

ATTACHMENT 2

Summary of the Proposed Changes to Appendix A Technical Specifications Facility Operating Licenses DPR-29 and DPR-30

Page 3.9/4.9-7, DPR-29 and DPR-30

The proposed change to TS 4.9.F.1.a is consistent with the guidance provided in Generic Letter 91-09, "MODIFICATION OF SURVEILLANCE INTERVAL FOR THE ELECTRICAL PROTECTIVE ASSEMBLIES IN POWER SUPPLIES FOR THE REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM".

- a. By performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST each time the plant is in COLD SHUTDOWN for a period of more than 24 hours, unless performed in the previous 6 months.

ATTACHMENT 3

Affected Pages for Proposed Changes to Appendix A Technical Specifications Facility Operating Licenses DPR-29 and DPR-30

DPR-29

3.9/4.9-7

DPR-30

3.9/4.9-7

- a. By performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST each time the plant is in COLD SHUTDOWN for a period of more than 24 hours, unless performed in the previous 6 months.

a. ~~At least once per 6 months by performing a channel functional test, and~~

- b. At least once per operating cycle by demonstrating the operability of overvoltage, undervoltage, and underfrequency protective instrumentation by performance of a channel calibration including simulated automatic activation of the protective relays, tripping logic, and output circuit breakers, and verifying the following setpoints:

(1) overvoltage 126.5 V = 2.5%
Min. 123.3 V
Max. 129.6 V

(2) undervoltage 108 V = 2.5%
Min. 105.3 V
Max. 110.7 V

(3) underfrequency 56.0 Hz $\pm 1\%$
of 60 Hz
Min. 55.4 Hz
Max. 56.6 Hz

- b. Verifying the diesel starts from ambient condition on the auto-start signal, energizes the emergency buses with permanently connected loads, energizes the auto-connected emergency loads through the load sequencer, and operates for greater than 5 minutes while its generator is loaded with the emergency loads.
3. When the reactor is in the Cold Shutdown or Refueling mode, a minimum of one diesel generator (either the Unit diesel generator or the Unit 1/2 diesel generator) shall be operable whenever any work is being done which has the potential for draining the vessel, secondary containment is required, or a core or containment cooling system is required.

F. REACTOR PROTECTION BUS POWER MONITORING SYSTEM

1. Two RPS electric power monitoring channels for each inservice RPS MG set or inservice alternate power source shall be OPERABLE except when the reactor is in the SHUTDOWN mode.

F. REACTOR PROTECTION BUS POWER MONITORING SYSTEM

1. The RPS Bus power monitoring system instrumentation shall be determined OPERABLE:
 - a. By performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST each time the plant is in COLD SHUTDOWN for a period of more than 24 hours, unless performed in the previous 6 months.
 - b. At least once per operating cycle by demonstrating the operability of overvoltage, undervoltage, and the underfrequency protective instrumentation by performance of a channel calibration including simulated automatic activation of the protective relays, tripping logic, and output circuit breakers and verifying the following setpoints:

ATTACHMENT 4

Evaluation of Significant Hazards Consideration for Proposed Changes to Appendix A Technical Specifications Facility Operating Licenses DPR-29 and DPR-30

The proposed change outlined in this amendment request modifies the surveillance requirement for the Reactor Protection System-Electrical Protection Assembly (RPS-EPA) units to require a channel functional test every time the unit is in cold shutdown for greater than 24 hours, unless the test was performed within the previous 6 months. This proposed change is a line item improvement and reflects the guidance in Generic Letter 91-09, "MODIFICATION OF SURVEILLANCE INTERVAL FOR THE ELECTRICAL PROTECTIVE ASSEMBLIES IN POWER SUPPLIES FOR THE REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM".

Commonwealth Edison has evaluated this proposed amendment for Quad Cities Station, and has determined that it involves no significant hazards consideration. In accordance with the criteria of 10 CFR 50.92 (c), a proposed amendment to an operating license involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility, in accordance with the proposed amendment, would not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously analyzed.

The proposed change modifies the surveillance requirement for an electrical protective device on the Reactor Protection System. The proposed change does not affect any accident precursor or initiator. Therefore, the probability of an accident is not affected by the proposed change.

The RPS-EPA units are designed to protect RPS equipment from abnormal operating voltage or frequency produced by RPS motor generator sets. The proposed change will preclude the need to test the RPS-EPA units during power operation. This will eliminate the potential for reactor scrams and Group isolations during performance of the surveillance, thus preventing unwarranted challenges to safety systems. The proposed Technical Specification amendment does not affect the operability of the RPS-EPA units. The demonstrated high reliability of the RPS-EPA units (reference J.A. Silady to T.E. Murley letter dated July 6, 1990) ensures that they will be capable of performing as designed in the event of an abnormal condition on an RPS bus. Based upon this historical reliability, the proposed change does not affect the ability of the Reactor Protection System to maintain the integrity of the fuel cladding, protect the reactor coolant pressure boundary, or limit the amount of energy released to primary containment. Therefore, the consequences of an accident is not affected by the proposed change.

2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously analyzed.

The proposed change does not decrease the ability of the RPS-EPA units to perform their intended function, nor do the proposed changes create any opportunities for a new or different accident outside of those previously evaluated. No new or different modes of plant operation are introduced by the proposed changes. Therefore, there is no possibility of creating any new failure mechanisms which could initiate a new or different kind of accident from those previously analyzed.

3. Involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

This proposed Technical Specification amendment ensures that a spurious RPS trip does not result in a reactor scram and group isolations during RPS-EPA functional testing. The proposed change does not affect the operability of the RPS-EPA units. The demonstrated high reliability of the RPS-EPA units ensures that they will be capable of performing as designed in the event of an abnormal condition on an RPS bus. Therefore, the margin of safety is not affected.

ATTACHMENT 5

Environmental Assessment of Proposed Changes to Appendix A Technical Specifications Facility Operating Licenses DPR-29 and DPR-30

The proposed change outlined in this amendment request modifies the surveillance requirement for the Reactor Protection System-Electrical Protection Assembly (RPS-EPA) units to require a channel functional test every time the unit is in cold shutdown for greater than 24 hours, unless the test was performed within the previous 6 months. This proposed change is a line item improvement and reflects the guidance in Generic Letter 91-09, "MODIFICATION OF SURVEILLANCE INTERVAL FOR THE ELECTRICAL PROTECTIVE ASSEMBLIES IN POWER SUPPLIES FOR THE REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM".

Commonwealth Edison has evaluated the proposed change against the criteria of 10 CFR 50.92 (c) and has determined that the proposed changes do not present a significant hazards consideration. The proposed Technical Specification amendment does not result in a change in the types or amounts of effluents released offsite. The proposed change has no effect upon individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. Therefore, incorporating the proposed changes into the Technical Specifications will not result in any increase in environmental consequences beyond those already accepted by the NRC in the Final Environmental Statement. Accordingly, Commonwealth Edison has determined that the proposed amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22 (c) (9).