BOSTON EDISON
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station
Rocky Hill Road
Plymouth, Massachusetts 02360

10 CFR 50.73

Ralph G. Bird
Senior Vice President — Nuclear

April 19, 1990
BECo Ltr. 90-059

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Docket No. 50-293
License No. DPR-35

Dear Sir:

The enclosed Licensee Event Report (LER) 90-005-00, "General Electric Type AK-2A-50 Circuit Breaker Did Not Trip Due to Latch Prop Misalignment", is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50.73.

Please do not hesitate to contact me if there are any questions regarding this report.

R. G. Bird

DWE/bal

Enclosure: LER 90-005-00

cc: Mr. Thomas T. Martin
Regional Administrator, Region I
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
475 Allendale Rd.
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Sr. NRC Resident Inspector - Pilgrim Station

Standard BECo LER Distribution

Cert No P082896062

9004270250 900419
PDR ADOCK 05000293
S PDC

IE22
1/1

NRC Form 366
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/88

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station	0 5 0 0 0 2 9 3	1 OF 0 1

TITLE (4) General Electric Type AK-2A-50 Circuit Breaker Did Not Trip Due to Latch Prop Misalignment

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
									N/A	0 5 0 0 0
0 3	2 0	9 0	9 0	- 0 0 5	- 0 0	0 4	1 9	9 0	N/A	0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)			
N		20.402(b)	20.405(c)	X 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
POWER LEVEL (10)	0 1 0	20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
		20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
	AREA CODE
Douglas W. Ellis - Senior Compliance Engineer	5 0 8 7 4 7 - 8 1 6 0

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	
X	E B	52	G 0 8 0	Y							

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
X YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	NO		0 5	3 1	9 0

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On March 20, 1990 at 1750 hours, a 480 VAC circuit breaker (EIIS Code 52) that is part of a safety-related transfer scheme did not trip (open) automatically as designed during a planned Bus transfer. The breaker (52-202), type AK-2A-50, was manufactured by the General Electric Company. The failure of 52-202 to open resulted in the failure of its trip coil. In response, safety-related Bus B2 (EIIS Code EC) was intentionally de-energized at 1805 hours and was re-energized at 1825 hours after 52-202 was tripped and removed from its cubicle. Breaker 52-202 was tripped (using its local trip button) after the breaker's latch prop was manually realigned. Because Bus B2 was de-energized, portions of the primary and secondary containment isolation control systems (EIIS Codes JM) actuated, and shutdown cooling and Salt Service Water (EIIS Code BS) cooling was interrupted for approximately 30 minutes. Breaker 52-202 failed to trip because its latch prop which is part of the breaker's trip mechanism, was misaligned due to a missing retaining ring. An investigation for cause is in progress. Corrective actions taken or being taken include offsite inspection, overhaul, and testing of 52-202 by the manufacturer, and onsite inspection, overhaul and testing of similar breakers by manufacturer and utility personnel. A supplement to this report will be submitted after the investigation is completed.

This event occurred while in cold shutdown with the reactor mode selector switch in the SHUTDOWN position. The reactor power level was zero percent and the control rods were in the inserted position. The Reactor Vessel (RV) was vented with the RV water temperature at 98 degrees Fahrenheit. The plant remained in a cold shutdown condition during the event and this event posed no threat to the public health and safety.