

1. Procedure Number FNP-O-EIP-8 Revision Number 19
 Procedure Title NOTIFICATION ROSTER

- ☒ Safety Related ☐ Non-Safety Related
☐ New Procedure Request
☐ Procedure Revision, New Revision Number _____
☐ Change of Intent
☒ Temporary Procedure Change, Effective until next permanent change, TCN 19C
☐ One time Temporary Procedure Change, Effective from _____ to _____, TCN DOCUMENT CONTROL

2. Change Summary

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2.1 Procedure Page Numbers Affected by Change

Table 3; page 1 of 3, 2 of 3 and 3 of 3

2.2 Description of Changes

Changed phone numbers of EOF staff for
Birmingham extensions; added permanent TSC phone
numbers; designated alternate TSC phone numbers

2.3 Reason for Change

Members of the EOF staff moved from the main general
office building to the Flintridge building
effective 2/23/81

3. Prepared By WRB Signature Emergency Planner Title 2/23/81 Date

4. Reviewed By William J. Supertog Signature C+HP Sector Supervisor Title 2-23-81 Date

5. Cross-Disciplinary/PORC Review

Group	Signature	Title	Date
<u>PORC</u>	<u>W. A. Hunt III</u>	<u>PM</u>	<u>2-23-81</u>

6. Temporary Change Approval (Signature/Date)

- ☒ Member Group Staff
☐ Shift Foreman
☒ Senior Reactor Operator

Pincoffton / 2/23/81
R. D. Hill / 2/23/81

7. Final Approval (Signature/Date, required within 30 days of temporary approval)

- ☐ Group Supervisor _____
☐ Plant Superintendent _____
☐ Manager of Operations QA _____
☐ Manager of Nuclear Generation _____
☒ Plant Manager W. A. Hunt III / 2-24-81

FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT
NUCLEAR SAFETY EVALUATION CHECK LIST

- (1) UNIT 142
 (2) CHECK LIST APPLICABLE TO: FNP-0-EIP-B Revision 19 TCN 19C
 (3) SAFETY EVALUATION - PART A

The procedure, procedure change or modification to which this evaluation is applicable represents:

- (3.1) Yes ☐ No ☒ A change to the plant as described in the FSAR?
 (3.2) Yes ☐ No ☒ A change to procedures as described in the FSAR?
 (3.3) Yes ☐ No ☒ A test or experiment not described in the FSAR?
 (3.4) Yes ☐ No ☒ A change to the Technical Specifications?

If the answer to any of the above questions is "Yes," complete Item (4) and attach a 10CFR50.59 evaluation. If the answer to all of the above is "No," omit Item (4) and Item (9).

(4) SAFETY EVALUATION - PART B

- (4.1) Yes ☐ No ☐ Will the probability of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR be increased?
 (4.2) Yes ☐ No ☐ Will the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR be increased?
 (4.3) Yes ☐ No ☐ May the possibility of an accident which is different than any already evaluated in the FSAR be created?
 (4.4) Yes ☐ No ☐ Will the probability of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR be increased?
 (4.5) Yes ☐ No ☐ Will the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety different than any already evaluated in the FSAR be increased?
 (4.6) Yes ☐ No ☐ May the possibility of a malfunction of equipment important to safety different than any already evaluated in the FSAR be created?
 (4.7) Yes ☐ No ☐ Will the margin of safety as defined in the basis to any Technical Specification be reduced?

If the answer to any of the above questions is "Yes," an unreviewed safety question is involved. Explain the basis for each answer provided in Section 4.

(5) REMARKS: (Attach additional pages if necessary) _____

(6)	PREPARED BY: <u>W.R. Bayne</u>	DATE <u>2/23/81</u>
(7)	REVIEWED BY: <u>William J. [unclear]</u>	DATE <u>2-23-81</u>
(8)	PORC REVIEW: <u>[unclear]</u>	DATE <u>2-23-81</u>
(9)	NORB REVIEW: _____	DATE _____

Distribution

Original: Document Control File A21 6226

TABLE 3
APCO MANAGEMENT NOTIFICATION

EMERGENCY COORDINATOR/RECOVERY MANAGER

<u>Name</u>	<u>APCO Ext.</u>	<u>Home Phone</u>	<u>Pageboy Code*</u>	<u>Radio Call Unit Number**</u>
R. P. McDonald				
H. O. Thrash				
O. D. Kingsley, Jr.				

RECOVERY SUPPORT DIRECTOR AND STAFF

<u>Name</u>	<u>APCO Ext.</u>	<u>Home Phone</u>	<u>Pageboy Code*</u>
H. O. Thrash			
R. P. McDonald			
O. D. Kingsley, Jr.			
J. R. Campbell			
J. G. Sims			

TECHNICAL SUPPORT DIRECTOR AND ¹STAFF

<u>Name</u>	<u>APCO Ext.</u>	<u>Home Phone</u>	<u>Pageboy Code*</u>
O. D. Kingsley, Jr.			
R. L. George			
¹ W. M. Jackson			

*To contact individual via beeper call one of the following numbers listed for the Birmingham area.

**To contact individual via car radio on frequency 37.86, call one of the numbers listed for the area in which the individual is located. Give the radio operator the message you wish to be relayed.

<u>Area</u>	<u>APCo Ext.</u>	<u>Bell Number</u>
Birmingham		
Montgomery		
Eufaula (Day Only)		

PUBLIC INFORMATION MANAGER

<u>Name</u>	<u>APCO Ext.</u>	<u>Home Phone</u>	<u>Pager Number</u>
Neal Wade			
Steven E. Bradley			

MEDICAL SUPPORT

<u>Name</u>	<u>APCO Ext.</u>	<u>Home Phone</u>	<u>Ans. Serv.</u>
Dr. C. H. Colvin			
Dr. M. Bradley			
Dr. E. B. Glenn			
Dr. T. B. Patton			

LEGAL SUPPORT

<u>Name</u>	<u>APCO Ext.</u>	<u>Home Phone</u>
R. A. Buettner		
H. H. Boles		
J. P. Scott, Jr.		

SAFETY DEPARTMENTEMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY

<u>Location</u>	<u>APCO Ext.</u>	<u>Bell Number</u>	<u>Other</u>
Startup Trailer			

ALTERNATE
TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER

<u>Location</u>	<u>APCO Ext.</u>	<u>Bell Number</u>	<u>Other</u>
Control Room			

(red phone)

OPERATIONS SUPPORT CENTERS

Maintenance Shop	Pax
Auditorium	Pax
CSC	Pax
Control Room	Pax
Switchhouse	Pax

INSURANCE SUPPORT

<u>Name</u>	<u>APCo Ext.</u>	<u>Home Phone</u>
Normal Horsley		
H. K. Travis		

TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER

<u>Location</u>	<u>Extension</u>
Communications Cabinet	ENN (State Hotline - White Phone)
	NRC Ring Down (Red Phone)
	PAX with Speaker
	Bham with Speaker
	Bham
Communications Area	PAX (next to Communications Cabinet)
	Security radio
	Plant radio
	Division radio
Emergency Director	PAX
Operations Manager	PAX
Maintenance Manager	PAX
Technical Manager	PAX
Health Physics Manager	PAX
NRC	PAX
	PAX
Monitoring Area	PAX

TCN-19C

VOLUME 14

FNP-0-EIP-10
February 19, 1981
Revision 7


FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT
EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE
FNP-0-EIP-10

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EVACUATION AND PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY

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Approved:


Plant Manager

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Date Issued: 2-20-81

List of Effective Pages

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EVACUATION AND PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY

1.0 Purpose

This procedure describes the action to be taken for the evacuation and accountability of all personnel onsite in the event of an emergency at the Farley Nuclear Plant.

2.0 References

- 2.1 Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Emergency Plan.
- 2.2 FNP Operating Manual, Vol. 14, FNP-0-EIP-14, "Re-entry Procedures".

3.0 General

- 3.1 For the purposes of site evacuation and personnel accountability, the following locations are designated as assembly areas: the Service Building auditorium and maintenance shop; the Switchhouse (Figure 1); and the plant road immediately east of the Daniel Construction Company Office complex (Figure 1).
- 3.2 All personnel shall familiarize themselves with the location of their particular assembly area.
- 3.3 Personnel who report to an assembly area shall assemble according to groups to facilitate accurate and timely accountability.
- 3.4 When reporting to an assembly area, personnel should avoid any route or area of the plant which has been declared part of the emergency or which could result in excessive radiation exposure or personal injury.
- 3.5 Personnel who have been in the emergency area shall remain segregated from other personnel in the assembly area until they have been monitored for possible contamination, if applicable.
- 3.6 Each plant supervisor or senior individual onsite from each group shall be responsible for accounting for all persons working in or visiting his group.

- 3.7 When evacuating the RCA, attempt to remove the outer layer of protective clothing before proceeding to the assembly area.
- 3.8 Personnel exiting the RCA wearing protective clothing during an evacuation should make every reasonable effort to avoid contaminating equipment, walls, floors and other personnel.
- 3.9 Visitors shall be under the direction of the APCo tour guide.
- 3.10 When an evacuation is announced the plant guard at the Primary Access Point to the Protected Area shall immediately review the visitor log and badge storage racks to determine the number of people in each group who are inside the Protected Area.
- 3.11 After an emergency has been declared, the security guard at the Primary Access Point shall ensure that no one except personnel with emergency duty assignments enters the Protected Area without the approval of the Emergency Director or his designee.
- 3.12 All personnel shall return their security badge and personnel dosimetry devices to the plant guard at the Primary Access Point each time they leave the Protected Area.
- 3.13 Accountability shall be deemed complete upon the reporting of the total number of missing personnel to the Emergency Director. The report must not be delayed as a result of trying to locate the missing personnel.

4.0 Procedure

4.1 Local Evacuation

A Local Evacuation is initiated by a local alarm or by the Shift Supervisor announcing over the PA system the affected area, evacuation routes, assembly area(s) and other instructions as applicable.

- 4.1.1 All personnel in the affected area shall stop work, render safe any hazardous equipment and leave the area by the most direct route to the assembly area unless otherwise instructed by the Control Room.

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- 4.1.2 The Shift Supervisor or Emergency Director will activate emergency teams as required to locate and ensure the evacuation of personnel.
- 4.1.3 Accountability
 - 4.1.3.1 For Containment evacuation, the guard or senior APCo employee present will account for personnel utilizing the Containment Access Log and notify the Shift Supervisor.
 - 4.1.3.2 For Auxiliary Building evacuation, the senior health physics technician present will account for personnel utilizing the RWP time cards and notify the Shift Supervisor.
 - 4.1.3.3 In the event of local evacuations other than the Containment or the Auxiliary Building, the senior APCo employee present will count all personnel and notify the Shift Supervisor.
 - 4.1.3.4 For areas where the number of personnel who may be in the area is not known (e.g. a floor of the turbine building or entire turbine building) accountability may be effected by a systematic search of the affected area to ascertain all personnel have evacuated.

4.2 General Evacuation

A General Evacuation is initiated by the sounding of the Plant Emergency Alarm.

- 4.2.1 The Emergency Director, Technical Manager, Maintenance Manager, Operations Manager and Health Physics Manager shall report to the Technical Support Center.

Rev. 7

- 4.2.2 The Operations Supervisor, Health Physics Supervisor, members of the operating crew(s) and on-shift C&HP personnel, if not in the Control Room shall secure the operation in which they are engaged and proceed immediately to the Control Room (southeast corner). The senior individual at the Protected Area OSC shall determine all Operations and C&HP personnel assembled in the OSC and control room and notify the PAP. The report shall be made immediately after the number of missing personnel is determined. The report shall not be delayed as a result of trying to locate missing personnel.
- 4.2.3 All construction personnel (DCCA and APCo) inside the Protected Area, and all APCo production personnel onsite shall secure equipment which they are operating and shall report to the following assembly areas.
- 4.2.3.1 Service Building maintenance shop - Maintenance Supervision, all Maintenance personnel and all contractor construction personnel inside the Protected Area.
 - 4.2.3.2 Service Building auditorium - All other personnel
 - 4.2.3.3 CSC Building
All security personnel
- 4.2.4 Visitors on tour of the site (outside the Controlled Area) shall be immediately escorted to the Switchhouse by the APCo tour guide in charge of the group. Visitors will remain at the Switchhouse until released by the Emergency Director.
- 4.2.5 Each supervisor shall account for personnel in his group and shall report the results to the senior individual at the assembly area. The report shall be made immediately after the number of missing personnel is determined. The report shall not be delayed as a result of trying to locate the missing personnel.

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- 4.2.6 Accountability within the Protected Area will be determined by the senior individual at the assembly area coordinating with the Primary Access Point (PAP). Results of the count shall then be reported to the Emergency Director by the senior plant guard at the PAP. The report shall be made immediately after the number of missing personnel is determined. The report shall not be delayed as a result of trying to locate the missing personnel.
- 4.2.7 Accountability within the Controlled Area will be determined by the senior individual at each assembly area coordinating with the CSC and then reported to the Emergency Director by the senior individual in the CSC. The report shall be made immediately after the number of missing personnel is determined. The report shall not be delayed as a result of trying to locate the missing personnel.
- 4.2.8 Construction personnel outside the Protected Area.
- 4.2.8.1 Timekeepers shall keep an accurate count by time cards of all Daniel Construction Company employees and Subcontractor employees.
- 4.2.8.2 All visitors shall be logged in by name and address and logged out upon leaving.
- 4.2.8.3 Evacuation & accountability shall proceed as follows:
- a. Secure equipment and evacuate their work areas.
 - b. Report to their designated assembly areas as shown in Figure 2.
 - c. Each foreman or other first line supervisor shall be responsible for the accountability of his personnel. He shall

report the number of his personnel present and any missing personnel to his general foreman. General foreman shall report the numbers to their superintendent or other designated supervisor. Superintendents shall report the numbers to their department manager. Department managers shall then check the totals for each craft or employee group against the time card numbers. Results of the checks shall be reported by the department managers to the Project Manager. The Project Manager shall report to the APCo Emergency Director.

4.2.9 The Emergency Director shall:


- 4.2.9.1 Activate teams to search for unaccounted personnel according to FNP-0-EIP-14, "Re-entry Procedures".
- 4.2.9.2 Evaluate the emergency conditions and direct non-essential personnel to either depart from the site or return to work.
- 4.2.9.3 Provide for transportation for persons without vehicles.
- 4.2.9.4 Provide clothing for personnel found to be contaminated.

4.2.10 Upon the order to evacuate the site, non-essential, APCo Production personnel shall be monitored by a C&HP technician and released from the CSC Building. If the background radiation makes the CSC Building unsuitable as a release point, personnel shall be escorted by the C&HP technician and a plant guard to the site boundary at the intersection of the Main Entrance Road and State Road 95, monitored and released.

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Construction personnel shall be monitored by C&HP technicians and released at the clock alleys. If this location is unsuitable as a release point, the personnel shall be escorted by the C&HP technicians and security guards to the intersection of the construction entrance road and State Road 95, monitored and released.

- 4.2.11 Onsite evacuation routes are shown in Figure 1. Offsite evacuation routes are shown in Figure 2.



OFFSITE EVACUATION ROUTES

Figure 2

This map, titled "SITE ASSEMBLY AREAS", illustrates the layout of a facility with various buildings and access points. Key features include:

- Buildings:** Unit 1 Cooling Towers, Unit 2 Cooling Towers, Diesel Bldg., Auxiliary Building (containing units #1 and #2), Turbine Building, Service Building, Warehouse, Daniel Const. Offices, and a Switchhouse.
- Roads and Access:** Construction Access Road (top left), Production Access Road (bottom right), and a road connecting to Hwy. 95 (right side).
- Water Connections:** To River Water (top), To Service Water (middle right), and To Facility (bottom right).
- Evacuation Routes:** Indicated by hatched arrows pointing towards the bottom left and bottom right.
- Other Markers:** A north arrow (N) is located in the upper left, and an "EOF" (End of Facility) marker is present near the Daniel Const. Offices.

Rev. 6

1. Procedure Number FNP-0-EIP-4 Revision Number 5
 Procedure Title CHEMISTRY & HEALTH PHYSICS SUPPORT TO THE EMERGENCY PLAN

- ☒ Safety Related ☐ Non-Safety Related
☐ New Procedure Request
☐ Procedure Revision, New Revision Number _____
☐ Change of Intent
☒ Temporary Procedure Change, Effective until next permanent change, TCN 5A
☐ One time Temporary Procedure Change, Effective from _____ to _____, TCN _____

2. Change Summary

2.1 Procedure Page Numbers Affected by Change

3 ; Added Appendix 1 (2 pages)

2.2 Description of Changes

Added methodology to assess core damage based on dose rate inside containment

2.3 Reason for Change

Commitment to NRC for Unit 2 Full Power License.3. Prepared By WRB ayne, Emergency Planner, 2/23/81
 Signature Title Date4. Reviewed By J. S. Williams, Trng Supt., 2/23/81
 Signature Title Date

5. Cross-Disciplinary/PORC Review

Group	Signature	Title	Date
<u>PORC</u>	<u>J. S. Williams</u>	<u>Asst. P.H. Mgr.</u>	<u>2-23-81</u>

6. Temporary Change Approval (Signature/Date)

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Member Group Staff	<u>Robert A. Kengil</u>	<u>2-23-81</u>
<input type="checkbox"/> Shift Foreman		
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Senior Reactor Operator	<u>J. S. Williams</u>	<u>2-23-81</u>

7. Final Approval (Signature/Date, required within 30 days of temporary approval)

- ☐ Group Supervisor _____/_____
☐ Plant Superintendent _____/_____
☐ Manager of Operations QA _____/_____
☐ Manager of Nuclear Generation _____/_____
☒ Plant Manager J. S. Williams 2-23-81

FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT
NUCLEAR SAFETY EVALUATION CHECK LIST

- (1) UNIT 1+2
 (2) CHECK LIST APPLICABLE TO: FNP-0-EIP-4 Revision 5 TCN 5A
 (3) SAFETY EVALUATION - PART A

The procedure, procedure change or modification to which this evaluation is applicable represents:

- (3.1) Yes ☐ No ☒ A change to the plant as described in the FSAR?
 (3.2) Yes ☐ No ☒ A change to procedures as described in the FSAR?
 (3.3) Yes ☐ No ☒ A test or experiment not described in the FSAR?
 (3.4) Yes ☐ No ☒ A change to the Technical Specifications?

If the answer to any of the above questions is "Yes," complete Item (4) and attach a 10CFR50.59 evaluation. If the answer to all of the above is "No," omit Item (4) and Item (9).

(4) SAFETY EVALUATION - PART B

- (4.1) Yes ☐ No ☐ Will the probability of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR be increased?
 (4.2) Yes ☐ No ☐ Will the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR be increased?
 (4.3) Yes ☐ No ☐ May the possibility of an accident which is different than any already evaluated in the FSAR be created?
 (4.4) Yes ☐ No ☐ Will the probability of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR be increased?
 (4.5) Yes ☐ No ☐ Will the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety different than any already evaluated in the FSAR be increased?
 (4.6) Yes ☐ No ☐ May the possibility of a malfunction of equipment important to safety different than any already evaluated in the FSAR be created?
 (4.7) Yes ☐ No ☐ Will the margin of safety as defined in the basis to any Technical Specification be reduced?

If the answer to any of the above questions is "Yes," an unreviewed safety question is involved. Explain the basis for each answer provided in Section 4.

- (5) REMARKS: (Attach additional pages if necessary) _____

- (6) PREPARED BY: W.B. Bayne DATE 2/23/81
 (7) REVIEWED BY: Robert H. Bennett DATE 2/23/81
 (8) PORC REVIEW: James L. A. Holland DATE 2-23-81
 (9) NORB REVIEW: _____ DATE _____

Distribution

Original: Document Control File A21 6226

Decontamination will be initiated if practicable:

- a. Inside the Radiation Controlled Area (RCA) when radioactive contamination for personnel and equipment reach 1000 and 5000 dpm/100cm³, respectively.
- b. Outside the RCA when radioactive contamination for personnel and equipment reach 200 and 500 dpm/100cm³, respectively.

4.1.12 Provide for offsite analysis of radiological samples as appropriate.

4.1.13 If conditions warrant, provide for sampling and analysis of site drinking water for radioactive contamination.

4.2 A Radiation Monitoring Team assigned to monitor in the plant or at assembly areas shall:

4.2.1 Comply with EIP-10 in providing support during evacuations.

4.2.2 Comply with EIP-11 in providing support to injured personnel.

4.2.3 Comply with EIP-13 if supporting the fire brigade.

4.2.4 Comply with EIP-14 if a member of a re-entry team.

4.2.5 Don necessary protective clothing and emergency equipment and perform radiological surveys as directed.

4.2.6 Document all survey data.

4.2.7 Post and establish controlled access areas as appropriate.

4.2.8 Report findings to the Technical Support Center (TSC).

4.3 A Radiation Monitoring Team assigned to monitor in the environment (onsite and offsite) shall:

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APPENDIX 1

The graph on sheet 3 of this PCN shows gamma dose rates inside containment as a function of time after reactor shutdown. The three cases shown on the graph represent the following:

CASE 1: 100% Core Melt. (100% of noble gas and 25% of iodine core inventory is released into the containment and is available for leakage to the environment.)


CASE 2: 10% Core melt. (approximates total cladding failure with 10% of noble gas and 2.5% of iodine core inventory released.)

CASE 3: 1.0% Core Melt or 10% Cladding Failure. (1.0% of noble gases and 0.25% of iodine core inventory released.)

Note that these plots are for volumes above the operating deck EL. 155'-0". All assumptions made to plot the graph are the same as those given in the FSAR for LOCA analysis.

[One of these assumptions is one train of CMT. Spray & one train of CMT. coolers is operating. Two trains of CMT. Spray were considered in a separate analysis. Assuming both trains are operating would effectively double the removal rate of the elemental & particulate forms of iodine. However, due to the limit of spray removal credit allowed by the NRC (DF=100), the sprays would be "cut-off" in half the time. This effect would be seen in the first 30 minutes after shutdown, but is negligible in the graph due to the presence of noble gases. Thus, justification of using the FSAR LOCA analysis as guidelines for this analysis.]

APPENDIX 1



Gamma Dose Rate in Containment versus Time After Shutdown