



VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION

SEVENTY SEVEN GROVE STREET
RUTLAND, VERMONT 05701

2.C.2.1
FVY 81-162

REPLY TO:
ENGINEERING OFFICE
1671 WORCESTER ROAD
FRAMINGHAM, MASSACHUSETTS 01701
TELEPHONE 617-872-8100

November 18, 1981

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Attention: Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Mr. T. A. Ippolito, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #2
Division of Licensing



References: (a) License No. DPR-28 (Docket No. 50-271)
(b) Letter, VYNPC to USNRC, FVY 81-144, dated October 5, 1981,
Vermont Yankee Proposed Change No. 95, RCIC Break Detection
Logic
(c) Letter, USNRC to VYNPC, dated October 7, 1981

Subject: Additional Information Regarding NUREG-0737 ITEM II.K.3.15

Dear Sir:

Reference (c) requested Vermont Yankee to submit additional information regarding our implementation of the subject NUREG Item to enable the NRC staff to complete the required post-implementation review. The requested information is presented below.

RCIC Break Detection Logic Modification

Reference (b) was submitted two days prior to the issuance of Reference (c), and was therefore not available to the staff when their request for additional information was written. Reference (b) contains proposed Technical Specifications addressing the addition of the time delay relay, a description of the modification, and a written evaluation of the safety considerations involved. This modification is currently being installed, and post-installation testing will be conducted to verify that the change prevents spurious isolation during system initiation. The results of this testing will be available for NRC review.

HPCI Start Modification

The original design of the HPCI system allowed steam to be admitted to the turbine with the governor valves completely open. Since the

8111230286 811118
PDR ADOCK 05000271
P PDR

A046
S1/0

Mr. T. A. Ippolito
November 18, 1981
Page 2

governor valves do not start to close until the turbine is turning, the system experiences a large steam surge during startup. This modification changes the governor control system such that these valves will be partially shut when steam is admitted to the turbine. This will eliminate the large surge of steam on turbine startup, thereby eliminating the possibility of a spurious system isolation due to the associated break detection logic.

A safety evaluation of this change has been completed which concludes that there is no degradation of the safety function of any portion of the HPCI system due to this change. Because of the nature of the modification, no new Technical Specifications are necessary. Testing accomplished prior to the current plant shutdown indicated a significant improvement in system startup characteristics. Additional testing will be performed during plant startup to verify that spurious system isolation does not occur. The results of this testing will be available for NRC review.

We trust the information presented above and in Reference (b) is sufficient to enable you to complete your review. Should you have any further questions, please contact us.

Very truly yours,

VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION



R. L. Smith
Licensing Engineer

RLS:dad