

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: 1

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 0 H D B S 1 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 4 5

LICENSEE CODE

LICENSE NUMBER

LICENSE TYPE

CAT 58

CON'T

0 1 L 6 0 5 0 0 0 3 4 6 7 1 0 2 2 8 1 8 1 1 8 8 1 9

REPORT SOURCE

DOCKET NUMBER

EVENT DATE

REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES 10

0 2 (NP-23-81-80) On 10/22/81 at 1720 hours, an operator was entering containment to open
0 3 steam generator drains. While closing the outer door to the personnel lock, the
0 4 latch on the door went to the shut position, however, the door did not shut. The op-
0 5 erator did not notice this and opened the inner door. Both doors were open for
0 6 approximately 1 minute. Per Technical Specification 3.6.1.3 at least one door is
0 7 required to be shut at all times. There was no danger to the health and safety of the
0 8 public or station personnel. The reactor was in Hot Standby.

0 9 S D 11 E 12 B 13 P E N E T R 14 A 15 Z 16

17 8 1 0 6 7 3 L 0

X 18 X 19 Z 20 Z 21 0 0 0 0 22 V 23 N 24 A 25 C 3 1 0 26

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 27

1 0 The cause of this occurrence was an equipment failure. It is suspected that due to
1 1 excessive use the roller cam bearings were damaged. Maintenance Work Order 81-3730
1 2 was written to investigate the damaged roller cam bearings during the next refueling
1 3 outage.

1 5 E 28 0 0 0 29 NA A 31 Operator Observation

1 6 Z 33 Z 34 NA NA

1 7 0 0 0 37 Z 38 NA

1 8 0 0 0 40 NA

1 9 Z 42 NA

2 0 N 44 NA

DVR 81-181

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TOLEGO EDISON COMPANY
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-81-80

DATE OF EVENT: October 22, 1981

FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Personnel hatch interlock failure

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 2 with Power (MWT) = 0 and Load (Gross MWE) = 0.

Description of Occurrence: At 1720 hours on October 22, 1981, an operator was entering containment to open steam generator drains. The operator opened the outer door and entered the personnel lock area. The latch on the outer door went to the shut position but the door itself did not shut. The operator, without noticing this, opened the inner door. Both doors were open for approximately one minute before this situation was noticed. At that time, both doors were shut. At least one of these doors is required to be shut at all times per Technical Specification 3.6.1.3. The reactor was already in Hot Standby at zero percent power as required by the action statement of the technical specification.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The cause of the occurrence is equipment failure. A work request was written and the doors were inspected for any failure. Nothing was found at that time as the door interlock was working fine, but it was suspected that due to excessive use, the roller cam bearings were damaged.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or to station personnel. The reactor had already been shut down previous to this occurrence.

Corrective Action: Maintenance Work Order 81-3730 was written to investigate the roller cam bearing damage during the next refueling outage. A preventive maintenance inspection and repair procedure will be developed to identify and correct degraded door interlock situations to prevent recurrence. This will be done and implemented before return to service from the next refueling outage.

Failure Data: A previous failure of the containment personnel lock due to broken CAMROL cam follower bearings was reported in LER NP-33-80-92 (80-073).

SUPPLEMENTAL

LER #81-067