

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

V A S P S 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 4 1 1 1 1 4 5
LICENSEE CODE 14 LICENSE NUMBER 25 LICENSE TYPE 30 ET CAT SE 52

REPORT SOURCE L 6 0 5 0 0 0 2 8 1 7 1 1 0 2 8 1 8 1 1 2 0 18 1 9
DOCKET NUMBER 56 EVENT DATE 74 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

On 11-2-81 and 11-6-81 with the unit at full power, and again on 11-13-81 with the unit at cold shutdown, electrical penetrations through fire barriers were found open and unattended contrary to T.S.-3.2.1.G.2. This event is reportable per T.S. 6.6.2.b(2). All other fire warning and suppression systems were operable; therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

SYSTEM CODE A B 11 CAUSE CODE A 12 CAUSE SUB CODE E 13 COMPONENT CODE X X X X X X 14 COMP SUBCODE Z 15 VALVE SUBCODE Z 16
LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 17 EVENT YEAR 8 1 21 SHUTDOWN METHOD Z 21 HOURS 0 0 0 0 22 ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y 23 NPRO- FORM SUB N 24 PRIME COMP SUPPLIER A 25 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER Z 19 19 19 25
ACTION TAKEN X 18 FUTURE ACTION X 19 EFFECT ON PLANT Z 20

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

Construction personnel failed to restore the fire barrier after completion of cable installation, and did not post a fire watch. The penetrations were temporarily sealed. Construction management has been reminded of the requirements for breaching fire barriers.

FACILITY STATUS E 28 % POWER 1 0 0 29 OTHER STATUS N/A 30 METHOD OF DISCOVERY B 31 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION Routine Observation 32
ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE Z 33 Z 34 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY N/A 35 LOCATION OF RELEASE N/A 36
PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER 1 0 0 37 TYPE Z 38 DESCRIPTION N/A 39
PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER 1 0 0 40 DESCRIPTION N/A 41
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE Z 42 DESCRIPTION N/A 43

PUBLICITY ISSUED N 44 DESCRIPTION 8112020666 811120 PDR ADOCK 05000281 PDR 45

ATTACHMENT 1
SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT 2
DOCKET NO: 50/281
REPORT NO: 81-068/03L-0
EVENT DATE: 11-2-81

UNSEALED PENETRATIONS

1. EVENT DESCRIPTION:

On 11-2-81 and 11-6-81, with the unit at full power, and on 11-13-81, with the unit at cold shutdown, electrical penetrations through fire barriers were found open and unattended contrary to T.S.-3.21.G.2. The penetrations involved were in the emergency switchgear room, between the cable spreading room and the cable vault, and between the auxiliary building and cable vault, respectively. These events are reportable per T.S.-6.6.2.b(2).

2. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES:

The integrity of fire barrier seals ensures that a fire in one area of the plant will be confined, or adequately retarded from spreading to adjacent areas. Since all other fire warning and suppression systems were operable, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

3. CAUSE:

Construction personnel failed to seal the penetrations in the fire barriers, and left them without a fire watch.

4. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The immediate corrective action was to establish a fire watch, and inform the Fire Marshall.

5. SUBSEQUENT CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The subsequent corrective action was to fill the penetrations with approved temporary sealant, or to replace the cover plate, in the case of the wall between the auxiliary building and cable vault.

6. ACTION TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:

A meeting was conducted between the station Fire Marshall and the construction electrical Supervisor and Superintendent on 11-16-81. The Superintendent indicated that all foremen are aware of the importance of maintaining a fire watch at an open fire penetration, and that their procedures reflect this requirement. Procedural requirements also require notification of the Fire Marshall whenever a fire boundary is breached.

7. GENERIC IMPLICATIONS:

None.