



Carolina Power & Light Company

Brunswick Nuclear Project
P. O. Box 10429
Southport, NC 28461-0429

April 11, 1990

FILE: B09-13510C
SERIAL: BSEP/90-0325

10CFR50.73

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNIT 2
DOCKET NO. 50-324
LICENSE NO. DPR-62
SUPPLEMENT TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 2-90-001

Gentlemen:

In accordance with Title 10 to the Code of Federal Regulations, the enclosed Supplemental Licensee Event Report is submitted. The original report fulfilled the requirement for a written report within thirty (30) days of a reportable occurrence and was in accordance with the format set forth in NUREG-1022, September 1983.

Very truly yours,

J. L. Harness, General Manager
Brunswick Nuclear Project

TMJ/mcg

Enclosure

cc: Mr. S. D. Ebnetter
Mr. E. G. Tourigny
BSEP NRC Resident Office

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 600 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-630), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0106), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)

Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Unit 2

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

0 5 0 0 0 3 2 4 1 OF 0 1

PAGE (3)

TITLE (4) Outside Technical Specification Due to Missed Surveillance; CS Subsystems Inoperable

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
02	10	90	90	001	01	04	11	90		0 5 0 0 0
OPERATING MODE (9)			THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5. (Check one or more of the following) (11)							
5			20.402(b)			20.405(e)			60.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
POWER LEVEL (10)			20.405(a)(1)(i)			60.36(e)(1)			60.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
0 10 10			20.405(a)(1)(ii)			60.36(e)(2)			60.73(a)(2)(vi)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 306A)
			20.405(a)(1)(iii)		X	60.73(a)(2)(ii)			60.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)	
			20.405(a)(1)(iv)			60.73(a)(2)(iii)			60.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)	
			20.405(a)(1)(v)			60.73(a)(2)(iii)			60.73(a)(2)(ix)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
T. M. Jones, Regulatory Compliance Specialist	9 1 9 4 5 7 1 - 2 10 3 19

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) <input type="checkbox"/> NO	04	30	90

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single space typewritten lines) (16)

On February 10, 1990, it was determined that the Unit 2 Core Spray (CS) loops A and B were inoperable because of a missed surveillance. A maintenance surveillance test (MST) used to satisfy Technical Specifications (TS) for both CS and the Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) system had not been performed. The test, 2MST-RHR26M, "RHR/CS Lo Reactor Pressure Permissive Trip Unit Channel Calibration", had been excepted from performance on September 25, 1989, due to the systems being out of service (refuel outage). The MST was added to the supplement sheet of existing RHR LCOs, but not on the CS LCOs.

On February 6, 1990, both CS loops were declared operable on the basis that the work items listed on the LCO supplement sheets were completed. At 1305 on February 7, the spent fuel pool gates were installed, resulting in the requirement that at least two low pressure core cooling sub-systems be operable (TS 3.5.3.1). This was discovered at 1300 on February 10, and CS was declared inoperable. At 1454, the MST was completed and operability was declared. An investigation into this event is continuing and results will be reported in a supplement to this LER by April 30, 1990. This event had minimal safety significance.