

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 F L C R P 3 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 4 5
7 8 9 14 15 25 26 30 57 CAT 58

0 1 REPORT SOURCE L 6 0 5 0 - 0 3 0 2 7 1 0 2 7 8 1 8 1 1 1 0 8 1 9
7 8 60 61 68 69 74 75 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES 10

0 2 At 1030 during routine refueling operations, notification was received from the
0 3 Architect Engineer that the main steam lines supplying the turbine driven emergency
0 4 feed pump are presently categorized as High Energy Lines, but were not considered
0 5 in the 1973 FPC High Energy Line Break Outside the Containment (Helboc) Report.
0 6 This requires reporting per T.S. 6.9.1.8.i. There was no effect upon the health or
0 7 safety of the general public. This was the first event of this type.

0 8 9

0 9 SYSTEM CODE CAUSE CODE CAUSE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE COMP. SUBCODE VALVE SUBCODE
C C C 11 B 12 A 13 P I P E X X 14 C 15 Z 16
9 10 11 12 13 18 19 20

17 LEA-RO REPORT NUMBER 8 1 21 22 0 6 8 24 25 0 1 28 29 T 30 0 32
EVENT YEAR SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. OCCURRENCE CODE REPORT TYPE REVISION NO.

ACTION TAKEN FUTURE ACTION EFFECT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN MET '00 HOURS ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED NPRD-4 FORM SUB. PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
X 18 F 19 Z 20 Z 21 0 0 0 0 22 Y 23 N 24 A 25 X 9 9 9 26
33 34 35 36 37 40 41 42 43 44 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 27

1 0 This event was caused by changes in operational procedures not specifically considered
1 1 by the A/E in the Helboc Report. The creation of High Energy Lines, therefore, falls
1 2 outside the bounds of the analysis. Evaluation of the lines is in progress. Following
1 3 completion of the evaluation and procurement of material, modification (MAR 81-10-19)
1 4 will be completed during the first available outage of sufficient duration.

1 5 FACILITY STATUS % POWER OTHER STATUS 30 METHOD OF DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION 32
H 28 0 0 0 29 NA D 31 Notification from A/E
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 44 45 46 80

1 6 ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY 35 LOCATION OF RELEASE 36
Z 33 Z 34 NA NA
7 8 9 10 11 44 45 80

1 7 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION 39
0 0 0 37 Z 38 NA
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 80

1 8 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION 41
0 0 0 40 NA
7 8 9 10 11 12 80

1 9 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE DESCRIPTION 43
Z 42 NA
7 8 9 10 11 12 80

2 0 PUBLICATION ISSUED DESCRIPTION 45
N 44
7 8 9 10 80

8111200743 811110
PDR ADOCK 05000302
S PDR

NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER

PHONE: 904/795-6486

(SEE ATTACHED SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION SHEET)

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

Report No.: 50-302/81-068/01T-0
Facility: Crystal River Unit 3
Report Date: November 10, 1981
Occurrence Date: October 27, 1981
Identification of Occurrence:

Corrective measures are required to prevent operation in a manner less conservative than that assumed in the Accident Analysis in the Final Safety Analysis Report for a High Energy Line Break Outside Containment, as described in Technical Specification 6.9.1.8.1.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence:

Mode 6 refueling (0%).

Description of Occurrence:

At 1030, during routine refueling operations, notification was received from the Architect Engineer, Gilbert Associates, Inc., that the main steam lines supplying the turbine driven emergency feed pump are presently categorized as High Energy Lines, but that they were not considered as such when the FPC High Energy Line Break Outside Containment (Helboc) Report was done in 1973.

Designation of Apparent Cause:

This event was caused by changes in operational procedures not specifically considered by the Architectural Engineer in the Helboc Report. High Energy Lines were created, and, therefore fell outside the bounds of this analysis.

Analysis of Occurrence:

There was no effect upon the health or safety of the general public.

Corrective Action:

Evaluation of the lines is in progress. Following completion of the evaluation, and procurement of material, modification (MAR 81-10-19) will be completed during the first available outage of sufficient duration.

Failure Data:

This was the first event of this type.