Public Service Company of Colorado

16805 Road 19 1/2, Platteville, Colorado 80651-9298

November 25, 1981
Fort St. Vrain
Unit No. 1
P-81300

Mr. John T. Collins, Regional Administrator
Region IV
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
611 Ryan Plaza Drive
Suite 1000
Arlington, Texas 76011

Reference: Facility Operating License
No. DPR-34

Docket No. 50-267

Dear Mr. Seyfrit:

Enclosed please find a copy of Reportable Occurrence Report No. 50-267/81-070, Final, submitted per the requirements of Technical Specification AC 7.5.2(b)2.

Also, please find enclosed one copy of the Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence Report No. 50-267/81-070.

Very truly yours,

Don Warembourg
Manager, Nuclear Production

DW/cls

Enclosure

cc: Director, MIPC

IE 22
S:1

FORT ST. VRAIN NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO
16805 WELD COUNTY ROAD 19 1/2
PLATTEVILLE, COLORADO 80651-9298

REPORT NO. 50-267/81-070/03-L-0

Final

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

On two occasions between October 28 and November 3, 1981, the Loop 2 steam generator penetration overpressure protection instrumentation required by LCO 4.4.1, Table 4.4-2 was not in service. This is a degraded mode of LCO 4.4.1 and is reportable per Fort St. Vrain Technical Specification AC 7.5.2(b)2.

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

On October 24, 1981, the Loop 2 steam generator B-2-3 interspace leakage rate exceeded the allowable limit of LCO 4.2.9. The reactor power was reduced, and the turbine generator taken off line. This problem had occurred before and was previously reported in Reportable Occurrence 50-267/80-030/03-L-0.

On October 26, 1981, a proposal, P-81270, was sent to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission which would allow continued operation for completion of the temperature fluctuation testing that had been in progress. The proposal consisted of operating the interspace for steam generator module B-2-3 separately from the remaining Loop 2 steam generator modules to permit control of the interspace pressure at slightly above cold reheat steam pressure. To effect this control change, modifications of the steam generator piping involving a rupture disk, relief valve, and plant protective system overpressure protection were necessary for the module B-2-3 penetration interspace.

On October 27, 1981, with the reactor at 0.5% power and the PCRV depressurized to less than 100 psig, the modification to steam generator module B-2-3 interspace piping was begun. On October 28, at about 0000 hours, the rupture disk was welded into the module B-2-3 penetration interspace piping; therefore, the capability for pressurizing the penetration existed at that time. However, automatic plant protective system action for an overpressurization condition had not yet been provided for the B-2-3 penetration. Therefore, operation in a degraded mode of LCO 4.4.1 occurred until the loop was shutdown at 1110 hours on October 28, 1981, within the 12 hours required by LCO 4.4.1.

The modification was completed, and the plant rise-to-power was begun. On November 3, 1981, it became necessary to install a pressure gauge on a pressure sensing line of the B-2-3 penetration to provide local indication and better control of the B-2-3 penetration pressure. This installation required the Loop 2 steam generator penetration overpressure protection instruments be disconnected at 1450 hours on November 3, 1981, to prevent an unnecessary loop shutdown. The gauge was installed, and the circuitry was returned to service at 1600 hours the same day. The Loop 2 steam generator penetration overpressure protection instrumentation was out of service for 1 hour and 10 minutes.

CAUSE
DESCRIPTION:

The steam generator penetration overpressure protection instrumentation was out of service during modification of the Loop 2 steam generator penetration piping and the associated plant protective system circuitry.

CORRECTIVE
ACTION:

On the first occassion, the Loop 2 steam generator loop was shutdown within 12 hours, as required by LCO 4.4.1. On the second occassion, the modification was completed in 1 hour and 10 minutes, and the Loop 2 steam generator overpressurization protection instrumentation was restored to service.

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