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April 17, 1990

W. G. Hairston, III
Senior Vice President
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ELV-01530
0337

Docket No. 50-424

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Gentlemen:

VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT
PROCEDURAL INADEQUACY LEADS TO A MISSED
ASME SECTION XI VALVE TEST

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Georgia Power Company hereby submits the enclosed report related to an event which was discovered on March 21, 1990.

Sincerely,


W. G. Hairston, III

WGH,III/NJS/gm

Enclosure: LER 50-424/1990-008

xc: Georgia Power Company
Mr. C. K. McCoy
Mr. G. Bockhold, Jr.
Mr. R. M. Odom
Mr. P. D. Rushton
NORMS

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Mr. S. D. Ebnetter, Regional Administrator
Mr. T. A. Reed, Licensing Project Manager, NRR
Mr. R. F. Aiello, Senior Resident Inspector, Vogtle

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT - UNIT 1										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 4 2 4				PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 4										
TITLE (4) PROCEDURAL INADEQUACY LEADS TO A MISSED ASME SECTION XI VALVE TEST																								
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)														
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES			DOCKET NUMBER(S)												
0	1	2	5	9	0	9	0	0	0	8	0	0	0	4	1	7	9	0	0	5	0	0	0	0
OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)																						
1		20.402(b)				20.405(c)				50.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)										
POWER LEVEL (10)		20.405(a)(1)(i)				50.36(c)(1)				50.73(a)(2)(v)				73.71(c)										
4		20.405(a)(1)(ii)				50.36(c)(2)				50.73(a)(2)(vii)				OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)										
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(i)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)														
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)				50.73(a)(2)(ii)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)														
		20.405(a)(1)(v)				50.73(a)(2)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(ix)														
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																								
NAME										TELEPHONE NUMBER														
R. M. ODOM, NUCLEAR SAFETY AND COMPLIANCE										AREA CODE 4 0 4 8 2 6 - 3 2 0 1														
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																								
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS														
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)												EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR								
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)												<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO												

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single space typewritten lines) (16)

On 3-21-90, while Unit 1 was in Mode 6 (refueling) at midloop operation, it was discovered that a valid stroke time test was not performed for Boron Injection Tank discharge isolation valve 1HV-8801B during the previous quarterly inservice test. The valve had been stroke time tested to its closed position, instead of to its safety position which is open. Since a valid surveillance test did not exist, this resulted in a surveillance required by Technical Specification 4.0.5 and ASME Section XI not being satisfied.

The cause of this event was procedural inadequacy. The safety position for valve 1HV-8801B was incorrectly identified in the surveillance procedure as closed. The procedural inadequacy occurred as a result of a typographical error in a procedure revision approved on 12-12-89.

On discovery of the invalid surveillance, valve 1HV-8801B was declared inoperable. The surveillance procedure was corrected and the surveillance was satisfactorily performed. Valve 1HV-8801B was subsequently returned to operable status on 3-29-90.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

LER NUMBER (5)

PAGE (3)

VEGP - UNIT 1

0 5 0 0 0 4 2 4 9 0 - 0 0 8 - 0 0 0 2 OF 0 4

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 305A's) (17)

A. REQUIREMENT FOR REPORT

This report is required per 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i) because a Technical Specification (TS) required surveillance test was not performed within the specified time interval. An ASME Class 2 valve was not inservice tested per TS 4.0.5 requirements within the quarterly time interval specified by ASME Section XI.

B. UNIT STATUS AT TIME OF EVENT

At the time of discovery of this event on 3-21-90, Unit 1 was in Mode 6 (Refueling) at midloop operation. On 1-25-90, at the time that the surveillance late date was exceeded, Unit 1 was operating in Mode 1 (Power Operation) at approximately 48% of rated thermal power. There was no inoperable equipment which contributed to the occurrence of this event.

C. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On 3-21-90, a Quality Assurance engineer, in performing an audit of the Inservice Test (IST) Program, discovered an apparent discrepancy involving surveillance Procedure 14825-1, "Quarterly Inservice Valve Test". The safety position for valve 1HV-8801B was indicated as closed when the actual safety position for this valve is open. Valve 1HV-8801B is a Safety Injection, Boron Injection Tank discharge isolation valve. This discrepancy was brought to the attention of the IST engineer who then investigated the last performance of the surveillance procedure. It was found that on 1-8-90, valve 1HV-8801B had been stroke time tested to a closed position. ASME Section XI requires a stroke time test be performed by placing the valve in a position opposite its safety position and then stroking it to its safety position. Therefore, a valid stroke time test was not performed for valve 1HV-8801B.

Since the late date (i.e., 1-25-90) for performing the surveillance had been exceeded, valve 1HV-8801B was declared inoperable. A change to Procedure 14825-1 was initiated to correct the indicated safety position and on 3-26-90, valve 1HV-8801B was satisfactorily stroke time tested. Valve 1HV-8801B was subsequently returned to operable status on 3-29-90.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 60.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) VEGP - UNIT 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 4 2 4 9 0	LER NUMBER (5)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		0 0	0 8	0 0	0 3	OF	0 4

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 305A's) (17)

D. CAUSE OF EVENT

The direct cause of this event was a procedural inadequacy. The safety position for valve 1HV-8801B was incorrectly identified in Procedure 14825-1. The procedure inadequacy was traced to a typographical error which occurred in a procedure revision approved on 12-12-89. Prior to that date, the safety position was correctly identified. The revision approved on 12-12-89 involved an extensive restructuring of the valve test data sheets so that the valves were rearranged by plant mode applicability requirements.

E. ANALYSIS OF EVENT

Technical Specification 3.5.2 requires two independent Emergency Core Cooling System subsystems to be operable while the unit is operating in Modes 1, 2, and 3. Prior to the stroke time test performed on 1-8-90, valve 1HV-8801B had been satisfactorily stroke time tested, to its correct safety position, on 10-15-89. The stroke time test performed on 3-26-90 was also satisfactory. Based on these test results, valve 1HV-8801B was capable of performing its intended safety function, even though the surveillance late date had been exceeded. It is therefore concluded that there was no adverse effect on plant safety or public health and safety as a result of this event.

F. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

1. Procedure 14825-1 has been revised to correct the typographical error.
2. Valve 1HV-8801B has been satisfactorily stroke time tested and returned to operable status.
3. The equivalent Unit 2 Procedure 14825-2, has been checked and it has been verified that it does not contain the same typographical error.

G. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

1. Failed Components

None

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-630), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

LER NUMBER (6)

PAGE (3)

VEGP - UNIT 1

0 5 0 0 0 4 2 4 9 0 - 0 0 8 - 0 0 0 4 OF 0 4

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 385A's) (17)

2. Previous Similar Events

LER 50-425/1989-026, dated 10-2-90, described a previous event for Unit 2 involving a missed ASME Section XI valve test. LER 50-424/1988-014, dated 5-25-88, described a previous event for Unit 1 involving a missed ASME Section XI valve test. While these previous events similarly involved a missed ASME Section XI valve test, the cause of these events was different since they did not result from a typographical error.

3. Energy Industry Identification System Codes

High Pressure Safety Injection System (PWR) - BQ