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USNRC REGION II
ATLANTA, GEORGIA
VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY
Surry Power Station
P. O. Box 315
Surry, Virginia 23883

NOV 12 1981

NOV 17 1981

Serial No: 81-069

Docket No: 50-280/G

License Nos: DPR-32

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
Office of I & E, USNRC Region II
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Pursuant to Surry Power Station Technical Specifications, the Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits the following Licensee Event Reports for Surry

Report Number

Applicable Technical Specification

81-061/03L-0

T.S. 6.6.2.b.(2)

These reports have been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be reviewed by Safety Evaluation and Control.

Very truly yours,

J. L. Wilson
J. L. Wilson
Station Manager



Enclosures

cc: Mr. Victor Stello, Director (3)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement

Mr. Norman Haller, Director (3)
Office of Management and Program Analysis

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ATTACHMENT 1
SURREY POWER STATION, UNIT 1
DOCKET NO: 50-280
REPORT NO: 81-061/03L-0
EVENT DATE: 10/15/81

TITLE OF THE EVENT: THERMAL GROWTH OF "A" MAIN STEAM LINE

1. DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT:

On October 15, 1981, with the unit at 100% power, it was discovered during a routine walkdown that snubber 1-SHP-HSS-1B on "A" main steam line was compressed such that the end bolts of the snubber body were in contact with the clevis of the mounting bracket on the steam line. In this condition, the snubber could not have been compressed any further; therefore, it was declared inoperable. This event is contrary to Technical Specification 3.20.A and is reportable per Technical Specification 6.6.2.b.(2).

2. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF OCCURRENCE:

Snubbers are designed to prevent unrestrained pipe motion under dynamic loads such as earthquakes or severe transients, while allowing for normal thermal motion during startup or shutdown. Because snubber protection is required only during low probability events, a period of 72 hours is allowed for repairs or replacement. The affected snubber was returned to fully operable status within the allotted time and was not called upon to perform its design function; therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

3. CAUSE OF EVENT:

The cause of the event is believed to have been the result of thermal growth of the "A" main steam line.

4. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The immediate corrective action was to declare the snubber inoperable and initiate a repair via station engineering.

5. SUBSEQUENT CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The subsequent corrective action was to modify the main steam line bracket clevis by trimming the square corners of the clevis that were making contact with the snubber body. The Architect/Engineer was requested to perform a stress analysis of the affected main steam line. This analysis has shown that the steam line was not overstressed, and that no further actions are necessary.

6. ACTIONS TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:

None are required.

7. GENERIC IMPLICATIONS:

There are no generic implications.