



MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

Helping Build Mississippi

P. O. BOX 1640, JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI 39205

81 NOV 23 4:29

JAMES P. McGAUGHY, JR.
ASSISTANT VICE PRESIDENT

November 20, 1981

Office of Inspection & Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, N.W.
Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Attention: Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:



SUBJECT: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station
Units 1 and 2
Docket Nos. 50-416/417
File 0260/15525/15526
PRD-81/25, Final Report,
Construction Damage to Cables
AECM-81/460

On May, 19, 1981, Mississippi Power & Light Company notified you of a Potentially Reportable Deficiency (PRD) at the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS) construction site. The deficiency concerns construction damage to cables in conduit.

We have determined that this deficiency, had it remained uncorrected, would not have affected the safety of operations of the nuclear power plant, and is not reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e). Details are given in our final report, which is attached.

This report was originally due on November 15, 1981, but a one week extension was granted by Mr. P. A. Taylor on that date.

Yours truly,

J. P. McGaughy, Jr.
for J. P. McGaughy, Jr.

KDS:dr
ATTACHMENT

cc: See page 2

OFFICIAL COPY

8112020395 811120
PDR ADOCK 05000416
S PDR

Member Middle South Utilities System

IE 27.11

Mr. J. P. O'Reilly
NRC

AECM-81/460
Page 2

cc: Mr. N. L. Stampley
Mr. R. B. McGehee
Mr. T. B. Conner

Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director
Office of Inspection & Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Mr. G. B. Taylor
South Miss. Electric Power Association
P. O. Box 1589
Hattiesburg, MS 39401

FINAL REPORT TO PRD-81/25

I. Description of the Deficiency

During the course of high potential testing to detect cables with rope burn damage in a previous Potentially Reportable Deficiency (PRD-80/05), which has been closed out, four cable which did not experience rope burn damage exhibited unsatisfactory test results. It was noted that the cables had nicks and cuts in the insulation. Further investigation was conducted in order to determine the extent and significance of possible damage to other cables. Nicks and cuts in the cables were at locations near the motor operated valves (MOV's), mainly in the conduit and/or flexible metal conduit. It was determined that a total of 274 safety related MOV's could be involved. A sample of ten percent (27) of the cables to the affected valves was chosen to be inspected.

The cables chosen were applicable to Unit 1 only. The deficiency did not apply to the NSSS vendor.

II. Analysis of Safety Implications

As previously mentioned, the equipment cables to twenty-seven (27) valves were chosen to be inspected. This inspection consisted of disconnecting all cables connected to the selected 27 valves, performing a pull back to the conduit, and inspecting the individual wires for nicks and/or cuts in the insulation.

The inspection involved the examination of a total of seventy-five (75) cables. The acceptance criteria required that there be no nicks or cuts in the insulation on individual wires which would either expose the conductor or remove any insulation. No cables were found to have these conditions.

All damage to the cables was minor. The deficiency could not have affected the safety of operations of the nuclear power plant and is not reportable under 10CFR50.55(e).

III. Corrective Actions Taken

The four (4) cables with actual nicks or cuts on them have been repaired or replaced. No other corrective actions were necessary on any other cables.

To preclude recurrence of the deficiency, controls have been increased on inspection of cables connected to motor operated valves. Following rework requiring removal of the cables and flexible metal conduit, the individual conductors will be reinspected for nicks and cuts in the insulation. Future installations will also continue to be inspected for the same conditions.