. The next step instructed the operator to open the vent and drain valves, which would remove the water from the volume. The order of these steps should have been reversed. This event has no safety significance since the scram functioned as required and represented only an unnecessary challenge to the equipment. Immediate corrective action was taken to bypass the scram signal, drain the SDV, and reset the scram. The bypass switch was returned to normal. The Primary Containment integrated leak rate test procedure will be revised as necessary to prevent this event from recurring.

DATE OF OCCURRENCE

The event occurred on January 30, 1993, at 1258 hours.

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE

A full reactor scram was initiated while performing system lineups to return the Control Rod Drive (EIIS - AA) system to its normal configuration after the Primary Containment integrated leak rate test. This is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv).

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE

The plant was shut down for a refueling outage and operators were returning system lineups to normal after completion of the Primary Containment integrated leak rate test. All control rods were inserted.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE

On January 25, 1993, at 0400 hours, the isolation valves on the Scram Discharge Volumes were closed and the reactor scram associated with high water level in the Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) was bypassed using the bypass switch. These steps were taken in accordance with the Primary Containment integrated leak rate test procedure to align the system for the test. After the test was completed (on January 30 at 1130 hours), the procedure provided steps to return systems to their normal lineups. For the Control Rod Drive system, the procedure instructed the operator to return the SDV high water level scram bypass switch to normal and to open the SDV vent (CFI - VTV) and drain (CFI - ISV) valves. The operator followed these steps in the order given, and a reactor scram signal resulted when the bypass switch was placed in normal. The scram signal functioned as designed to scram the reactor on a high water level in the SDV.

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE

The cause of the occurrence is an inadequate procedure. The order in which the steps were written led the operator to remove the SDV high water level scram bypass signal while there was still a high water level in the SDV. The next step instructed the operator to open the vent and drain valves, which would remove the water from the volume. The order of these steps should have been reversed.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE AND SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

The Scram Discharge Volumes are used to limit the loss of and contain the reactor vessel water from all the Control Rod Drives (CRDs) during a scram. During normal plant operation, the SDVs are empty with both the drain and vent valves open. During a scram, the vent and drain valves automatically close and the SDVs partly fill with the water from above the CRD pistons. When the scram signal is removed, the SDVs are drained by placing the SDV high water level scram bypass switch to bypass and then opening the vent and drain valves. The bypass switch is then returned to normal. A series of level switches (CFI - LS) connected to the SDVs indicate when they have emptied after a scram. The level switches also guard against the discharge volume being inadvertently full when a scram is required. Should the SDV start to fill with water, an alarm (CFI - LA) will sound and a control rod withdrawal block will be initiated. If the SDV continues to fill, the reactor will automatically scram while there is still sufficient available volume in the SDV to accept the water from a scram.

In this case, the SDV high water level scram signal functioned as designed when the scram function was no longer bypassed and a high water level condition existed in the SDV. This event has no safety significance since the scram functioned as required and represented only an unnecessary challenge to the equipment.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

Immediate corrective action was taken to bypass the scram signal, drain the SDV, and reset the scram. The bypass switch was returned to normal.

The Primary Containment integrated leak rate test procedure will be revised as necessary to prevent this event from recurring.

SIMILAR EVENTS

LER 89-004 Main Steam Isolation Signal During Reactor Protection System Power Supply Transfer Caused by Inadequate Procedure

LER 88-024 Main Steam Isolation Signal During Surveillance Test Caused by Procedural Deficiency

LER 88-026 Reactor Scram Signal Received While Shutdown During Surveillance Testing Due to Inadequate Procedure

LER 88-028 Containment High Range Radiation Monitor Causes Partial Containment Isolation Due to Procedure Inadequacy

LER 87-023 Partial Primary Containment Isolation During Testing due to Procedural Inadequacy

LER 86-005 Core Spray and Diesel Generator Initiation Caused by Procedural Deficiency