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April 27, 1990

W. J. Cahill
Executive Vice President

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

SUBJECT: COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION (CPSES)
DOCKET NO. 50-445
REQUEST FOR INFORMATION REGARDING OPERATION OF THE
AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM

Gentlemen:

On April 26 and 27, 1990, discussions were conducted with members of the NRC staff regarding a potential overtemperature condition in Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) piping due to minor check valve leakage. It was identified that minor leakage through the AFW check valves from operation of main feedwater at low power levels resulted in excessive temperatures in the AFW piping on the upstream side of check valves. Continued minor leakage allows pressure equalization across these check valves, allowing them to unseat slightly and permit flow through the AFW lines from steam generator feedwater lines at a higher pressure to steam generator feedwater lines at a slightly lower pressure (~ 4psid). The slight pressure differential between feedlines is a result of the feedwater piping configuration.

During these discussions CPSES stated that it would vent the upstream side of check valves as necessary to seat the check valves tighter, allowing piping temperatures to stabilize at acceptable values. The controls implemented to perform this venting function have been reviewed by your onsite staff.

Subsequently, the NRC staff requested that TU Electric provide a letter committing to establish a schedule for any proposed long term actions for the above described condition and that TU Electric provide assurance that all other BW/IP check valves are capable of performing their intended safety function.

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TU Electric will provide the details of and a schedule for any proposed long term actions and, if TU Electric elects to continue to use venting as the long term action, this decision will be discussed with the NRC staff. The Unit's transition from operational Modes 6 through 1, which required surveillance testing and rework with post work testing, has assured that all BW/IP check valves will perform their intended safety function.

Please contact me if further information is required.

Sincerely,



William J. Cahill, Jr.

TLH/daj

c - Mr. R. D. Martin, Region IV
Resident Inspectors, CPSES (3)