

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

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APR 13 1990

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:


TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 - DOCKET NO.
50-327 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-77 - SPECIAL REPORT 90-05

This special report provides details concerning the Unit 1 auxiliary instrument room carbon dioxide (CO₂) fire suppression system being inoperable for greater than 14 days. The system was removed from service to facilitate outage activities and to prevent accidental actuation of the CO₂ into the auxiliary instrument room. This report is being made in accordance with Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.3.a. The enclosure contains the details concerning the condition.

If you have any questions concerning this submittal, please telephone M. A. Cooper at (615) 843-6651.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY


E. G. Wallace, Manager
Nuclear Licensing and
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Enclosure
cc: See page 2

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

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cc (Enclosure):

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ENCLOSURE

SQN Unit 1 Special Report 90-05

Description of Event

On March 20, 1990, with Unit 2 operating in Mode 1 (100 percent power, 2,235 pounds per square inch gauge and 578 degrees Fahrenheit) and Unit 1 shut down in Mode 5 for a planned refueling outage, the Unit 1 auxiliary instrument room carbon dioxide (CO₂) fire suppression system was removed from service to facilitate outage activities and to prevent any accidental discharge of CO₂ in the instrument room. The CO₂ system will be inoperable for the duration of the refueling outage. This report is being made in accordance with SQN Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.3.a.

Cause of the Condition

Modification activities in the Unit 1 auxiliary building instrument room require an increased number of personnel to be present at the same time in order to accomplish the assigned tasks, e.g., cable pulling. Additionally, personnel will be required to perform some tasks in cramped positions between the cable trays and on top of scaffolding. In the event of an activation of the CO₂ fire suppression system, the evacuation of personnel from the room in 20 seconds would be difficult. Therefore, for the safety of personnel working in the instrument room, the CO₂ fire suppression system has been removed from service for the duration of the Unit 1 Cycle 4 refueling outage.

Corrective Action

Limiting Condition for Operation 3.7.11.3 was entered at 1400 Eastern standard time on March 20, 1990. A continuous fire watch was immediately established with backup fire suppression equipment available for fire protection while the CO₂ system is inoperable. The fire watch will remain in effect until the outage-related activities in the room have been completed and the CO₂ system is returned to service.