

Omaha Public Power District
444 South 16th Street Mall
Omaha, Nebraska 68102-2247
402/636-2000

February 24, 1992
LIC-93-051

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attention: Document Control Desk
Mail Station: P1-137
Washington, D. C. 20555

Reference: Docket No. 50-285

Gentlemen:

SUBJECT: Special Reports on Inoperability of Fire Protection Equipment

The Omaha Public Power District (OPPD), holder of Operating License DPR-40, submits the following two reports pursuant to the requirements of Fort Calhoun Station (FCS) Unit No. 1, Technical Specification (TS) Section 2.19, "Fire Protection System".

FCS Technical Specification Section 2.19(7), requires that all penetration fire barriers protecting safety-related areas shall be functional (intact). With a penetration fire barrier non-functional, within one hour, either a continuous fire watch is to be established on at least one side of the affected penetration, or the operability of fire detectors on at least one side of the penetration is to be verified and an hourly fire watch patrol established. The non-functional penetration is to be restored to functional status within seven days, or a report to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission pursuant to TS Section 5.9.3 is to be prepared and submitted within an additional 30 days.

On January 18, 1993, at approximately 1100 hours during a surveillance of the Auxiliary Building, a Quality Control Inspector discovered that penetration 5-N-27 (between Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger Room 5 and Corridor 4) was not completely sealed. The seal was open on the Corridor 4 side of the penetration so it was declared inoperable.

On the same day at 1115 hours, a Fire Protection Impairment Permit was written to establish an hourly fire watch and document the as found condition of the penetration seal. Maintenance Work Order (MWO) 930288 was written to repair the seal, but repairs could not be effected within the seven days specified by T.S. 2.19. During the initial repair efforts under MWO 930288, further damage to the penetration was found. MWO 930680 was written to repair the elbow of the penetration. The additional repairs require procurement of replacement parts and reinstallation of cables. The MWO is scheduled to be completed by March 31, 1993. The hourly fire watch will remain in place until the repairs are completed.

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Additionally, FCS Technical Specification 2.19(8) requires the Control Room, Switchgear Room, and Cable Spreading Room Halon systems to be operable. With a Halon system inoperable, a continuous fire watch with back-up fire suppression equipment is to be established. The Halon system is to be restored to an operable status within 14 days, or a special report is to be submitted within an additional 30 days pursuant to TS Section 5.9.3.

On January 18, 1993, Fire Protection Impairment Permits were written for the Halon systems in rooms 56E and 56W to allow repair/replacement of Halon system piping under modification MR-FC-86-093. Appropriate compensatory measures required by TS 2.19(8) were also established.

On February 2, 1993, the impairments exceeded the 14 days specified in TS 2.19(8) thus requiring a special report. Appropriate compensatory measures will continue until the modification is complete. Modification MR-FC-86-093 is scheduled for completion by June 30, 1993.

If you have any questions, please contact me.

Sincerely,



for W. G. Gates
Vice President

WGG:cfs

c: LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae
J. L. Milhoan, Regional Administrator, Region IV
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